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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to systematically study the 
interrelationships among the 
independent Lithuania during 
Antanas Smetona, 1926-1940. 
military, politics, and society in 
the authoritarian regime of President 
The military, which brought Smetona to power in a coup d'etat, 
played a leading role in politics and permeated society. In turn, the 
military became politicized and, further, was affected by societal 
vicissitudes. The problem must be addressed in order to fully 
understand socio-political dynamics in Lithuania at that crucial point 
in its political, historical, and socio-cultural development. It is 
this kind of systematic study which the academic community lacks, in 
either the English or Lithuanian languages. It is thus the aim of this 
thesis to fill the scholarly vacuum. 
The issues involved, of course, have been addressed by many 
individuals: scholars, participants, observers. However, these merely 
provide pieces of a grand puzzle which no one has yet constructed. The 
problems with these pieces are as follows: 
1) They are often quite small, sometimes just a few sentences in 
a book or article, which are minimally comprehensible when not viewed in 
the general context of events. 
2) Bias takes two forms. 
2 
FIGURE 1.1: MAP OF THE BALTIC AREA 
Source: John Alexander Swettenham. The Tragedy of the Baltic States: A 
Report Compiled From Official Documents and Eyewitnesses' Reports (New 
York: Praege:r, 1954), faces title page. 
3 
A) Memoirs, biographies and historical accounts are often 
written by participants or other individuals who maintain an interest in 
seeing that information is presented in a light favorable to themselves 
or their faction. 
B) Some accounts of Lithuanian affairs during the period 
of independence are written by Soviet scholars who paint a fascist 
portrait of the country in order to discredit the regime, the indivi-
duals involved, and help legitimize Soviet occupation. 
These factors create obstacles which obscure objectivity. 
Objectivity can be created, however, by piecing many of these diverse --
and sometimes contradictory -- pieces together. Research to date has 
demonstrated that truthful accounts can be synthesized when critically 
examining large quantities of data. 
The sources utilized are books, articles, biographies and 
memoirs, and documents. Because data is scattered in small quantities, 
a broad base had to be established and the sources carefully studied. 
This is reflected in the notes. Some of them contain a number of 
citations. This is because scattered information is distilled from many 
sources. If each source were cited individually, some passages would 
contain a note for every sentence. 
It was decided that the scope of the thesis would be limited to 
the military per se. The National Guard, a civilian militia, and other 
parallel and auxiliary organizations are mentioned throughout the course 
of the study, but are not treated separately. The thesis would become 
unwieldly should they be included. They are best left to a separate, or 
4 
broader, work. 1 Nevertheless, the thesis should be able to stand on its 
own as a self-contained entity. The events of 1926-1940 should be 
understandable without an extensive knowledge of Lithuanian politics and 
history preceding or following that period. It would serve no purpose 
to produce another general summary of Lithuanian history, such as are 
found at the beginning of most monographs. Instead, those with interest 
in the topic are encouraged to consult Appendix A, which is reproduced 
from another work and summarizes pre-coup events in Lithuania. 
While the bulk of the thesis serves as an interpret! ve case 
study, it commences with general propositions of civil-military 
relations and their adaption to Lithuania. It is this subject which the 
following chapter addresses. 
1cf. bibliography for sources on the National Guard. 
CHAPTER II 
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
A. HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW 
Though the systematic scholarly study of civil-military 
relations is relatively new, the matter has been the topic of discourse 
and writing for centuries. For example, in the Republic, Plato writes 
much of civil-military relationships and politico-military affairs. He 
also discusses at length the utilization of military education to serve 
and guard the state. 1 In one passage, Socrates says to Glaucon: 
If a man appears hard to bewitch and graceful in everything, a good 
guardian of himself and the music he was learning, proving himself to 
possess rhythm and harmony on all these occasions -- such a man would 
certainly be most useful to himself and the city. And the one who on 
each occasion, among the children and youths and among the men, is 
tested and comes through untainted, must be appointed ruler of the 
city and guardian; and he must be given honors, both while living and 
when dead, and must be allotted the greatest prizes in burial and the 
other memorials. And the man who's not of this sort must be 
rejected. 2 
Chapter five of Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire is 
entitled "The Growth of Military Autocracy and the Influx of 
Orientalism: The Sale of the Empire by the Praetorians. The Rise of 
Septimi us Severus." It deals with the period 1 93-197 A. D. 3 Some 
-----------------1see especially Plato, The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom 
(New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 91 [412c] - 102 [424d]. 
2Plato, p. 93 [413e -414a]. 
3see Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 
abridgement by D.M. Low (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1960), pp. 
56-62. 
5 
6 
excerpts from this chapter follow: 
The Praetorian bands • • • licentious fury was the first symptom ot 
the decline of the Roman empire •••• They derived their institution 
from Augustus. That crafty tyrant, sensible that laws might colour, 
but that arms alone could maintain, his usurped dominion, had gra-
dually formed this powerful body of guards, in constant readiness to 
protect his person, to awe the senate, and either to prevent or to 
crush the first motions of rebellion. He distingui!hed these fa-
voured troops by a double pay and superior privileges. 
By thus introducing the Praetorian guards as it were into the palace 
and the senate, the emporers taught them to perceive their own 
strength, and the weakness of the civil government; to view the vices 
of their masters with familiar contempt. • • • The firmest and best-
established princes were obliged to mix blandishments with commands, 
rewards with punishments, to flatter their pride, indulge their 
pleasures, connive at their irregularities, and to purchase their 
precarious faith by a liberal donnative. • • • Their consent was 
essentially necessary in the appointment of an emporer. • • • The 
fierce Praetorians increased their weight by throwin~ like the 
barbarian conqueror of Rome, their swords into the scale. 
An analogy to the Lithuanian coup· of 1926, discussed in the following 
chapter, may also be drawn from Gibbon: 
The senate was commanded to assemble. • • • After Julian had filled 
the senate-house with armed soldiers, he expatiated on the freedom of 
his election, his own eminent virtues, and his full assurance of the 
affections of the senate. • •• Yet it was observed that, after the 
crowd of flatterers dispersed, and left him to darkness, solitude, 
and terrible reflection, he passed a sleepless night; revolving most 
probably in his mind his own rash folly, the fate of his virtuous 
predecessor, and the doubtful, and dangerous tenure of an empire 
which had not been acquired by merit, but purchased by money. He had 
. ·. reason to tremble. On the throne of6 the world he found himself 
··without a friend, and even an adherent. 
Machiavelli, who claimed that "where there are good arms there 
-----------------4Gibbon, p. 56. 
5Gibbon, p. 57. Gibbon's emphasis. 
6Gibbon, pp. 58-59. 
7 
are bound to be good laws," 7 devoted section fourteen of The Prince to 
the "military duties of the prince." There, among other things, tte 
writes: 
A prince • • • should have no other object, no other thought, no 
other subject of study, than war, its rules and disciplines •••• A 
prince who knows riothing of warfare • e . can't hope for respect from 
his soldiers or put any trust in them. 
Laying the foundation for a perspective which would be 
capitalized on by the communist successors and critics of the Smetana 
regime, Lenin wrote: 
The centralized state power that is peculiar to bourgeoise society 
came into being in the period of the fall of absolutism. Two 
institutions are most characteristic of this state machine: the 
bureaucracy and the standing army. In their works, Marx and Engels 
repeatedly show that it is the bourgeoisie with whom these 
institutions are connected by thousands of threads. The 
bureaucracy and the standing army are a "parasite" on the body of 
bourgeois society -- a parasite created by the internal antagonisms 
which rend that society, but still a parasite, "choking" all its 
vital pores. In particular, it is precisely the petty 
bourgeoisie that is attracted to.the side of the big bourgeoisie and 
is subordinated to it to a large extent by means of this apparatus, 
which provides the upper strata of the peasantry, small artisans, 
tradesmen and the like with comparatively comfortable~ quiet and 
respectable jobs, raising their holders above the people. 
Iskenderov also quotes Lenin with regard to military intervention in the 
political realm: "'The army cannot be, never was, and never will be 
neutral. '" 1 O 
-----------------7Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. and ed. Robert M. Adams 
(New York: Norton, 1977), chap XII, p. 35. 
8Machiavelli, chap. XIV, p. 42. 
9Vladimir Lenin, "State and Revolution: The Marxist Teaching on 
the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution," in 
Essential Works of Marxism, ed. Arthur P. Mendel (New York: Bantam, 
1979), pp. 122-123. Lenin's emphasis. 
8 
Modern events demonstrate the intertwining of politics and the 
military. President George Washington personally conmanded troops in 
the field during the Whiskey Rebellion. During the American Civil War, 
Abraham Lincoln was, for all practical purposes, military dictator or 
the Union. He consulted with senior officers and decided military 
actions. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) of the People's Republic of 
China is an excellent example of a politicized military establishment. 
Since internal and external security issues are vitally important to 
China, the PLA is very much involved in policy debates. 11 
B. THE MILITARY MIND: CONSERVATIVE REALISM 
In order to more fully comprehend civil-military relations, it 
is necessary to delve into the military mind. It is often characterized 
as having a perspective of conservative realism, which arises from 
pessimistic Hobbesian philosophy regarding human nature. In capsule 
form, Hobbesian conservative realism dictates that people are in 
constant conflict -- a conflict found in contemporary domestic and 
international relations. Because man is naturally selfish, the 
Leviathan must establish order from aboye, by coercion, if necessary. 
Swords cannot be beaten into ploughshares. 12 
10A. Iskenderov, 11 The Army, Poli tics, and the People," in The 
Military and Modernization, ed. Henry Bienen (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 
1971), p. 150. . 
11 James R. Townsend, Politics in China, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1980), pp. 91-92. See Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and 
Coercion in the Developing Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1977), pp. 151-182 for the importance of the military in 
contemporary developing nations. 
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Hobbesian natural equality results in diffidence and desire for 
the same object by many men. This inevitably leads to conflict and 
war. Because all men are equal, a power must be created which can 
overawe all into submission. 13 "During the time men 1i ve without a 
common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which 
is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man." 14 
Needless to say, war precludes all else, such as industry, art, and 
productivity. In order to remedy this situation, Hobbes concludes: 
Considering what value men are naturally apt to set upon themselves, 
what respect they look for from others, and how little they value 
other men - from whence continually arise among them emulation, 
quarrels, factions, and at last war, to the destroying of one another 
and diminution of their strength against a common enemy - it is 
necessary that there be laws of honor and a public rate of the worth 
of such men as have deserved or are able to deserve well of the 
commonwealth, and that there be force in the hands of some or other 
to put those laws in execution. 15 
The implications for authority, power, and coercion are obvious. Hobbes 
cannot envision a society which is able to peacefully exist and 
simultaneously be founded upon orderly, procedural consensus and 
compromise. Also obvious is the sanctioning of authoritarian systems, 
which are preferable to debilitating socio-political conflict: 
"Sovereign power not so hurtful as the want of it, and the hurt proceeds 
-----------------12sam C. Sarkesian, lecture, Department of Political Science, 
Loyola University of Chicago, 11 November 1981. 
13Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Indianapolis: Library of Liberal 
Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, 1980), part I, chap. 13, pp. 105-106. 
14Hobbes, part I, chap. 13, p. 106. 
15Hobbes, part II, chap. 18, p. 149. 
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for the greatest part from not submitting readily to a less." 16 
With this assumption in mind, the professional military man is 
suspicious of political activity, finding self-serving elements in 
bargaining, negotiation, consensus-building, and compromise. Order and 
stability, instead, are the highest priorities for the military man. He 
equates these qualities with the effectiveness of any given political• 
order. What he views as bickering, graft, and corruption give way to an 
engineering approach, emphasizing discipline, skill, loyalty, and 
obedience. 17 C. Wright Mills states the case in the following fashion: 
Inside their often trim bureaucracy, where everything seems under 
neat control, army officers have felt that "politics" is a dirty, 
uncertain, and ungentlemanly kind of game; and in terms of their 
status code, they have often felt that ,%oliticians were unqualified 
creatures inhabiting an uncertain world. 
Civilian standards are .inferior to military order, respect for 
authority, patriotism, duty, and self-sacrifice. Taken to its extreme, 
human nature is not perfectible and violence is thus inevitable: 
"Violence is the final arbiter of human relations. 111 9 
Huntington offers a succinct summary of the conservatively 
realistic military mind: 
The military ethic emphasizes the 
weakness, and evil in human nature. 
permanence, irrationality, 
It stresses the supremacy of 
16Hobbes, part II, chap. 18, p. 151. 
17sarkesian, lecture, 11 November 1981. 
18c. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1980), p.174. 
19Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: 
Political Portrait (New York: -'Free Press, 1971), p. 21i2. 
A Social and 
Also 248-249. 
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society .over the individual and the importance of order,. hierarchy, 
and di vision of function. It stresses the continuity and value of 
history. rt accepts the nation state as the highest form of 
political organization and :recognizes the continuing likelihood of 
wars among nation states. It emphasizes the importance of power in 
international :relations and warns of the dangers to state security. 
It holds that the security of the state depends upon the creation and 
maintenance of strong military forces. It urges the limitation of 
state action to the direct interests of the state, the restriction of 
extensive commitments, and the undesirability of bellicose or 
adventurous policies. It holds that war is the instrument of 
politics, that the military are the servants of the statesman, and 
that civilian control is essential of military professionalism. It 
exalts obedience as the highest virtue of military men. The military 
ethic is thus pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, 
power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and 
instrumentalist in its view of the military profession. It is, in 
brief, realistic and conse:rvative. 20 
C. THE MILITARY PROFESSION 
How does this philosophical perspective translate into 
reality? One finds the answer in military characteristics and 
professionalism. Sarkesian lists six general characteristics of the 
military. The first is bureaucracy. The military is governed by 
standard operating procedures, regular relationships, and possesses 
autonomy regarding internal matters such as promotions. The second is 
hierarchy. There is a table of organization founded upon a top-down 
system of authority. Third is the profession. The military serves 
society regardless of financial reward. It is a total social system 
demanding expertise and constant education. Fourth, the sole client of 
the military is the state, with the former subordinate to the latter. 
20sa~uel P. Hunti,ngton, The Soldier and the State: The Theory 
and Politics of Civil-~!litary Relations (New York: Vintage, 1957), p. 
79. 
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Fifth, military professionalism holds a member to ultimate liability, 
that is, the possibility of giving one's life while serving for the sole 
client. Finally, absolute institutional and professional loyalty takes 
precedence over the individua1. 21 
Huntington categorizes military professionalism in slightly 
different fashion, though with the same basic ideas. First is 
expertise. The military professional possesses specialized knowledge 
and skills from prolonged education and experience. He is an expert in 
what Harold Laswell terms the "management of violence." This is .further 
subdivided into the contemporary land, sea, or air specialist. To 
remain a specialist, constant drill and practice are necessary. 
Finally, military expertise is universal; all professionals are alike 
regardless of the particular state they serve. 
Second in the Huntington typology is military responsibility 
within a social context. The client of a professional in any field is 
society; his services are essential to its existence. Social 
responsibility -- the maintenance of military security in this case --
distinguishes professionals from those with mere intellectual skills. 
Strictly speaking, the professional must be devoted to what he is doing 
21 sarkesian, lecture, 9 November 1981. For a short discussion 
of military professionalism see Amos A. Jordan, Jr., "Officer 
Education," in ~~_?Okr of Military Institutions, ed. Roger W. Little-
(Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1971), pp. 211-213. A longer discussion is 
found in Jacques van Doorn, The Soldier and Social Change (Beverly 
Hills, CA: Sage, 1975), pp. 29-41>. Teitler devotes an entire book to 
the origins of professionalism. He writes that instrumental armed 
conflict since the seventeenth century forced the establishment of a 
professional officer corps. See G. Teitler, The Genesis of the 
Professional Officers' C9rp~ (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977), pp. 3-5. 
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and not performing solely for material gain. Further, the state 
regulates and monopolizes the military profession to assure that its 
power is utilized solely for socially approved purposes. This sense of 
social obligation and responsibility is based, finally, on long-standing 
custom and tradition. 
The third characteristic of military professionalism according 
to Huntington is corporateness. In addition to the sense of organic 
unity among military professionals, there is also a consciousness of 
being separate from society. The profession itself applies and enforces 
standards to insure status and distinction from the layman. The 
commission is to an officer what a medical license is to a physician. 
Rank, which brings appropriate privileges, functions, and duties, is 
determined by one's peers. "Entrance into this unit is restricted to 
those with the requisite education and training and is usually permitted 
only at the lowest level of professional competence."22 
In sum, the military professional is unlike the warrior of 
previous ages, for whom military activity was a part-time undertaking, a 
hobby, or a mercenary service for booty. The military professional, the 
officer, must today be compared with the physician and the attorney. He 
is not an amateur practicing a trade or craft, but possesses a "higher 
calling."23 
22Huntington, p. 16. See pp. 8-18 for the full treatment of 
this tripartite typology. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 220 
discusses brotherhood and the military community. 
23Huntington pp. 7-8. 
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D. THE MILITARY AND POLITICS 
The military professional, though, does not exist unto himself, 
but must relate with his client, that is, the state and its 
politicians. Inevitably, the question of properly relating politics 
with military professionalism arises. The Western tradition holds that 
civil authority is superior to that of the military. The military, 
according to theory, obeys and serves the state without question, 
regardless of its changing political makeup: 
The effectiveness of civilian political control over the military is 
dependent only to a small extent upon the political beliefs held by 
the military profession. Yet, a democratic political system assumes 
that its military officers are positively committed to, if not 
enthusiasti~4 about, the merits of civilian supremacy and civilian leadership. 
As discussed above, though, the tension between the civilian and 
military minds can render this balancing act difficult. 
Huntington attempts to address this tension. He first 
recognizes the crux of the problem of civil-military relations when 
describing the conflict between two imperatives faced by the military. 
The first is the functional imperative, which deals with external 
threats to the state. The second is the societal imperative, which 
arises from social forces, ideologies, and domestic institutions. In 
other words, while attempting to carry out its primary duties of 
protecting the state and the citizenry, the military must also deal with 
the context from which it emerges and within which it must serve. There 
is a constant battle for attention which each imperative demands of the 
24Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 253. 
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military professional. Further, adjustment and balance between them is 
not automatic and inevitable; here a fine line must be tread. For 
example, if the societal imperative consumes a disproportionate amount 
of the military's resources and time, it is less capable of the 
functional imperative, leaving the state more vulnerable to external 
attack. 25 The officer corps is central to this dichotomy: 
The principal focus of civil-military relations is the relation of 
the officer corps to the state. Here the conflict between functional 
and societal pressures comes to a head. The officer corps is the 
active directing element of the military structure and is responsible 
for the military security of society. The state is the active 
directing element of society and is responsible for the allocation of 
resources among important values including military security. The 
social and economic relations between the military and the rest of 
society normally refl.Bct the political relations between the officer 
corps and the state.26 
Huntington discovers the solution in "objective civilian control," which 
maximizes military professionalism. Subjective civilian control 
ci vilianizes the military and injects social and political elements, 
rendering it less professional. Civil control is merely of instrumental 
value to civilian groups, and no independent military sphere exists. 
Objective civilian control, on the other hand, demands an autonomous 
military profession. The military is "militarized" and becomes a tool 
of the state. There is no military participation in politics; the 
military is politically neutral and sterile. It obeys any legitimate 
civilian governing group. In sum, low military political power and high 
military professional power insure both civil authority and military 
25Huntington, p. 2. 
26Huntington, p. 3. 
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security. 27 This, however, does not solve the civil-military dichotomy 
once and for all, for fundamental tensions will always exist and must 
constantly be managed: 
The professional man who pursues the values of professional 
competence and obedience and the political man who pursues power as 
an end in itself are two distinct types. Yet elements of both exist 
in most human beings and in every group. The tension between the 
two, consequently, can never be rem§ved; it can only be ordered so as 
to make it more or less endurable. 2 
Janowitz does not make distinctions as neatly as Huntington: 
According to the definitions of military honor, the professional 
soldier is "above politics" in domestic affairs. In an authoritarian 
society -- monarchical or totalitarian -- to be above politics means 
that the officer is committed to the status quo. Under democratic 
theory, the "above politics" formula requires that, in domestic 
politics, generals and.admirals do not attach themselves to political 
parties or overtly display partisanship. Furthermore, military men 
are civil servants, so that elected leaders are assured of the 
military's partisan neutrality. 29 
For Janowitz, to be "above politics" does not necessarily mean being 
non-political. Indeed an officer need not politically agree with his 
civilian superiors,· though he must execute military-related 
directives. The political beliefs of any military establishment are 
long-term phenomena arising from socio-pol! tical factors, recruitment, 
27Huntington, pp. 80-85. 
28Huntington, p. 95. 
29Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 233. Huntington tends 
to deal with the icfeal, that is, two separate civil and military 
spheres. Janowitz, on the other hand, appears to take a more 
sociological "is" approach, which recognizes the need for civilian 
control while simultaneously contending that the two spheres must share 
fundamental views. The officer corps must reflect society, including 
politically. I am indebted to Dr. John Allen Williams of Loyola 
University of Chicago for this distinction. 
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and education. It would be unrealistic to expect an apolitical officer 
corps, recognizing that "for all professional officers, there is a 
special gap between private and expressed beliefs.30 
E. THE MILITARY INTERVENES 
Yet, experience dictates that the military has on countless 
I 
occasions become actively involved in politics, assuming various roles 
as political governors and actors. There is, of course, a moral barrier 
against usurpation where a long tradition of civil supremacy exists, 
though no civilian group can hope to match the cohesion, size, and arms 
of the military should it choose to intervene.31 This is especially 
true in non-Western and/or developing systems where the boundaries of 
military and society have yet to be concretized: 
Military might is likely to be a decisive factor in politics in a J 
society where there are no crystallized and universally accepted 
beliefs about the legitimacy of power: where there are doubts and 
disagreements about who should occ®y the positions of command and 
what orders he is entitled to give.32 
In such a context, the military is still developing its own professional 
dimensions and attitudes toward politics. Further, where there is less 
institutionalization in general, authority is less apt to be accepted as 
30Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 235. Sam S. Sarkesian 
echoes the belief that the military is never apolitical. The Western 
tradition claims that apolitical equals professional. For Sarkesian, 
non-partisan equals professional. Lectures, autumn 1983. 
31Eric A. Nordlinger, So~~~ in Politics: Military Coups and 
Governments (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 93-94. 
32stanislav Andreski, Military Organizatiol!__and Society, 2nd 
rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 105-106. 
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legitimate. 33 
Military intervention usually occurs during a political crisis, 
such as perceived failure in governmental performance regarding the 
management of internal disorder. This loss of legitimacy is perhaps the 
reason most intervention occurs. Disgruntled officers find their excuse 
here. The defense and enhancement of military corporate interests may 
also be a factor. Intense domestic disturbances inevitably spill over 
into the military and politicize it, especially if it is utilized as a 
para-police force to maintain law and order. After some time of such 
activity, the military may assume that since it possesses the power to 
prop up an ailing regime, it also possesses the power to alter it. In 
developing systems, the prestige and functioning of the state are linked 
to that of the military. If these factors are low vis-a-vis the civil 
government, the military has an interest in taking corrective action. 
Since the military represents the power, sovereignty, and honor of the 
nation, the attitude may be that what is good for the military is good 
for the country.34 
Now that the military has intervened, a variable period of 
praetorianism is initiated. Nordlinger defines praetorianism as "a 
33sarkesian, lectures, 13, 16 November 1981. 
34These thoughts are distilled from Crane Brinton, The Anato~ 
of Revolution, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: Vintage, 1965), p. 3; 
Nordlinger pp. 63-66; Monte Palmer, Dilemmas of Political Develop_ment: 
_An Introduction to the Poli tics of the Developing Areas, 2nd ed. 
(Itasca, IL: Peacock, 1980), pp. 216-217; Amos Perlmutter, Modern 
Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 54-55; Sarkesian, lectures, autumn 
1981, 1983. 
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situation in which military officers are major or predominant political 
actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force."35 He goes 
on to posit three levels of military intervention, which are found in 
Table 2. 1: 
TABLE 2.1: THE LEVELS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION 
Extent of power 
Political and economic 
objectives 
Moderators 
Veto group 
Preserve 
status quo 
Source: Nordlinger, p. 22. 
Guardians 
Governmental 
control 
Preserve 
status quo 
and/or 
correct 
malpractices 
and 
deficiencies 
Rulers 
Regime 
dominance 
Effect political 
change and sometimes 
socioeconomic 
change 
The military finds at least three basic methods for controlling 
political events. After the initial shock of intervention, the easiest 
level of rule is the first, that of being a moderating veto group 
without dealing with day-to-day administrative and political matters. 
Guardians and rulers, on the other hand, are the "men in mufti" who take 
an activist political stance. In all cases, though, Nordlinger holds 
that competitive and meaningful participatory structures are 
eliminated. 36 
35Nordlinger, p. 2. 
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Perlmutter takes an especially dim view of military intervention 
and its concomitant authoritarianism, on both practical and 
philosophical planes: 
The symbiotic, conflictual, and cooperative relationship between 
civilian and military elites clearly typifies the era of the central 
state, the ·grand organization, the hegemonic party, the 
interventionist military, all of which operate at the ex~ense of the 
society, the individual; and genuine political pluralism. 7 
Others assume a mixed stance with regard to intervention. Sarkesian 
claims that the impact of military rule in the short-run is 
advantageous, bringing with it law and order, stability, security, and a 
respite .from debilitating confrontation. Indeed, the military may set 
the preconditions for the establishment or return of democracy. 
However, in the long-run, political issues cannot be managed with 
military means. The military mind, as discussed above, is not 
compatible with the polttical arena. Further, because it must operate 
within the same environment, the military often performs no better or 
worse than its civilian predecessors. If the military must remain 
central to politics -- by its own judgement or that of others -- it is 
best to rule .for approximately two years, then return to the barracks 
and act as a veto group. If it remains any longer it becomes embroiled 
in the same problems which beset its predecessors -- and led to their 
downfall at the hands of the very people now under domestic political 
attack.38 
36Nordlinger, p. 7. 
37Perlmutter, p. 62. 
38sarkesian, lectures, autumn 1981, 1983. 
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F. PROPOSITIONS VIS-A-VIS LITHUANIA 
In any field, theory is supposed to transcend spatio-temporal 
parameters. Keeping in mind the above discussion, it is now necessary 
to turn to civil-military relations in Lithuania under President Antanas 
Smetona. While details differ from case study to case study, there is 
often a good deal of similarity among them regarding theoretical 
underpinnings and general propositions. The case dealt with here is no 
different. It is possible to view Lithuania not merely in itself, but 
in terms of its relationship to theory and other contexts. This can be 
seen in the succeeding chapters, for example, especially in the sections 
dealing with politico-military affairs and political socialization. 
Arend Lijphart writes that there are six types of case studies 
in the subdiscipline of comparative politics: atheoretical, 
interpretive, hypothesis-generating, theory-confirming, theory-
infirming, and deviant.39 This particular study may best be classified 
as interpretive. Such case studies display primary interest in the 
case, utilizing established theoretical propositions. They do not 
strive to formulate general theory: "In these studies, a generalization 
is applied to a specific case with the aim of throwing light on the case 
rather than of improving the generalization in any way. Hence they are 
studies in 'applied science. rn40 While far from perfect, it is at least· 
---------~-------
39Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative 
Method," American P~11t;,.~1-~cience Review, 65 (September 1971), 
691-693. 
40Lijphart, p. 692. 
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hoped that some light may be shed on the often tense relationship 
between politics and the military in Smetona's Lithuania. 41 
The reader must be cautioned not to apply Western liberal 
standards to interwar East-Central Europe. The region had never had 
such a tradition, be it political, social, or economic. It should not 
be expected, therefore, that the military accept civilian superiority as 
i 
it exists in the contemporary West. The new post-Versailles nations of 
that area were still developing relationships and borders among its 
various institutions. In this sense, the military did not really 
comprehend what its role should be vis-a-vis politics. It often 
overstepped its proper boundaries according to Western standards, thus 
assisting the growth of authoritarian regimes. 
several examples of this phenomenon. 42 
Lithuania is one of 
It should also be stressed, though, that interwar Lithuania was 
not a developing system, as that term is used in contemporary scholarly 
discourse. While it was a reconstituted nation, carved out of the 
defunct czarist empire, it possessed attributes which distinguish it 
41 Case studies of all six types abound in the field of civil-
mili tary relations. One comparative study which is perhaps best 
described as a cross between interpretive and hypothesis-generating is 
Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Toward 
a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems, 11 
American Political Sciep_sie Review, 76, 4 (December 1982), 778-789. 
42Perlmutter, p. 51 and Sarkesian, lecture, 6 November 1981 
discuss the fundamental linkage between the modern authoritarian state 
and the military. When the Lithuanian coup occured in December 1926, 
many Lithuanian-Americans who had supported the new state morally and 
materially became disenchanted. This was an example of Western liberal 
standards of military conduct being applied to a non-Western, non-
liberal context. 
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from today's sub-Saharan nations, for example. There was an intense 
feeling of nationalism which found its roots in the Lithuanian kingdom 
of the thirteenth century, and which had been growing since the latter 
half of the nineteenth centry during the Lithuanian national 
renaissance. While possessing ethnic and religious minorities, there 
were no major cleavages to be found as arise from the haphazardly drawn 
boundaries of the old colonial empires. There was also a developed 
infrastructure and educational system, which continued growth and 
refinement during the independence era. ,While primarily an agrarian 
country, Lithuania was nevertheless able to export agricultural goods 
and develop light industry. Thus while not a fully developed liberal 
Western system, Lithuania leaned further toward that pole than toward 
contemporary developing systems. The behavior of the Lithuanian 
military, however, did in some respects resemble that found in those 
systems today. 
Civil-military relations in independent Lithuania must not be 
studied merely from a domestic perspective. There were legitimate 
external factors requiring the military to be in .the forefront of public 
affairs. The country was located at a crucial and vulnerable juncture 
of Eastern Eur~pe. There. were dangers from tb~ Soviet Union, Germany, 
and Poland. As such, national security was very much on the minds of 
politicians and citizens alike. 
What also brought the military into public affairs was the 
juxtaposition of· the professional ·military mind. and ·the volatile 
political situation of 1926, both prior to and following the elections 
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of the third Seimas on 8-10 May. As the following chapter explains, the 
elections were polarizing in that the new Social Democratic-Peasant 
Populist coalition began instituting democratic reforms after six years 
of conservative Christian Democratic rule and a bitter campaign. Many 
perceived these moves to the "left" as politically and socially 
debilitating. Violent clashes occured. Lithuania, which did not have a 
democratic tradition, simply could not adapt to the sudden political 
change. New civil liberties were quickly taken advantage of by radical 
elements. It was obvious to many -- including army officers -- that the 
consensus and compromise needed for a successful democracy necessarily 
led to degeneration and disorder. The coup of 17 December 1926, 
sponsored and encouraged by the minority Nationalist Association, was an 
attempt at creating a Lithuanian Leviathan to restore order in 
accordance with norms of the military mind. Hobbesian conservative 
realism was the philosophy of the Lithuanian officer corps -- as it is, 
to a greater or lesser extent, that of any corps. 
Huntington posited two imperatives, functional and societal, in 
describing the tension between purely external military matters and the 
socio-economic-pol! ti cal context. This same tension was present in 
Lithuania during the Smetona regime and immediately preceding it, that 
is, the unstable seven month tenure of the Grinius-Slezevicius 
administration and the third Seimas. This, too, is the arena where the 
politicization of the military is easiest. Huntington recommended 
objective civilian control as a remedy. However, such military 
neutrality and sterility vis-a-vis politics did not exist under Smetona, 
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though Commander-in-Chief General Stasys Rastikis would make efforts to 
achieve such conditions. De facto, even if it would have supposedly 
been neutral, the Lithuanian army was a prop to the status quo as long 
as Smetona ruled, for he initially assumed power through extra-
constitutional means. 43 
The behavior of the Lithuanian officer corps did not even meet 
the standards of non-partisanship as set forth by Janowitz. As will be 
discussed in this study, different officers supported different 
political leaders and their respective factions: 
The army, commanded by veterans of the war of independence, 
represented, in a sense, the repository of Lithuanian nationalism, 
and was thus the natural sponsor of an administration whose first 
watchword was the defense of the national cause abroad, particularly 
against Poland, and at home, against Communism, national minorities, 
and any government whose "weakness" might expose the country to 
external dangers. At the same time, the army was not of one mind in 
the actual policies to be followed. The older officers, trained in 
the Russian Imperial Army, tended to be more conservative and 
cautious in the pursuit of these general aims, while a younger group, 
which rallied around · Voldemaras, • wa.s more openly anti-Polish and 
anti-minority, and more in favor of the institutions of Fascism as 
the best framework for the national mission of the state. The former 
group in general concurred with the policies of the Smetona 
government; the latter found those policies too cautious and more 
than once • • at tempted to overthrow it. Smetona, therefore, 
enjoye~4 important, but not unanimous support from the military group. 
This politicization and polarization of the officer corps reflects 
general politico-military tendencies in authoritarian contexts. While 
43cf. Janowitz above. 
44Benedict V. Maciuika, ed., Lithuania in the Last 30 Years, 
Subcontractor's monograph prepared in the Division of the Social 
Sciences at the University of Chicago. HRAF Subcontract HRAF-1 Chi-1 
(New Haven, CT: Human Relations Area Files, 1955), p. 58. 
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Palmer here writes of developing areas, the same holds true for 
Smetona's·Lithuania: 
Given the. winner-ta.ke-all nature of political conflict , 
distrust between diverse ideological and parochial factions within 
the military often generates the very real fear that successful 
political intervention by one faction will result in efforts to 
eliminate the major competing factions. Counte4~oups, therefore, 
often are perceived in terms of self-preservation. 
In the period 1927-1940, opponents of the Smetona regime, often backed 
by the appropriate faction within the officer corps, attempted thirteen 
revolts. The 1926 coup, thus, did not solve the problems of partisan 
politics which it had set out to eliminate. 
exacerbated them. 46 
Indeed it may have 
On the other hand, Smetona stayed in power partially due to the 
military' s support. This reflects other politico-military tendencies. 
One scholar writes that the military in authoritarian systems sees to it 
that interelite struggles remain within the boundaries of the ruling 
party. It does not usually intervene against the party, but supports a 
particular faction in the internal power struggle. Indeed without the 
military or with a neutral military, an opposing faction may refuse to 
surrender, leading to debilitating -- possible bloody -- results. 
Military intervention is thus less of a threat to the ruling elite than 
from civilian political challenges. 47 When studying post-coup political 
45Palmer, p. 215. 
46cf. Nordlinger, p. 209 where he writes of the confidence the 
opposition possesses in carrying out countercoups. 
47Perlmutter, pp. 52, 56. 
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dynamics, it is possible to discern two primary factions within the 
ruling Nationalist Association: the Smetona supporters and those 
following the right-wing radical Professor Augustinas Voldemaras. As 
will be discussed in chapter four, Vol~emaras' faction made several 
attempts to depose, or at least weaken, Smetona; ~his to pave the way 
for Voldemaras' return to power a return which would never 
materialize. This faction was relatively small, for most officers 
eventually accepted Smetona's more stable and moderate course in 
domestic and foreign affairs. 
Extreme politicization of the military may lead to its 
intervention in the political arena. As was discussed above, this most 
likely occurs during a period of extreme political crisis when domestic 
disturbances spill over into the military. Such a crisis occured during 
the Grinius-Slezevicius administration discussed in the following 
chapter. This short-lived political leadership failed in dealing with 
disorder created by radical elements, especially the communists, and 
alienated a substantial segment of the officer corps by threatening 
budget and personnel cuts, along with actual discharges of officers 
deemed imcompetent. The administration thus set the stage for its own 
downfall in a highly charged atmosphere. Domestic disorder and the 
threat to corporate interests, coupled with encouragement from the 
Nationalists, spurred some officers to act against the government. The 
perceived loss of governmental legitimacy in the eyes of the public was 
the rationale for that action.48 
The coup, regardless of detail, resembled a standard coup. The 
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Kaunas garrison carried it out rather easily since it was a concentrated 
force. Provincial uni ts were powerless to act since their commanding 
officers were interned in the capital during President Grinius' birthday 
festivities. The lightning speed with which the conspirators carried 
out their plans prevented a civil war. A civil war was also averted 
perhaps because the population breathed a sigh of relief at the change 
and the perceived turn toward stability and order. 
The Lithuanian army, however, did not rule. The following day 
power was turned over to Smetona, who was installed as president at a 
rump session of the Seimas on 19 December. Succeeding events render it 
difficult to classify the military's role in politics. Just as it is 
difficult to describe Smetona 's regime utilizing standard nomenclature 
in chapter four, the same holds true for the military. It did not 
appear to be even a moderating veto group, to use Nordlinger's taxonomy, 
though it did experience divisiveness and political difficulties 
associated with the politico-military duties described in chapter 
five. Yet, it appears that the army was not acting on its own here, but 
on orders of the civilian leadership, seeking to maintain order through 
the district military command system. The military was thus a tool of 
the government, not vice versa, though the tensions are obvious 
throughout the study. There were still challenges, even from the most 
senior officers. For example, General Stasys Rastikis, commander-in-
chief of the army 1935-1940, is described as both a force for 
48cf. Nordlinger, pp. 63-66. 
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authoritarianism and democracy in chapter seven. 
One thread which runs throughout this study is the tension and 
ambivalence among the politicians, the military, and the president who 
was head of both. Perhaps the only factor which guaranteed the relative 
obedience and trustworthiness of the military, along with civil rule, 
was the allegiance to both the person and office of the commander-in-
ohief, President Antanas Smetona. As Janowitz writes, "this image of 
personalized allegiance helps to make military honor compatible with 
civilian supremacy." 49 
The following chapter deals with the rise of this focus of 
allegiance. 
-----------------49 Janowitz, The frofessional:__Soldier, P.• 220. 
CHAPTER III 
SMETONA ASSUMES POWER 
A. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GRINIUS ADMINISTRATION 
In order to fully understand civil-military relations during the 
regime of President Antanas Smetona, it is necessary to begin with the 
coup d'etat of 17 December 1926, in which the military dramatically 
entered the sphere of politics for the first time. In the spring of 
1926, elections for the third Seimas were held. They were, to say the 
least, divisive. Many write that the elections were conducted outside 
the bounds of decency as factions smeared and libeled each other, with 
the result of sharply polarizing Lithuanian society along political and 
class lines. The results of the voting are found in Table 3.1. 
As had been the case throughout the period of independence, the 
Nationalists were not recipients of a significant number of votes. 
Further, no party had an absolute majority. However, the Peasant, 
. 
Populists and Social Democrats had previously agreed to a coalition 
should circumstances permit. This was exactly what was done as Peasant 
Populist Kazys Grinius, a medical doctor, former prime minister, and 
long-time political activist, was elected president by the Seimas, 
replacing Christian Democrat Aleksandras Stulginskis after six years of 
rule. Grini us, in turn, selected Peasant Populist Mykolas Slezevicius, 
an attorney, to form a cabinet. 
The new cabinet, headed by the Populist leader Mykolas Slezevicius, 
an energetic and idealistic stalwart of Lithuanian politics, who had 
30 
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TABLE 3.1: THE THIRD SEIMAS OF LITHUANIA MAY 1926-APRIL 1927 
Faction Number of seats Percentage of vote 
Christ.tan Democratic 14 16.4 
Farmers Association 11 12.9 
Labor Federation 5 5.7 
Christian Democratic bloc 30 35.3 
----
Peasant Populist 22 25.8 
Social Democratic 15 17.6 
Lithuanian Farmers Party 2 2.3 
Nationalist Association 3 3.5 
Minorities 13• 15.3 
*This included three communists and five representatives from the 
Klaipeda Territory (Memel). 
Source: Kazys Grinius, Aeie 1926 m. a_ruodzio 17-os dienos perversma (On 
the C~ of 17 December 1926) (Chicago: Chicago Lithuanian Literary 
Society, 1954), p. 226. 
---· ________ , __ _ 
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headed a differently constituted coalition Cabinet during the 
dangerous years of the wars of independence ( 1919-21), immediately 
proceeded to reward coalition partners and supporters and initiated 
or planned a number of policies designed to cut expenditures; 
unfortunately, these seemed (and some were) devised to redress the 
domestic balance of power, which until then had favored the Christian 
Democrats. Some of the measures were intended to normalize certain 
democratic procedures. However, these policies estranged influential 
segments of society and irritated the citizenry, thus producing 
effects quite contrary to those intended, For example, the 
elimination of restraints on th~ right of assembly and on the press, 
which dated back to the war period of 1920, and an amnesty for 
prisoners convicted for violation of these restraints benefited the 
Communist Party almost exclusively. Its activities now aroused fears 
of Communist domination, especially sin.ce the Social Democratic 
Minister of the Interior, in the name of freedom, even allowed 
attacks on, and blackmail of, law-enforcement agencies. These fears 
were intensified by plans, advocated primarily by the Social 
Democratic coalition partner, to reconsider the place of religion in 
the schools ••• , to discontinue the clergy's salaries, and even to 
cut the size of the Church's landholdings. The dissatisfaction of 
the clergy and other groups with these developments, and with 
radically Leftist tendencies generally, was shared by many Army 
officers, who feared not only the regime's Leftism, but also for 
plans in the reduction in the armed forces, which they considered a 
threat to national security. Finally, the coalition incurred 
universal disfavor by allowing an increase of Polish schools ••• as 
a reward for Polish support. This favoritism was shown at a time 
when the Polish Government was closing down Lithuanian schools in the 
occupied Vilnius region; the country was very angry. These anxieties 
and emotions easily engulfed the youth, who began demonstrations 
against the government, and by the fall of 1926, the country was a 
powder keg. 1 
Graham also c::t.tes a crop failure and renewed economic depression as 
additional components of the Lithuanian political crisis of 1926. 2 
The military directly felt the hand of the reform-minded 
Slezevicius government. It had become established practice that with 
1v. Stanley Vardys, "Independent Lithuania: A Profile," in 
Lithuania Under the Soviets: Portrait of a Nation, 1940-65, ed. V. 
Stanley Vardys (New-York: 'Praeser;-i'"9b5f;-PP• 34-35. -
2Malbone W. Graham, Jr., ~Governments of Eastern Euroee (New 
York: Henry Holt, 1927), p. 403. 
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each cabinet change, a new defense minister and chief of staff were also 
appointed. Since cabinets in Lithuania alternated relatively 
frequently, this created instability in military leadership and progress 
was next to impossible. Lieutenant Colonel· Juozas Papeckys, an 
attorney, was appointed defense minister and Lieutenant Colonel Kazys 
Skirpa took the post of chief of staff. 3 Skirpa, a recent graduate of 
the Belgian Military Academy, possessed a number of ideas for military 
reform, some of which elicited opposition from his fellow officers. 4 
Skirpa took swift action to dismiss incompetent officers. About ten 
officers were almost immediately discharged to the reserve, including 
two officers with prestige earned in the wars of independence: Colonel 
Vincas Grigaliunas-Glovackis and General Kazys Ladiga. Some senior 
officers soon realized that only a change in government would save 
them.5 
The Slezevicius government was a budget-cutting one. Papeckys 
and Skirpa spoke of reducing the army in size by one-third - even 
one-half. Concern grew, especially among aviation· officers who earned 
high pay and a pen.sion after only ten years of service. 6 However, 
3stasys Rastikis, Kovose del Lietuvos: Kario atsiminimai (In the 
Battles for Lithuania: A Soldier's Reminiscences) (Los Angeles: Lietuviu 
dienos I Lithuanian Days, 1956), I, 202. 
4Albertas Gerutis, "Independent Lithuania," in Lithuania 700 
Years, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Manyland, 1969), p. 220. 
.. . ~Grinius, pp., . 245-?46. ·Smetana, upon returning to power, would 
return b.oth ]Den. ·to t.he regular army •. 
6Konstantinas Zukas, Zvilgsnis i praeiti: Zmogaus ir kario 
atsiminimai. Med ziaga istorikams (A Glance at the Past: A Person's and 
Soldier's Reminiscences. Material for Historians) (Chicago: Terra'· 
; 
. 
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another author writes that charges of the army being greatly reduced and 
a large number of officers discharged were false. 7 Nevertheless, fear 
on the part of officers was justifiable in light of statements made by 
some radical members of the Seimas. One of them was Social Democrat 
Steponas Kairys, who declared that he was an antimilitarist: "'The 
demand to reduce the military is just a minimal one. 
Democrats seek the complete elimination of the military.' "8 
The Social 
It was not sufficient for officers to have knowledge of an 
agreement between the Social Democrats and Peasant Populists not to 
inject politics into decisions involving military policy. They still 
feared military reform legislation prepared for Seimas action upon 
reconvening in the fall of 1926. Among other aims, it sought the 
reduction of the influence of opposition parties in the military. As 
opposed to most of his colleagues, Skirpa, the chief of staff, felt that 
reforms were strengthening the military, not decimating it.9 
The official state of war which had existed in Lithuania ever 
since the wars of independence even during peacetime was 
eliminated by the third Seimas. It had been both an embarrassment and 
1959), pp. 456-457. 
7Antanas Rukas, ed., Mykolas Slezevicius (Chicago: Terra, 1954), 
p. 161. 
~.K., Valstybininkas politikos sukuriuose: Prelatas Mykolas 
Krupavicius 1885-1970 (Statesman in the Whirlwind of Politics: Prelate 
Mykolas Krupavicius 1885-1970) (Chicago: Pope Leo XIII Fund, 1980), 
p. 106. 
9Rukas, pp. 243-246, 251. 
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burden to the district military commandants, charged with carrying out 
its provisions of censorship and political restraint. This inevitably 
brought them and the rest of the officer corps into politics, though 
perhaps unwillingly. However, the elimination of the state of war was 
brought on too suddenly, without adequate provision for administrative 
transitory phases or machinery. 10 This only served to contribute to the 
impression that the government had lost effective control over the 
country. This was especially due to increased communist activity, 
including various incidents, harassment, demonstrations, and physical 
assaults. General Sta sys Rastikis writes that he began carrying a 
revolver in his pocket for the purpose of self-protection, though he was 
never the victim of any incident. 11 
There was a perception that the government and police were 
ignoring criminal behavior by leftist groups, while occasionally 
utilizing physical force to disperse anti-communist students and 
demonstrators. 12 There were also rumors that Interior Minister Vladas 
Pozela, a Social Democrat, was actually a closet communist. Many of the 
old Christian Democrat civil servants hired during the Stulginskis 
administration were dismissed. All of this served to decrease morale in 
the provinces and the military, and increase feelings of uncer-
tainty. 13 It should be noted, though, that anger was not directed 
10 Rukas, pp. 148, 247. 
11Rastikis, I, pp. 202-203. 
12Rasti ki s, I, pp. 202-203 ~ 
1 3sa~ c •. Sark~sian finds that people cannot long operate in such 
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personally at Grinius or Slezevicius, who both had long records of 
patriotic service to Lithuania, but that general discontent was a 
response to government inaction against disorder. 14 Many feared that 
the Slezevicius government would follow the same destructive road as had 
Kerensky's provisional government in Russia in 1917. Of the many fears, 
the triumph of bolshevik elements in Lithuania was the greatest. 15 
A major event on the road toward the coup d'etat was the 
rightist student demonstration of 21 November .1926. It was organized by 
the Nationalist Association and included members of the Lithuanian 
Catholic Federation "Ateitis" and "Meo-Lithuania." Over two thousand 
participants listened to anti-government speeches and cheers. They then 
marched to the War Museum to honor the Unknown Soldier and sing the 
National Anthem. En route, the mounted police, administratively under 
the Interior Ministry, attacked the demonstrators with truncheons. Some 
police officers entered the grounds of the museum, but its director, the 
popular Brigadier General Vladas Nagius-Nagevicius, ordered them out. 
The University of Kaunas Senate condemned this police action and a 
condemning interpellation was made in the Seimas, signed by the 
Christian Democratic bloc, the Nationalists, and the Farmers Party. 
an atmosphere and are increasingly disposed to use drastic measures to 
eliminate it. Cf. various lectures at Loyola University of Chicago 
1981-1985. 
14Rastikis, I, pp. 202-203. 
15Rapolas Ski pi tis, Nepriklausoma Lietuva statant: Atsiminimai 
(Building Independent Lithuania: Reminiscences) (Chicago: Terra, 1961), 
p. 414. 
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National sentiment was overwhelmingly in favor of the students, though 
in his memoirs, President Grinius writes that they behaved poorly and 
chose to fight the police. 16 
Did the Grinius administration lose its legitimacy in the eyes 
of Lithuanians? An interesting parallel may be drawn to Chile with 
regard to the perception of disorder: 
In Chile in 1972 and 1973, the long and devastating strikes by the 
Confederation of Truck Owners against the Allende government created 
shortages in food and raw materials throughout the nation, which 
initially encouraged the government to bring the military officers 
into the cabinet and later played an imP.ortant role in the breakdown 
of legitimacy preceding a military coup. 17 
Disorder contributes to feelings in favor of regime change -- drastic, 
if necessary. It is here where, just as in Chile, the Lithuanian 
military stepped into the political arena. 
B. THE COUP D'ETAT OF 17 DECEMBER 1926 
Despite the fact that the Lithuanian army was a relatively small 
one, the officers involved in the overthrow plot realized the advantages 
of such size with regard to political change, especially witbin a 
context where the populace is seeking relief. "If the civilian 
16Grinius, pp. 254-255; M. K., pp. 16-17; Aleksandras Merkelis, 
Antanas Smetona: -!~~!suo~~,!line, kulturine J:!:_p_?litine veikla (Antanas 
Smetona: His Social, Cultural, and Political Activjty) (New York: 
American Lithuanian-National-Association, 191'4), ·pp. ·31 -319, Zukas, pp. 
457-458. See Petras Maldeikis, Ml.,_kolas Krueavicius (Chicago: Lithuanian 
Christian Democratic Association, 1975), p. 187 for an account of the 
breakup of the demonstration and Rukas, pp. 155-158 for the government's 
version of the events. 
17Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Come_ara~ 
Politics: System, Process, and Policy. An Anal~tic Study, 2nd ed. 
(Boston:- Little, Brown,--1978), p. 88. 
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population is indifferent or disaffected, even a very small military can 
overthrow a civilian government. Indeed, it may be easier for officers 
to organize discontent in a smaller military organization." 18 Even 
prior to the elections of May 1926, the problematic nature of military 
loyalty was brought out in a meeting between delegations of the 
Nationalists and Peasant Populists. Kazys Grinius asked Professor 
Augustinas Voldemaras, an extremist Nationalist, if the military would 
obey the Nationalists. Voldemaras reportedly responded, "Yes, the army 
is ours." 19 Nevertheless, once in power, Grinius and the government did 
not heed such warnings, for they did not think the Nationalists could 
actually carry out a coup.20 
The Christian Democrats, who were ousted from power in the 
elections of 1926, were also partially to blame for the politicization 
of the military. The Christian Democratic press savagely attacked the 
new military leadership, while the military itself was unable to respond 
either in the press or the political arena. The military did bring 
lawsuits in some cases in which it felt it had been libeled, but such 
procedures took time -- time in which attacks in the press continued. 
Defense Minister Papeckys even went to the extreme of suggesting 
legislation whereby press courts would be established. They would have 
18Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics, p. 133. 
19Maldeikis, p. 193. See also Mykolas Krupavicius, "1926 m. 
gruodzio septynioliktoji," ("17 December 1926"), Draugas, 6 December 
1956, p. 3. 
20arinius, pp. 256-257. 
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three members representing the government, the press, and the judiciary 
utilizing simpler procedures so that cases could be decided in a matter 
of days. However, this never came to pass. In addition, the Christian 
Democrats attempted to bring into their fold any officer who had been 
dismissed by his new superiors or who had been punished for violations 
of military discipline. The aim: To hurt the authority and legitimacy 
of the new military leadership, and to set the officer corps against the 
government. Indeed, one author writes that the major~ty of the Central 
Committee of the Christian Democratic Party was of the opinion that the 
Grinius-Slezevicius administration must be forcibly ousted. 21 
Reverend Mykolas Krupavicius, a former agriculture minister in a 
Christian Democratic government, was reportedly twice approached by 
Antanas Merkys, a Nationalist attorney, to seek support for the coup. 
In his memoirs, Krupavicius writes that he refused to participate on 
both occasions. 22 According to Petras Maldeikis, Krupavicius' 
biographer, General Kazys Ladiga, who had been replaced by Colonel Kazys 
Skirpa as chief of staff, went to Krupavicius complaining that he had 
been removed from the circle of officers plotting the coup because he 
was perceived to be a Christian Democrat and belonged to the "Ateitis" 
Catholic Federation. Krupavicius replied that the party does not 
support the idea of overthrowing the government. He advised Ladiga not 
to participate and go to his farm in the Birzai district; Ladiga took 
21 zukas, p. 459. See also Rukas, pp. 248-249. 
22 8 M. K. , pp. 17-1 • 
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this advice. Krupavicius became fearful that Lithuania would go the 
route of a South American dictatorship. 23 Nevertheless, many of the 
functionaries in the Internal Security Department were holdovers from 
the Christian Democratic era and had not yet been replaced by the new 
government. It is quite conceivable that they would not have hindered 
coup efforts. 24 
Events had led to a situation where high-ranking officials in 
the Defense Ministry had no authority or respect among the officer 
corps. Further, they had seemingly little, if any, knowledge of the 
unrest occuring within the military. 25 In response to questioning by 
Seimas Defense Committee member Aleksandras Stulginskis, Chief of Staff 
Colonel Skirpa replied that the military was trustworthy. 26 On another 
occasion, however, during the debate over military reductions, an 
officer told Seimas deputy Rapolas Skipitis that the Seimas will not 
reduce the military, but that the military will reduce the Seimas. 27 It 
was, after all, not surprising that military men would make such 
threats. The precedent was broken on 22-23 February 1920 when a portion 
of the Kaunas garrison revolted over conditions -- and fired erratic 
23Maldeikis, pp. 195-196. 
24J. Sarunas, Gruodzio 17 dienos perversmas (The Coup of 
December 17) (n.p.: Lietuvos demokratijos draugai I Lithuanian Frl-eriCiS 
of Democracy, 1927), p. 5. 
25 4 Sarunas, P• • 
26Rukas, p. 256. 
27Merkelis, pp. 320-321. See also Skipitis, Nepriklausoma 
Lietuva Statant, p. 415. 
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artillery rounds into the city. 28 Nevertheless, Slezevicius trusted 
the military, thinking it incapable of extreme political acts. He felt 
that officers and enlisted personnel would come to him with their 
problems as they had done when he served as prime minister in 1919. 29 
The only trouble Slezevicius foresaw was political, not military. He 
intended to clean radical socialists out of the government ~ though the 
coup was to carry this task out for him. 30 Ironically, he cancelled 
Interior Ministry surveillance of suspicious officers, citing its 
undemocratic nature. 
There were three groups of politicized officers. The first and 
largest consisted of those who sympathized with the Christian Democratic 
bloc. The second was of the opinion that Antanas Smetona, a 
nationalist, was the politician most able to restore order. He had an 
excellent . reputation based on his performance as first president in 
1919-1920. The third and smallest group consisted of supporters of 
Professor Augustin as Voldemaras, an ultra-Nationalist. This right-wing 
group was the most active and radica1.31 On 20 September 1926, a small 
28Skipitis, Nepriklausoma Lietuva Statant, pp. 177-192 writes of 
the revolt. A. Novai tis was one of the officers placed under house 
arrest by the rebels. However, the leaders of the Kaunas revolt were 
mainly civilians and former NCOs of the Czarist army. Of the thirty 
arrested and sentenced, only seven possessed Lithuanian surnames. See 
his 11 1920 metu kareiviu sukilimas" (The Soldiers' Revolt of 1920"), 
Karys, April 1961, pp. 103-106. 
29Rukas, p. 326. 
30 6 M.K., p. 10. 
31Rapolas Skipitis, Nepriklausoma Lietuva: Atsiminimai 
(Independent Lithuania: Reminiscences), (Chicago: Draugas, 1967), 
pp. 110-111 • 
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group of young officers, headed by Aviation Captain Antanas Maciuika, 
formed a committee to plot the coup. The committee, which included 
officers representing the Nationalists and Christian Democrats, decided 
to ask Smetona to be the new president.32 Colonel Vladas Skorupskis, a 
graduate of the Prague General Staff Academy, headed a group ho~sed in 
the Senior Officer Courses responsible for planning the coup.33 
Though the officers were patriots who meant no harm to the 
country, they were inexperienced in politics and affairs of state. They 
had forgotten that those presently at the head of the military and 
government were experienced patriots who had saved Lithuania during the 
wars of independence in 1918-1920. Indeed, it had been Slezevicius who 
called for volunteers to defend the nation in late 1919. The officers 
had become blind tools of the opposition parties.34 
Those who master-minded th~ coup were better able to recruit 
junior officers. Senior officers viewed affairs of state with a cooler, 
more pragmatic eye. Only a few senior officers whose careers were 
foundering or who were inclined to intrigue cooperated with disloyal 
elements. Even Major Povilas Plechavicius, who would be invited to act 
as dictator during and immediately following the coup, wavered prior to 
32Skipitis, Nepriklausoma 
believes that Smetona himself 
("Nation's Leader"). -
Lietuva, pp. 110-112. Ski pi tis 
devised the title "Tautos Vadas" 
33E. Dirvele, Klasiu kova Lietuvoje 1926 metais (Class Conflict 
in Lithuania 1926) (Vilnius: State Political and Scientific Press, 
1961), p. 171; Zukas, p. 458. 
34Rukas, pp. 252-253. 
43 
joining the plotters. 35 Most officers in the Kaunas garrison did not 
participate in the coup. They were concerned that a coup would invite 
counter-coups, perhaps a civil war -- even invasion by Poland.36 
What was the role of the Nationalist Association in the coup? 
The Nationalists, who had early expressed ambivalence toward agrarian 
and social reform, also possessed a lack of close contact with the Roman 
Catholic clergy. Consequently, because the country was overwhelmingly 
agrarian and Catholic, the Association had 1i ttle support among the 
people. This is reflected in their poor showing in all three Seimas 
elections. However, because of its elitist, nationalistic stance, and 
because a nationalist president ruled during the wars of independence, 
the Nationalist Association had a good deal of influence among army 
officers.37 The Nationalists cultivated support within the officer 
corps by accentuating patriotism. 38 In defending the coup, Jakstas 
writes that the Nationalists were not its initiators; it was the 
communists and anarchists who awoke the nation and stirred it to 
action.39 Be that as it may, it is widely believed that coup officers 
35Rukas, p. 254. 
36Rastikis, I, p. 206. 
37Kazys Pakstas, Lithuania and World War II (Chicago: Lithuanian 
Cultural Institute, 1947) p. 20. 
38Rukas, pp. 238-239. 
39Juozas Jakstas, "Tautos pazangos partijos-Lietuviu tautininku 
sajungos istorijos bruozai 1916-194011 ("An Historical Sketch of the 
National Progress Party-Lithuanian Nationalist Association 1916-1940 11 ), 
in Tautines minties keliu: . J..ietuviu tautininkijos istoriniai bruozai 
(Path of National Thought: Historical Sketch of Lithuanian Nationa-
lism) Eds. Jonas Puzinas and Jonas Pranas Palukaitis. (Chicago: 
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made contact with Smetona long before 17 December 1926, and that the 
officers would not have carried out the coup if it were not for the 
encouragement of the Nationalists. 40 
As was mentioned above, the new military leadership had 
dismissed Colonel Vincas Grigaliunas-Glovackis, a Christian. Democrat who 
had distinguished himself during the wars of independence. In October 
1926, along with Reserve Captain Pranas Klimaitis and Reserve Major 
Juozas Tomkus, he began editing and publishing Tautos Valia (National 
Will) in Kaunas. It was ideologically opposi tionist, anti-cormnunist, 
and occasionally fascist. It exhorted the people to actively oppose the 
government. Following publication of the eighth issue, the paper was 
banned and Grigaliunas-Glovackis was placed in the Kaunas hard labor 
prison. 41 Prior to his silencing, though, he was involved in a secret 
conference at the offices of the Christian Democratic publication Rytas 
(Morning) on 16 October 1926. Among other participants were 
representatives of the Christian Democratic Party, the Nationalist 
Association, and the commanding officer of the second infantry regiment, 
Colonel Jonas Petruitis. This was one of many meetings to coordinate 
the coup. 42 
It was soon an open secret. The coup officers began spreading 
American Lithuanian National Association, 1979), pp. 121-122. 
40Merkelis, p. 327; Sarunas, p. 11. 
41D. 1 irve e, p. 167; Merkelis, p. 318. 
42Dirvele, pp. 170-171. 
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rumors that Poland was preparing for an invasion of Lithuania and that 
the military leadership was doing nothing to counteract it. General 
Ladiga and Major Plechavicius reported to Chief of Staff Colonel Skirpa 
that Polish troops were massing in the east at the demarcation line; 
this despite the fact that Section Two reported no such movement. 43 A 
number of junior officers wished to speak with Skirpa to investigate 
whether there was a method to alter the situation short of armed 
force. However, Nationalist Antanas Merkys urged them not to do so, for 
that ~ould ruin the plot. 44 General Teodoras Daukantas would visit the 
editorial offices of Lietuvos Aidas (Lithuania's Echo) and infQrm the 
editors of coup preparations. Yet, Prime Minister Slezevicius trusted 
the ability of the military leadership to see that military discipline 
was maintained. 45 This is amazing considering the mounting evidence~ 
evidence which should have been greeted with more decisive action on the 
part of the government. One example of evidence may be found in the 
prime minister's office itself. In addition to being head of 
government, Slezevicius was also minister of foreign affairs and 
justice. A former Christian Democratic minister experiencing legal 
difficulties approached Slezevicius with a proposal. He would give the 
government a list of conspirators in return for favorable treatment; 
Slezevicius refused.46 Chief of Staff Skirpa was also apparently 
43 Rukas, p. 257. Section Two was the equivalent of the U.S. 
Army's intelligence branch, G-2. 
44Rukas, pp. 272-273. 
45Rukas, p. 314. 
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unwilling to take action beyond warnings and reminders of an officer's 
honor and duty to obey the elected political leadership. He summoned a 
number of officers and informed them that they should not become 
involved with politics; punishment would follow breaches of 
discipline. Skirpa also requested the Lithuanian National Guard, a 
civilian militia, to report on events and morale in the provinces. 47 
However, it was too late. The road to coup had already been paved. 
17 December 1926 marked President Grinius' sixtieth birthday. 
The commanding officers of all major units stationed throughout the 
country were gathered in Kaunas on the previous evening in preparation 
for the next day's celebration. In this way, they were able to be 
interned, preventing organized resistance from provincial units. 48 At a 
meeting held on 16 December, only one officer, Colonel Oskaras Urbonas, 
the commander of the fourth artillery regiment in Vilkaviskis, spoke of 
a potential revolt within the army itself ~ a revolt being organized by 
the Nationalists and Christian Democrats. Then, on behalf of the Kaunas 
garrison, spoke Colonel Jonas Petruitis, the commander of the second 
infantry regiment. He stat~d that the men in Kaunas were absolutely 
trustworthy and that no revolt was being organized. Ironically, it was 
Petrui tis, a Christian Democratic sympathizer, who would lead his men 
against the government several hours later. Defense Minister Papeckys 
46Grinius, pp. 255-256. 
47 Rukas, pp. 250, 255. 
48Dirvele, pp. 174-175. 
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and Colonel Skirpa calmed the officers down, but did not issue any 
orders to quell potential stirrings, for despite reports of low morale 
and opposition, the commanding officers also stated that the army will 
continue to obey. 49 
For purposes of this presentation, it is not necessary to enter 
into details of the actual coup. 50 It had been agreed in advance that 
Major Povilas Plechavicius would act as the dictator during the coup and 
in the interim period afterward. 51 In the early morning hours of 17 
49Rastikis, I, pp. 203-204. 
50see Vladas Krivickas, The Coup d'etat of 1926 in Lithuania, 
Diss. Columbia University 1970 for a comprehensive presentation. See 
also Algis Budreckis, "Gruodzio 17 d. perversmas" ("The Coup 'of 17 
December"), Karys, December 1962, pp. 290-293; P. Genys, 11 Atsimin1mai 
is 1926 metu gruodzio 17 dienos" ("Reminiscences from 17 December 
1926"), Karys, December 1962, p. 294; and.various articles in The New 
York Times, 18 December 1926. Grinius, ipp. 251-266; Rukas, pp. 258-267; 
Petras Stravinskas, Atsiminimai ir easaulezvalga: Rastai ir credo. 
Antra knyga (Reminiscences and Worldview: 'Writings and Credo. Second 
Book) (Chicago: Committee to Publish P. Stravinskas' Works, 1982), pp. 
30-32; and Bronius Balutis in Vytautas Sirvydas, ed., Bronius Kazys 
Balutis: Jo yvenimas ir darbai (Bronius Kaz s Balutis: His Life and 
Work)· (Sodus, I: J. J. Bachunas, 1951 ) ', pp. 89-95 write of their 
experiences during the coup. . Aviation Lieu.tenant Steponas Darius 
recalls his participation in the coup in Petras Jurgela, Sparnuoti 
lietuviai: Darius ir Girenas. Ju gyvenimas ir pirmasis lietuviu 
skridimas per Atlanta is Amerikos Lietuvon (Winged Lithuanians: Darius 
and Girenas. Their Lives and the First Lithuanian Transatlantic Flight 
From America to Lithuania) (Chicago: Vincas & Konstancija-Kotryna 
Stulpinas, 1935), pp. 99-103. Photographs taken after the coup 
depicting tanks, patrols, and the coup officers with members of the new 
government are in Jurgela and Pauli us Jurkus, Gen. Povilas Plechavicius 
(Brooklyn: Karys, 1978), pp. 35-36, 41; and P. Jurgelevicius, Kauno karo 
komendatura 1919-1929 (Kaunas Military Commandery 1919-1929) (Kaunas: 
Kaunas Municipal and District Commandery, 1930), pp. 31, 37. 
51 He first had to be released from the guardhouse during the 
initial stages of the coup. Different sources place him in the 
guardhouse for various reasons at the order of different superior 
officers. 
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December 1926, the men of the second infantry regiment were awakened by 
an alarm and informed that the bolsheviks were threatening the 
government. The presidential residence, the Seimas building and other 
vital centers had to be surrounded and "protected." This information 
was provided by the commanding officer, Colonel Petrui tis, who had 
professed his men's loyalty but several hours before. Colonel 
Grigaliunas-Glovackis, the editor of Nation's Will, was released from 
the Kaunas hard labor prison and named the commanding officer of the 
Kaunas garrison. Aviation Captain Antanas Maciuika and several dozen 
officers dispersed the Seimas, which was in the midst of late night 
budget debates. Aviation, cavalry, and armored units participated, 
assuming control over strategic centers in Kaunas. They were assisted 
by students from the University of Kaunas who were members of opposition 
groups, namely the 11 Atei tis" Catholic Federation and the "Neo-Lithuani&1t 
Nationalist Fraternity. In response, Chief of Staff Colonel Skirpa led 
approximately eighty military policemen in opposition to the coup --
with shots fired. 52 Nevertheless, Skirpa was captured. A Provisional 
Military Government (Laikinoji Karo Valdzia) was formed under the 
dictatorship of Major Plechavicius. Lithuania was declared to be in a 
state of war, Kaunas under a state of siege. Those who refused to obey 
the provisional government were to be turned over to military 
tribunals.53 
52The popular version of the coup says that no shots were fired; 
this is false. However, it was without bloodshed. 
53Dirvele, p. 183; Merkelis, pp. 328-329; Rukas, pp. 160-161; 
Zukas, pp. 459-460. 
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President Grinius, with a tank in the yard of the presidential 
residence, was awakened in the middle of the night by a lieutenant and 
placed under house arrest. Important members of the Seimas, along with 
the entire cabinet, were placed under arrest and brought to military 
headquarters. The president of the Seimas, Dr. Jonas Staugaitis, was in 
hiding and discovered only several days later. The cabinet was ordered 
to tender its resignation. Plechavicius advised Grinius to resign as 
president. When Grinius informed him that he had broken his oath as an 
officer and advised him to send the men back to the barracks, 
Plechavicius attempted to explain himself. Upon departing the 
presidential residence Plechavicius remarked that all that was left for 
him to do was commit suicide.54 After visits from several influential 
senior officers, including General Vlad as Nagius-Nagevicius, imploring 
him to resign in the interest of the country and to avert a possible 
invasion by Poland, Grinius agreed. He stipulated though, t~at the new 
prime minister, Professor Augustinas Voldemaras, sign an affidavit 
promising that he will act within the bounds. of the Constitution. 55 
Grinius resigned after approving Voldemaras' cabinet. This was his last 
official act as president. 
Military headquarters was in chaos. The government was under 
arrest and the coup officers were planning the future of the country 
54Grinius, pp. 259-260; M. K., p. 122; Zukas, p. 460. 
55This affidavit was to be broken many times. See Maldeikis, 
p. 199. 
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along with representatives from the Nationalist Association and the 
Christian Democratic Party. The collectivity, with Stasys Silingas as 
primary author, wrote a declaration, a public request by the military 
government asking Smetona to assume the reins of government. Smetana 
agreed in another declaration which they all helped write. The document 
mentioned the association between Smetona and the officer corps dating 
back to the wars of independence.56 
That day, 17 December, the Central Board of the Lithuanian 
National Guard issued the following instructions to its members: 
National Guardsmen of Lithuania! 
The Central Board of the National Guard of Lithuania, keeping in 
mind the new circumstances, having convened for a special 
consultation, on 17 December 14:00 hours unanimously decided: 
To order all National Guardsmen to remain calm and not take any 
action without the knowledge of the Central Board, remembering that 
our spiritual calm carries over into Lithuania's calm; 
to remind National Guardsmen that Lithuania's external enemy 
[Poland] is especially dangerous now. Therefore all National Guards-
men must be especially vigilant and prepared to defend Lithuania's 
borders at every hour.~7 
The. same day, the commanding officers assembled for President Grinius' 
birthday were informed of what had occurred and instructed to return to 
their units and carry on.58 Nevertheless, during officers' mess at the 
second infantry regiment that morning, one officer loudly exclaimed: 
"Men, what good have we done? We have overthrown our legal govern-
ment 11159 Many officers who had participated in the coup later regretted 
-----------------5~erkelis, pp. 329-330, 338. 
57Jonas Matusas, 
National Guard); 2nd ed. 
Sauliu Sajungos istorija (History of the 
(Sydney, Australia: Mirttis, 1966), p. 196. 
58Merkelis, p. 329. 
59zukas, pp. 460-461. 
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their actions. Indeed Major Plechavicius, the interim dictator, 
apologized to former Prime Minister Slezevicius, even offering to stage 
a counter-coup; Slezevicius refused.60 
Slezevicius later informed General Nagius-Nagevicius that the 
enlisted men were more worthy than their officers, who had broken their 
oaths and stricken the nation. 61 Evidently, the enlisted men were of 
the same opinion. The men in the Kaunas garrison were angry that their 
officers had deceived them. The officers, fearful of a counter-coup, 
were ordered to stay with the men at all times, even to sleep with 
them. Since lies had been used to rouse the men to action, they no 
longer trusted their superiors. 62 The conspirators were prepared to 
destroy the bridges leading to Kaunas, for their were several provincial 
uni ts suited up in full battle gear and prepared to rescue the legal 
government. However, Grinius' appointment of a new cabinet and his 
resignation from office stymied any action. 63 Several days after the 
coup, a delegation of NCOs proposed a counter-coup to the Peasant 
Populists. Grinius and Slezevicius politely refused. 64 
60Rukas, p. 315. 
61Grinius, p. 270. 
62Grinius, pp. 269-270; Rukas, p. 273; Sarunas, p. 33. 
63oirvele, pp. 181-182. 
64
zukas, p. 463. Within days of the coup, new Defense Minister 
Antanas Merkys visited a unit and shouted his greetings to the men 
( 11Sveiki, vyrai!"). There was no response. Merkys was greeted by total 
silence. See Dirvele, pp. 181-182. 
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On 19 December 1926 a rump session of the Seimas convened, 
confirmed the new cabinet, and elected Smetona the fourth president of 
Lithuania. 65 The Nationalist-Christian Democratic compromise following 
the coup made it appear to be just another governmental crisis, instead 
of the radical step it actually was. The bloodless nature of the coup, 
along with the pseudo-constitutional means utilized in altering the 
government, helped downplay the entire incident. 66 On 12 April 1927, 
President Smetona, in an announcement by Prime Minister Voldemaras, 
dissolved the Seimas. According to the Constitution, the president was 
to announce new elections and reconvene the Seimas within two months; 
this was not done. Elections to the Seimas would not be held until 
1936. In the meantime, decrees would be issued by the cabinet in place 
of formal legislation. The decade-long dissolution of the Seimas 
carried out in April 1927 was the more radical· "second coup d'etat" 
which closed the democratic chapter of Lithuania's existence. 67 This 
was the military's immediate contribution to .Lithuanian politics. It 
was to have a large role in those politics until the end of the 
independence period. 
65The new prime minister, Augustinas Voldemaras, had written six 
articles in Lietuvis (Lithuanian) from 25 June to 9 December 1926. 
Ironically, the final one was entitled 11 Valdzia pries istatymus" ("The 
Government Acting Against the Law"). See Augustinas Voldemaras, Rastai 
(Writings), ed. Morkus Simkus (Chicago: Lithuanian Renaissance League, 
1973), pp. 621-665. 
66Grinius, p. 207; Bronis J. Kaslas, The Baltic Nations: The 
Quest for Regional Integration and Political Liberty (Pittston, PA: 
Euramercia Press, 1976), p. 108. 
67 Kaslas, p. 109-110. 
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C. CONSEQUENCES OF THE COUP 
Of course, varying analyses of the coup abound. However, there 
are some objective causes for the coup. 11 Though the Lithuanian village 
was the very source of democracy, its residents hardly knew anything of 
democratic institutions, basic democratic elements, and political 
parties. 1168 The elections to the third Seimas in May 1926 strained 
Lithuania's democracy to the breaking point. Those who wished to 
circumvent democratic procedural arrangements were quite willing to use 
the situation to their advantage; the Nationalists succeeded. People 
cannot learn democracy overnight. Thus the government should have been 
better prepared to operate within a more liberal context subsequent to 
the lifting of various restraints. 
Supporters of the coup mainly view the short-term context of 
Lithuanian politics and politico-military relations. Binkis writes that 
the nation entered into chaos, and that the military intervened to put 
an end to selfish, uncontrolled partisan politics. 69 Sapoka writes that 
society strongly supported the coup, for it was yearning for any kind of 
change. 70 Others write that it was unfortunate that the inept civil 
68Juozas Audenas, Paskutinis posedis: Atsiminimai 
Meeting: Reminiscences) (New York: Romuva, 1966), p. 95. 
(Final 
69Kazys Binkis, Antanas Smetpna 1874-1934: ~esiu desimoiu metu 
sukaktuvems pamineti (Antanas Smetana 1874-1934: Commemorating His 
Sixtieth Birthday) (Kaunas: Chief Committee to Commemorate the 
President's Birthday, 1934), p. 60. 
70Adolfas Sapoka, ed. Lietuvos istorija (History of Lithuania), 
3rd ed. (Fellbach-Wurttemberg, Germany: Patria, 1950), p. 591. 
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government forced the military to become irrevocably involved in the 
politics which it so detested. Nevertheless, the young officers are 
viewed as "true patriots." 71 Smetona himself wrote that the coup 
unified the military, rendering it better prepared to defend the 
nation.72 
Critics of the coup take a more long-term approach, explaining 
its detrimental effect on Lithuania for the duration of independence. 
In the first place, they state that there was no communist threat to the 
nation, either within or without the military. The coD111unists were weak 
and disorganized. Indeed, the enlisted men would collect communist 
leaflets and bring them to their officers. 73 As far as Maldeikis is 
concerned, the coup was not a spasm of national unity. On the contrary, 
it was carried out by a small group of well-organized officers under the 
influence of the Nationalists. 74 .Zukas places the entire blame on the 
shoulders of the guilty officers, citing their lack of comprehension of 
the essence of government. They had no right to interfere in 
71Lietuviu tautos komitetas (Lithuanian National 
Desimts · nepriklausomos Lietuvos metu (Ten Years of 
Lithuania) (Chicago: L.N.C., 1928), pp. 7, 21. 
Committee), 
Independent 
72Antanas Smetana, Pasakyta parasyta: 1927-1934 (Spoken Written 
1927-1934) (Kaunas: Pazanga, 1935), I, 30. For a philosophical defense 
of the coup from. the Nationalist perspective, see J. Tamosaitis, 11 Nuo 
gruodzio m. 17 d. ligi siu dienu" ("From December 17th Until Today"), in 
Pirmasis nepriklausomos Lietuvos desimtmetis 1918-1928 (First Decade of 
Independent Lithuania 1918-1928), ed. J. Barkauskas, et al. (Kaunas: 
Chief Committee to Celebrate the Decennial of Lithuanian Independence, 
1930)' pp. 139-159. 
73Grinius, p. 247; Rukas, p. 250. 
74Maldeikis, p. 201. 
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politics. Once the precedent is broken, it can happen again at any 
time. The revolts which occured during the remaining thirteen years of 
independence received their impetus from the success of this first 
one. As far as Zukas is concerned, the military must be the backbone 
and foundation of the state ~ not its helm. 75 Sarunas asks how junior 
officers are expected to be obedient when they act as Napoleons. The 
coup hurt military discipline and split the military along two planes. 
First, the officer corps became divided along party lines. Second, the 
enlisted men, who felt they had been used as blind tools, were split 
from their officers.76 Rukas assumes a similar stance, adding that the 
coup hindered progress in military training and improvement. The 
military became a gendarme, which served to divide the nation and 
actually intensify debilitating forms of partisan politics.77 General 
Stasys Rastikis writes that state and military affairs were managed by 
one political group for many years following the coup. This served to 
alienate a substantial portion ·of society from the state -- and the 
military. 1B 
75zukas, pp. 464-465. 
76sarunas, p. 33. 
77Rukas, pp. 274-275. Smetana's biographer writes of the 
president's New Year's greeting to the military on 1 January 1927. 
Smetona stated that obedience and harmony were absolutely essential. 
All must work where assigned, with the junior obeying the senior. To 
say the least, it was an ironic statement considering the events which 
had transpired just two weeks b.efore • 
. 78 . . ' 
Rastikis, I, pp. 380, · 383. As will be seen ·later in this 
study, Rastikis took steps to close this gap when he served as 
commander-in-chief from 1935 to 1940. He was quite successful. 
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The ambivalent nature of the coup and its participants is 
articulated well by interim dictator Major Povilas Plechavicius. He 
places the bulk of the blame for the coup on his own shoulders, adding 
that the incident follows him like a "shadow." He was left with no 
foundation to stand on, for it is spiritual death for an old soldier to 
raise his hand against the government. Yet, he still believes that he 
participated out of love for his country.79 
79p. Plechavicius, 110 skambink per amzius vaikams Lietuvos" 
("Ring Through the Ages for Lithuania's Children"), Karys, January 1953, 
pp. 3-4. He adds an interesting historical sidelight in support of the 
coup. He believes that "pseudo-democracy" brought Europe to its knees 
in the face of Hitler and Stalin. This is most poignantly demonstrated 
by Chamberlain's appeasement in Munich in 1938. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
A. NATIONALISM AND THE NATIONALIST ASSOCIATION 
The context of Lithuanian civil-military relations, as well as 
the context of politics during the Smetona era in general, was 
nationalism. Nationalism, of course, was a phenomenon widely prevalent 
in interwar East-Central Europe. While in the Lithuanian context, the 
Nationalist Association had a monopoly over official politic al 
nationalism, it was accepted by the general populace, including even the 
opposition. For example, Juozas Audenas, Peasant Populist agriculture 
minister in the last cabinet, implies a non-political nationalism in his 
memoirs. He writes that defense and national uni t.y are inost important 
in times of crisis. Above all else, the state and nation's interests 
must be guarded through calm, harmony, and keeping one's house in 
order. 1 Gilpin writes: "The power of modern nationalism lies in the 
fact that individual identity and state interest become fused; the 
nationalist becomes the patriot willing to sacrifice his own life for 
the good of the state. 112 In this sense, even the politic al opposition 
in Lithuania was nationalistic. 
1Juozas Audenas, Paskutinis posedis: Atsiminimai (Final Meeting: 
Reminiscences) (New York: Romuva, 1966), pp. 139-140. 
2Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politios (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 98. 
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One scholar makes the point succintly with regard to small 
nations: 
Many Big Power ideologists condemn nationalism, and a number of 
scholars habitually use the te:rm nationalism only in a negative 
sense. However, ·small nations must recognize and rely on nationalism 
as a primary source of their strength. 
In theory, one must be able to distinguish sharply between 
nationalism on the one hand and imperialism, xenophobia, or the 
attempts to abridge the rights of nations on the other. 
Nationalism has become an expression of a nation's will to live 
and its individualism. It has become a symbol of the dignity of 
peoples. It is the feeling of belonging to a national brotherhood. 
In many instances it is the strongest and most durable social bond. 
From the point view of national defense and survival, nationalism 
-- a product of patriotic loyalty and uniting cohesion -- is the main 
source of strength. It fixes the basic loyalty, the political 
objectives, the strategy, and many techniques in the struggles to 
defend a nation. 
Nationalism, adequately mobilized, is an impressive force. In 
situations of political and social conflict, it enhances national 
strength in various ways: (a) rallies the nation's forces, {b) 
unifies them, (c) clarifies the issues of the struggle, distinguishes 
friend from foe, and (d) provides a guiding philosophy, a sense of 
direction, an understanding of the goals to be achieved. 
Small states and nations that do possess the precious inheritance 
of nationalism should recognize its value as a f~undation of national 
survival. They should build their future on it. 
How did political nationalism manifest itself in Lithuania? The 
Nationalist Association grew out of the Lithuanian Democratic Party 
(Lietuvos Demokratu Partija), which had been founded in 1902. It later 
called itself the National Progress Party (Tautos Pazangos Partija) and 
the Agricultural Association ( Zemdirbiu sajunga) • In 1924 it renamed 
itself the Nationalist Association. The Nationalist Association was a 
3v.v. Sveics, "Nationalism: A Source of Strength for Small 
Nations," in Fourth Conference on Baltic Studies: Summaries of Papers 
(Brooklyn: Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, 1974), p. 
69. Sveics' emphasis. For an extended treatment of these ideas see his 
Small Nation Survival: Political Defense in Unequal Conflicts, {New 
York: Exposi tion,1970) , PP. 127 :fb'5. 
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small, young party without wide suupport among the people. It had no 
seats in the first and second Seilnas. It was able to win three seats 
out of a total of eighty-five in the third. In 1926, the association 
had about 12,000 members. By 1938, membership, despite the fact that it 
was the only legal party, had increased by only about one thousand. 
Among the 13,000 registered members that year, 7,500 were farmers, 350 
were tradesmen, 500 were industrial workers, 2, 800 were professionals 
(including property and industrial owners, and bureaucrats), and 1, 700 
were teachers. 4 The Association desired national unity, but on its own 
terms. Thus, while in quest of unity, its internal politics and 
policies were often unpopular and unsuccessful.5 
Smetona was the Nation's Leader ( Tautos Vadas) • The Leader 
Principle was used elsewhere in Europe. The Italian "Duce" and the 
German "Fuhrer" were explicit manifestations. It was ilnplicit in 
Pilsudski's personal dictatorship in Poland and in the political 
development of the other Baltic states: Latvia and Estonia. Within 
Lithuania itself, this principle was often used in non-political 
4 Juozas Jakstas, "Tautos pazangos partijos-Lietuviu tautininku 
sajungos istorijos bruozai 1916-1940" ("An Historical Sketch of the 
National Progress Party-Lithuanian Nationalist Association 1916-1940"), 
in Tautines minties keliu: Lietuviu tautininkijos istoriniai bruozai 
(Path of National Thought: Historical Sketch of Lithuanian 
Nationalism). Eds. Jonas Puzinas and Jonas Pranas Palukaitis. 
(Chicago: American Lithuanian National Association, 1979), p. 155; Kazys 
Pakstas, Lithuania and World War II (Chicago: Lithuanian Cultural 
Institute,~7), p. 21. 
5stasys Rastikis, Kovose del Lietuvos: Kario atsiminimai (In the 
Battles for Lithuania: A Soldier's Reminiscences) (Los Angeles: Lietuviu 
dienos / Lithuanian-Days, 1956), I 491. 
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contexts. Commanding officers in the military had the title of "vadas" 
of their unit. The National Guard and the "Ateitis" Catholic Federation 
each had its respective "vadas." The cult of the National Leader was 
actually not begun by the Nationalists. According to one source, it 
began in the Christian Democratic newspaper ~as (Morning), using the 
term in reference to Smetona on 20 December 1926. 6 Smetona, who admired 
the strong executive in the US political system, formalized the Leader 
Principle (Vadizmas) in the Cons_titution promulgated in 1928, which 
authorized the President to execute "leadership of the state."7 
Smetona exercised his powers as Leader through the leadership of 
the Nationalist Association. However, he was able to assert that he was 
not participating in partisan politics, since the Nationalists were 
organized into an "association," not a "party." In a speech to the 
Nationalist Congress on 5 January 1940, Smetona stated that a political 
party deals only with a certain portion of society and is operated 
according to principles of democracy. The Nationalist Association, on 
the other hand, is ruled from above by the Leader not according to pars 
(a portion of the nation), but in tota (the nation in its entirety). 8 
6Audenas, p. 115. 
1 Albertas Gerutis, "Independent Lithuania," in Lithuania 700 
Years, 2nd rev. ed., Albertas Gerutis (New York: Manyland, 1969), pp. 
228-229; !ndrius Ryliskis, Fragmentai is praeities ~~lu: Atsiminimai 
(Fragments From the Mists of the Past: Reminiscences), ed. Povilas 
Gaucys (Chicago: n:p., 1974), p. 374. For biographies of other famous 
leaders, such as Lineoln, Gandhi, Woodrow Wilson, and "Kaiser Wilhelm II, 
in addition to analytic: . and . psychological essays, . see. Charles B. 
Strozier and Daniel Offer, eds., The Leader: Psychohistori.£!_1 Essays 
(New York: Plenum Press,, 1985). 
8 Audenas, pp. 116-117. 
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Smetona was also viewing the European context. He saw that, other than 
Czechoslovakia, there were no liberal governments remaining in East-
Central Europe. In such a climate, the nation's leadership must be 
strong and vigilant. There was no place for traditional liberalism in 
the interwar atmosphere.9 
Despite the negative connotation associated with interwar 
European "leadership," Smetona must be, judged differently. Personally, 
he was a quiet, gentle person. Politically, he was a moderating 
counterweight to the more radical Augustinas Voldemaras. 
Smetona saw some good in Fascism, but he considered it alien to 
Lithuania and therefore did not copy it too closely. He opposed 
National Socialism outright and condemned it pub1bcly. It is, 
however, quite clear that Smetona was not a democrat. 
Under Smetona, political development was retarded and the political 
arsenal declined in the sense that new political figures could not 
develop. Political affairs were the exclusive preserve of Smetona and 
the Nationalists. In this sphere, "the nation was not allowed to 
speak." 11 
9Edvardas Sulaitis, "A. Smetona apie kariuomene" ("A. Smetona on 
the Army"), Karys, June-July 1959, p. 162. For an overview of 
Lithuanian nationalism see Leonas Sabaliunas, Lithuania in Crisis: 
Nationalism to Communism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 
pp. 25-40. 
10v. Stanley Vardys, "Independent Lithuania: A Profile," in 
~~ia Under the -~oviets: Portrait of a NationL- 1940~-' ed. V. 
Stanley Vardys (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 36. 
11 Audenas, pp. 103-105. 
62 
B. THE POLITICS OF THE SMETONA ERA 
The Smetona regime is ambivalent with regard to scholarly 
analysis. Though authoritarian, there were many manifestations that the 
regime was a relatively benign one. Many pleas for commutation of the 
death sentence were approved by Smetona. They would be ~educed to life 
sentences, and political prisoners were often released under amnesty 
after several years of serving the commuted sentence. Another example 
is aviation officer Antanas Maciuika. Maciuika was the officer who 
dispersed the Seimas on the night of the coup. He would later offer 
several challenges to the regime, demanding that Voldemaras be returned 
to the post of prime min·ister. 12 Nevertheless, Maciuika rose to the 
rank of lieutenant colonel, holding important posts in military and 
civilian life, even serving as ''One of the attorneys connected to the 
Lithuanian Supreme Court in 1939. Kazys Grinius, Jr. , son of the 
deposed president, rose to the rank of colonel and served as military 
attache to Berlin 1937-1940. 
The ambivalent nature of the politics of the Smetana era is 
brought out in the analyses of Pakstas, Vardys, and the US House of 
Representatives: 
Some called the Nationalist regime of 1927-1939 a fascist 
dictatorship friendly to Moscow, others considered it as a special 
form of semi-democracy. This author is inclined to label it 'semi-
democracy, semi-dictatorship' with a few totalitarian attributes. 
Though all political parties (except Nationalists) were closed in 
1929-1930, 6,600 various cultural, professional and economic 
societies were functioning under mild police supervision; and a vast 
12As will be dicussed below, Voldemaras was forcibly removed 
from the post by Smetona in 1929. 
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majority of these societies was not dominated by the Nationalists. 
The opposition press was censored, but not liquidated. For instance, 
the Catholic daily 'The Twentieth Century' was the most influential, 
with the Liberal daily 'The News of Lithuania' next in importance. 
Most of the private Lithuanian and Jewish schools were still open and 
even subsidized by the government. President Smetona was held in 
great esteem by the orthodox Jews and by a part of the Polish 
minority interested to preserve their larger landed properties. A. 
Smetana had been assistant professor of Greek philosophy and was an 
admirer of Plato. With this background and his conservative 
humanistic leanings he was not suited to be a really totalitarian 
dictator. Thus, some foreign observers used to label Lithuania a 
'dictatorship without a dictator.' In German literature this was 
called 'Eingeschraenkte Demokratie' (limited or restricted 
democracy). In short, the Lithuanian democratic opposition was too 
numerous and too influential to submit to the much smaller 
Nationalist group of totalitarian leanings. 13 
The regime that the Nationalists created defies easy definition. It 
certainly was not totalitarian; opposition, though outlawed, 
functioned unofficially, and many opposition leaders were strongly 
entrenched in the universities and schools and in a number of large 
state-supported cooperatives. Although controlled and hampered, 
several thousand associations continued their work and only a small 
part of the press was in Nationalist hands. Press censorship 
existed, but it was not absolute. Arrests of opposition leaders, 
although numerous in the early 1930's, almost ceased by 1938. 
Economic activity was completely free. Minorities were protected. 
Attempts to overthrow the regime were put down, yet capital 
punishment against conspirators was extremely rare and only 
Communists were held in prisons for extended periods of time. The 
regime was certainly more moderate than Mussolini's and gentler than 
Pilsudski's personal dictatorship in Poland. Indeed, the 
Nationalist regime could not introduce totalitarianism, because the 
forces of democratic opposition were too strong and had to be handled 
by less extreme methods. A mild-mannered man, Smetana could not be 
compared to Mussolini, Hitler, or even Pilsudski. He kept the regime 
in power largely by using political patronage and cleverly playing 
off the competing governmental institutions and political forces, 
including his own supporters, against on!!! another. The regime was 
constantly subject to pressures at home. 1q , 
It is even noteworthy that even stro~g opposition leaders to 
Smetona 's rule found it impossible to label his regime as Fascist or 
13 Pakstas, p. 22. Pakstas' emphasis. 
14 Vardys, p. 37. 
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dictatorial in the accepted sense. In the face of the 
extraordinary complexities that faced Smetona from Poland over 
Vilnius and, later from Germany over Klaipeda, to say nothing of 
internal stresses and strains, the semiauthoritarian rule he directed 
from 1928 to 1938 might well go down in the history of Europe as more 
the government of enlightened statesmanship than the government of 
one-man rule. 15 
C. PRIME MINISTER AUGUSTINAS VOLDEMARAS 1926-1929 
While the regime of President Antanas Smetona may have been one 
of enlightened authoritarianism, it almost did not come to pass. In the 
first two years of his regime, he had to contend with the more radical 
Nationalist prime minister Professor Augustinas Voldemaras. Voldemaras 
was a brilliant, often arrogant and ascerbic, scholar who specialized in 
hi story, politics and languages. He spoke sever al languages fluently. 
While heading up the cabinet, he also served as minister of foreign 
affairs and, for the last few months of his rule, as minister of 
defense. His radicalism, aggressiveness, and arrogance caused him to 
lose support not only in military circl~s, but among the Nationalists as 
' -
well. 16 His extreme anti-Polish stance also contributed to this 
15u.s. Hous·e of ·Representatives, Third Interim· Report of the 
Select Committee on Communist Aggression, 83rd Congress, Second Session 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 128-129; see 
also pp. 126, 127. For accounts of the early development of Lithuanian 
political parties, see M. Kersis, Lietuviu politikos partijos 
(Lithuanian Political Parties) (n.p.: n.p., 1921); Martisius, 
Valstieciai liaudininkai arba valstieciu sajunga (Peasant Populists or 
the Peasant Association) (Kaunas: Liaudies politikos knygynelis I 
People's Political Library, 1923); Meskus (pseud. for Bishop Justinas 
Staugaitis of Telsiai), Musu politines partijos ir ko jos nori (Our 
Political Parties and What They Want) (Kaunas: Sviesa, 1923). 
16Aleksandras Merkelis, Antanas Smetona: Jo visuomenine, 
kulturine ir politine veikla (Antanas Smetona: His Social, Cultural, and 
Political Activity) (New York: American Lithuanian National Association, 
1964), p. 366. 
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disaffection. According to Voldemaras, "Lithuania had only two things 
in common with Poland, namely, the Catholic religion and 525 kilometers 
of demarcation line." 17 Voldemaras was aware that his power base was 
eroding and took steps to rectify the situation. 
[Voldemaras] endeavored to build a personal following among the 
younger nationalist officers who were favorably impressed by emergent 
fascism. The majority of the senior officers favored 
conservative policies and usually stood by the chief executive 
[Smetona]. On the other hand, the dynamic personality of Professor 
Voldemaras continued to attract admirers among the _younger officers 
who were displeased with Smetona's moderate course. 1 ~ 
Voldemaras and this group of younger officers condemned the government 
for being too conservative and not nationalistic enough. It would 
eventually develop that the Smetona regime, or any regime which did not 
include Voldemaras, must be opposed. Smetona, of course, would find 
such attitudes unacceptable and take steps against his opponents, 
including his own prime minister. 19 
On 6 May 1929, three leftist students attempted to assassinate 
Voldemaras as he was entering a theater in Kaunas with his family. 
Voldemaras escaped unharmed but one aide, Voldemaras' nephew Major 
Leonas Virbickas, was injured and another, Captain Pranas Gudynas, was 
17 Owen J.C. Norem, Timeless Lithuania, 2nd ed. (Cleveland: 
Viltis, 1967), p. 227. See also Benedict V. Maciuika, ed. Lithuania in 
the Last 30 Years, Subcontractor's monograph prepared in the Division of 
the Social Sciences at the University of Chicago. HRAF Subcontract 
HRAF-1 Chi-1 (New Haven, CT: ,Human Relations Area Files, 1955), p. 58. 
18sabaliurtas, pp. 257, 46 quoted in Kristina Vaicikonis, 
"Augustinas Voldemaras," !::_ituanus, 30,· 3 (Fall 1984), 76. 
19see Maciuika, P•. 61; Norem, pp. 131-132 • 
• 
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killed. This incident further turned Voldemaras toward the clique of 
officers he was forming. The clique, formed within the Iron Wolf Sports 
Association (Gelezinio vilko sporto sajunga), will be di~cussed in more 
depth in the following section.20 
Smetana, concerned about Voldemaras and the opposition he was 
fomenting among the younger officers, decided to end Voldemaras' 
political career. On 19 September 1929, after having served as prime 
minister for almost three years, Smetana dismissed the cabinet and 
appointed his brother-in-law, Juozas Tubelis, prime minister. Later 
that month, Voldemaras was forcibly evicted by the police from the 
apartment of the director of the Bank of Lithuania. Voldemaras had 
conrnandeered the residence for himself. He was exiled to Plateliai, 
later Zarasai. It was then that the secretive Iron Wolf organization 
mobilized more fully around Voldemaras and sought to return him to 
political power -- by force, if necessary.21 
D. THE IRON WOLF PARA-MILITARY ASSOCIATION 
During the cabinet crisis in which Voldemaras was removed from 
20Major Virbickas, the injured aide, writes that one of 
Voldemaras' relatives was injured in the attack. See Stepas Jakubickas, 
Kas yra Lietuvos atgimino sajudis (What the Lithuanian Renaissance 
League Is) (Delhi, ONT: L.R.L. Canadian Region, 1978), p. 48. Andrius 
Bulota writes that Voldemaras' arm was injured, though this fact was 
never publicized. See his Limuzinas nr. 4: Dokumentine apysaka 
(Limousine No. 4: A Documentary Narrative) (Vilnius: Vaga, 1977), p. 95. 
21see "Predict Lithuanian coup: Army reported to be ready to 
oust Premier Voldemaras, 11 The New York Times, 31 January 1929, p. 3. 
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power, one hundred "wolves" were prepared to act against Smetona and the 
government on behalf of their mentor. 22 What was the Iron Wolf? It was 
an organization patterned after the Blackshirts of Italy. The name of 
the organization was derived from the legend of the founding of the city 
of Vilnius. Gediminas, a grand duke of _Lithuania, allegedly had a dream 
about a wolf in a suit of armor. A soothsayer then interpreted it to 
mean that Gediminas must build a great city; that city would become 
Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania. 
Iron Wolf was founded in the fall of 1927. It was the Iron Wolf 
Sports Association (Gelezinio v:f.lko sporto sajunga). Its motto was 
"National honor, State welfare!" (Tautos garbe, Valstybes gerovel). The 
organization's political programr dictated that any government which 
seeks national unity, honor, the welfare of the state, honors _religion 
and guarantees property rights 111ust, be protected. 23 Iron Wolf was 
Voldemaras' prop. Its official chief was Smetona, but the president had 
little actual influence over its members. Voldemaras was the actual 
head of the organization, who was designated sponsor and chief leader 
(globejas ir vyriausias vadas). 
These extreme nationalists who operated semi-secretly wished to 
stabilize the post-coup situation, defend the regime, and keep opposi-
tion parties out of government. 24 A person who joined was a candidate 
22Andrius Bulota, Nuo baltojo zir~o __ i:_ki svastikos (From the 
White Steed to the SwastikafCVilnius: State Political and Scientific 
Press, 1962), pp.-85-86. 
23Bulota, Nuo~~alto.J.£_~irgo iki svastikos, pp. 73-74. 
24Bulota, Nuo balt_£Jo zirg~-~ki svastikos, p. 72. 
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for three months. If nothing unacceptable was discovered about him, he 
was allowed to give the oath, which included kneeling and kissing a 
dagger. Each member then secretly carried the dagger and possibly a 
firearm. This could have been a factor attractirlg youth to the 
organization. 25 
The membership of Iron Wolf represented people from different 
walks of life: lawyers, physicians, police officers, Internal Security 
Department agents, bureaucrats, foresters, students. More important for 
this study though, is the presence of reserve and active army NCOs and 
officers in the rolls of the organization. 26 Captain Antanas Maciuika 
was a leading member of Iron Wolf. The day Voldemaras was removed as 
prime minister, he met with Maciuika three times, possibly seeking the 
army's support through the organization. 27 Another top member and 
supporter of Voldemaras was Reserve Lieutenant Al gird as Sliesorai tis, 
25Apolinaras Bagdonas, ed., Lietuvos olici a istatymu ir 
tvarkos tarnyboje (Lithuania's Police in the Service of Law and Order 
(Chicago: Lithuanian Police Club "Kri v\iTe," 1974), p. 150; Bulota, Nuo 
baltojo ~irgg ___ iki svastikos, p. 74; Merkelis, p. 366. Nationalist 
Association member and future prime minister Rev. Vladas Mironas 
presided at the first secret swearing-in ceremony. See Bulota, Nuo 
baltojo zirgo iki s~~stikos, p. 74. 
26Bagdonas, p. 149; B. Baranauskas, ed., Gelezinis Vilkas (Iron 
Wolf), vol 7. of an archival documentary fi~collected by the 
Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences (Vilnius: Mintis, 1965), pp. 22, 24, 
58-59; Bulota, Nuo ba_~~~-z~!ki svastikos, pp. 77, 79; Lithuanian 
Christian Democratic Assooiation, Arkiytskupas Mecislovas ·Rein.ya 
(Archibishop Mecislovas ~~inys) (Chicago: L.C.D.A., 1977), p. 92. 
27Jonas Augustaitis, Antanas Smeton~. ir jo veikla (Antanas 
Smetona and His Work) (Chicago: Chicago Lithuanian Literary Society, 
1966), p. 90. 
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who edited Tautos kelias (Nation's Road), the newspaper of the 
Voldemaras faction. Sliesorai tis headed up the staff of Iron Wolf in 
1928 and 1929. Other members of the staff included Captain Maciuika, 
Major Leonas Virbickas, Captain Juozas Gineitis, Captain Pranas Gudynas, 
and aviation Major Jonas Pyragius. The staff of the Kaunas chapter 
included some members of the army's general staff •28 
The activity of wolves was dictated by secret instruction 32, 
which told them to "See all, Know all." They were to collect 
information on opposition parties and other organizations. They were 
also to monitor anti-state activity, especially by government workers. 
They would, for example, report on teachers and other bureaucrats, 
recommending whom to hire, fire, and promote. Iron Wolf attempted to 
purge the National Guard of elements with questionable loyalty to the 
regime. Thus Order (No. 1 )5 instructing all wolves to join the Guard 
was issued on 5 January 1928. Procedures indluded secret and coded 
correspondence, along with passwords and high signs. There were 
standing assembly and action orders in case of emergency. Activity was 
guarded by such se.crecy that there was one incident where a lower-
ranking police official refused to unlock a drawer for his superior 
because it contained some of the organization's secret papers. 29 
While Iron Wolf had been organized officially as a sports 
organization seeking to inculcate obedience and dispose of undesirable 
28Bulota, Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, p. 73. 
29Bagdonas, pp. 149-150; Bulota Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, 
pp. 68, 74, 82, 84. 
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elements through sports and drill, it assumed a broader dimension in 
August 1929 when sports became a secondary activity and more secret 
political activity assumed increased importance. It was now to be an 
internal regime army combating anti-nationalism and foreign anti-state 
elements. It was to defend any government which promoted nationalism --
and the authority of the leaders of Iron Wolf. Further, only 
Lithuanians could belong to the organization and expelled members were 
to be persecuted. 30 In the process, though, Iron Wolf became self-
willed and arbitrary, and began to terrorize the opposition. Even 
before Iron Wolf was officially formed, it had experimented with such 
activity. In his memoirs, President Grinius writes that individuals, 
later members of Iron Wolf, blew up the "Varpas" press on 11 March 
1927. It was here that the Peasant Populists printed the Lietuvos 
zinios (Lithuania's News) newspaper and other publications. The wolves 
were also known for breaking into homes and apartments at night, beating 
and threatening those whom they felt were not sufficiently loyal to the 
regime. They sometimes took victims outside city limits for late night 
interrogations.31 
There was some reaction to the wolves' activity. A group of 
Catholic students, members of the "Ateitis" Catholic Federation's 
"Kestutis" Fraternity, organized armed protection for Catholic 
-----------------
30Bulota, Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, pp. 73-74. 
31Kazys Grinius, Apie 1926 m. gruodzio 17-os dienos perversma 
(On the Coup of 17 December 1926) (Chicago: Chicago Lithuanian Literary 
Society, 1954), p. 273. 
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leaders. Later, however, an informal arragement was concluded whereby 
Iron Wolf would not attack Catholic leaders and "Kestutis" would remove 
its armed guards.32 
The terror assumed such proportions that the Vienybe (Unity) 
newspaper, published in the US by Lithuanian-Americans, called Iron Wolf 
Lithuania's Ku Klux Klan in 1928.33 President Smetona, who as chief was 
supposedly the supreme authority of the organization, but who practical-
ly had no ties to it, became increasingly critical of the wolves.34 The 
first strike was Voldemaras' ouster from government in September 1929. 
Subsequently, the liquidation of Iron Wolf commenced. Voldemaras was 
removed as sponsor of the organization and replaced by Colonel Brunonas 
Stencelis, the general secretary of the Interior Ministry. He was 
charged with disarming and disbanding the organization. Needless to 
say, the wolves were not pleased with these developments. It was as if 
there were now two organizations, with different groups of wolves 
obeying either Lieutenant Algirdas Sliesoraitis or Stencelis.35 
Though the organization was officially outlawed in 1930, it 
continued to operate secretly. The wolves were reorganized into groups 
of five (penketuku sistema) which were led by instructors. Captain 
32Lithuanian Christian Democratic Association, pp. 92-93. 
33J. Ziugzda, et al., eds., Lietuvos TSR istorija nuo 1917 iki 
1940 (History of the Lithuanian SSR 1917-1940) (Vilnius: Mintis, 1965), 
III, 215. 
34Merkelis, pp. 366-367. 
35Bulota, Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, pp. 92-98; Merkelis, 
p. 374. 
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Juozas Gineitis, who worked for Captain Antanas Maciuika, was at the 
head of this network. During his vacation in the summer of 1930, 
Captain Leonas Virbickas travelled Lithuania and contacted various Iron 
Wolf instructors.36 They continued to operate and terrorize various 
individuals, often challenging the regime itself. In 1930, several 
wolves attempted to assasinate Colonel Steponas Rusteika, director of 
the Internal Security Department of the Interior Ministry.37 
On 6 May 1934, the Voldemaras faction reorganized itself into 
the Lithuanian Nationalist Party (Lietuviu Nacionalistu Partija). While 
this made the wolves sound more respectable, a scant one month later 
they would carry out the greatest challenge to the Smetona regime, the 
Kubiliunas Revolt, which will be discussed below.38 
E. CHALLENGES TO THE REGIME 
In one meeting of the cabinet of Prime Minister Antanas Merkys, 
Interior Minister Brigadier General Kazys Skucas remarked that there had 
been fourteen revolts against the regime in the thirteen years following 
36Bulota, Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, p. 92; Maciuika, 
p. 58. 
37Bagdonas, p. 151; Bulota, Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, 
PP. 1 04-11 4. 
38Jakstas, p. 141; Jakubickas, p. 20; Merkelis, p. 422. The 
Jakubickas book is a pro-Voldemaras work published by his faction, which 
reorganized itself in 1948 into the Lithuanian Renaissance League 
(Lietuvos Atgimimo Sajudis). This League still publishes the Free 
Lithuania (Laisvoji Lietuva) newspaper in Chicago. The Iron Wolf logo 
and motto are on the masthead. Jakubickas participated in the 
Kubiliunas Revolt as an NCO and was sentenced to fifteen years in 
prison. President Smetona amnestied him, along with many others, in 
1937. See Jakubickas, p. 21. 
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the 1926 coup.39 There were indeed many serious challenges to the 
regime, involving both military and non-military elements. The NCO 
revolt of 1934 was discovered in advance. Its aim was the restqration 
of Voldemaras and General Petras Kubiliunas to power as prime minister 
and chief of staff, respectively. The Suvalkai farmers strike of 1935 
was violent and disruptive.40 
Attempted and unsuccessful revolts had obvious politico-military 
implications. On 21 February 1927, Dr Juozas Pajaujis, a Peasant Popu-
list Seimas deputy, gave a speech condemning the coup. He was also 
conferring with a number of officers regarding the possibility of a 
counter-coup. The plot, however, was discovered by Smetona 's security 
agents and Pajaujis, along with the other plotters, was arrested on 4 
April. On 28 April he was sentenced to death, though Smetona later 
commuted it to life in prison. Subsequent to his arrest,. leftist 
deputies issued an interpellation in the Seimas, charging that the 
government had violated the immunity of a Seimas deputy. Voldemaras 
39Audenas, p. 106. 
4
°For information regarding the Taurage revolt see Augustaitis, 
Antanas Smetona, pp. 62-63; Bagdonas, pp. 154-155; I. Lempertas, 
"Fasistines diktaturos Lietuvoje klasines esmes klausimu" ("On the 
Question of the Class Essence of the Fascist Dictatorship in 
Lithuania"), 175; Merkelis, pp. 358, 404-405; Rapolas Skipitis 
Nepriklausoma Lietuva: Atsiminimai (Independent Lithuania: 
Reminiscences) (Chicago: Draugas, 1967), pp. 121-129. Bulota, Nuo 
baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, p. 122 writes of the NCO plot. For the 
Suvalkai farmers strike see Juozas Kondratas, Tolimos pabares (Distant 
Fields) (Vilnius: Vaga, 1971), pp. 9-18; J. Macijauskas~ Saule leidzias, 
saule teka: Atsiminimai (The Sun Sets, The Sun Rises: Reminiscences) 
(Vilnius: State Literary Press, 1961), pp. 124-125; Maciuika 61. 
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responded on 12 April, though the Seimas would continue, with a 4/5 
majority, to vote no confidence in the government. At the same session, 
Voldemaras read President Smetona's decree dissolving the Seimas without 
issuing a new date for elections, as required by the Constitution. This 
was the second "constitutional" coup which placed Smetona and Voldemaras 
firmly in control of the government. 41 
Colonel Jonas Petrui tis, who led his second infantry regiment 
during the coup, was named commanding officer of the second infantry 
division and commander of the Kaunas garrison in the summer of 1927. He 
was a good friend of the president, visited him often, and was almost on 
a first name basis with him. However, he was also a Christian Democrat 
and friend of Christian Democratic leader Dr. Leonas Bistras. Bistras 
urged Petrui tis to bring the Christian Democrats into office and both 
began planning a revolt. In November 1927, Petruitis, along with Majors 
Juozas Grazulis and Ignas Slapsys, visited Smetona and informed him of 
discontent growing in the military, advising that the Seimas and 
democracy be returned. Smetona responded that it was too early. During 
a second visit with Grazulis only, Petruitis' advice became a demand, an 
ultimatum. He was subsequently discharged and asked to leave Kaunas to 
his farm in Daugai. Petruitis was still allowed to visit the city and 
did so. On one occasion, while wearing civilian clothing, he met and 
spoke with his friend and successor as commander of the second infantry 
41 Jakstas, p. 124; Merkelis, pp. 343, 358. Pajaujis was granted 
amnesty on 1 September 1929 under the condition that he leave 
Lithuania. He spent three years in Paris and then returned. In 1934 he 
founded and taught at the Institute of Conmerce in Klaipeda. 
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regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Bronius Ivanauskas. 
Ivanauskas was discharged.42 
Several days hence, 
The coup of December 1926 had been motivated by patriotism. 
Subsequent regime challenges were motivated by two different forces. 
Some officers, sympathetic to opposition groups, wished to turn the 
country toward democracy. Others, officers loyal to Voldemaras, wished 
to institute a more rigid regime. Though officers could not formally 
belong to a politic al party, different factions possessed different 
officers expressing sympathies. 43 
Different commentators claim varying results of the various 
challenges to the regime. Smetona's biographer writes that whereas the 
coup weakened the government, subsequent revolts actually made the 
government stronger, demonstrating the need for a strong regime. In 
Lithuania's case, partisan politics were not suited for affairs of 
state. 44 Most writers, however, write that challenges had negative 
effects on the state, the nation, and the military. As far as they are 
concerned, each revolt served to degrade and demoralize the officer 
corps as a whole. As officers were punished, otherwise good military 
men were lost. They became politicized and no longer trusted the 
42Petras Jurgela and Pauli us Jurkus, Gen. Povilas Plechavicius 
(Brooklyn: Karys, 1978), pp. 65-66; Merkelis, pp. 358-359; Antanas 
Rukas, ed., Mykolas Slezevicius (Chicago: Terra, 1954), p. 272; 
Ski pi tis, Nepriklausoma Lietuva, pp. 130-133. 
43For ~xample, see Bronys Raila, Pag_uoda (Solace) (London: Nida, 
1974), II, 207. 
44Merkelis; p. 359. 
! \ ,I 
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political leadership. Other officers were persuaded that the only 
solution was to take the 1926 coup even further, bringing the government 
to the extreme right. Such a government, presumably, could maintain 
better control and discipline within the army and society. 45 The 
Kubiliunas revolt of 6-7 June 1934 sought such a solution. 
F. THE KUBILIUNAS REVOLT OF JUNE 1934 
According to General Stasys Rastikis, the motto of the Kubiliu-
nas revolt could very well have been "Topple Tubelis' government!" 
Rastikis searches for politic al reasons for this anti-regime outburst. 
There was no national representation since the dissolution of the 
Seimas. There was no brake on governmental power. Indeed, not even 
Smetona could fully control his own government. Without the Seimas, 
there was no other political organ where politic al differences and 
frustations could be ameliorated; no sense of parliamentarianism 
existed. 46 
The individuals who masterminded the revolt were members of the 
Voldemaras faction and Iron Wolf. The center of activity was the Air 
45stasys Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones: Is mano uzrasu (Events and 
Personalities: From My Notes), ed. Bronius Kviklys (Chicago: Akademines 
skautijos leidykla I Academic Press, 1972), pp. 215-216. See also 
Bulota, Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, p. 125; Grinius, p. 276. 
46Rastikis, I, p. 447. For accounts of the revolt and its 
aftermath see "Ex-premier sentenced: Waldemaras [sic] gets 12 years for 
plot in Lithuania," The New York Times, 19 June 1934, p. 7; K. U., "1934-
tuju metu sukilimas" ("The 1934 Revolt"), Karys, May 1974, pp. 163-167, 
June-July 1974, pp. 209-212; "Lithuanian coup reported nipped," The New 
York Times, 8 June 1934, p. 10; Jonas Svoba, Seimine ir prezidentine 
Lietuva (Parliamentar_x and Presidential Lithuania) (Cleveland: Viltis, 
1985), pp. 229-235. 
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Club (Aeroklubas) in Kaunas, frequented by air force officers. They 
included Major Jonas Pyragius, former chief of staff Lieutenant Colonel 
Juozas Narakas, Lieutenant Colonel Antanas Haciuika, Captain Vlad as 
Morkus. 47 The name popularly attributed to the uprising implies that 
Chief of Staff General Petras Kubiliunas was the chief culprit. That is 
not the case at all, though. The Voldemaras faction was actually using 
him as an instrument, an intermediary. 48 
Kubiliunas was a distinguished military man who had served with 
honor in W0rld War I and during Lithuania,'s wars ,of independence. He 
was a graduate of the Czechoslovakian Military Academy and Lithuania's 
Senior Officer Courses. In 1930 he established the firing range at 
Gaiziunai. The following year he established the. Grand Duke Vytautas 
Senior Military School (DLK Vytauto Aukstoji Karo Mokykla). He was 
appointed chief of staff on 10 February 1929 and soon earned respect and 
admiration as a military organizer, reformer, and educator. He was even 
close to the president, often accompanying him horseback riding. 
Despite these impressive facts and his good intentions, he was a poor 
politician who could not comprehend complex political affairs and 
interpersonal relations. He was uninterested in politics and lent his 
support to no political faction. Indeed he felt contempt toward 
political parties, which he felt ignored the interest of the nation in 
-----------------47 J. Jakai tis, Isdavystes keliu (The Path of Treason) (Vilnius: 
Mintis, 1976), p. 12. See also Kazys Musteikis, Prisiminimu fragmentai 
(Fragments of Memories) (London: Nida, 1970), pp. 17, 19. 
48Jakubickas, p. 64. 
78 
favor of partisan advantage. 49 
This political ignorance must be understood within the context 
of the relationship between Kubiliunas and Defense Minister Colonel 
Balys Giedrai tis. There was a great deal of tension between the two 
men. Giedraitis, who had been appointed minister on 28 June 1930, was a 
good administrator, but slightly incompetent regarding military 
matters. This was juxtaposed with Kubiliunas, one of the most competent 
military professionals Lithuania ever produced. He was of the opinion 
that Giedraitis was holding back military arming and strengthening. The 
economic crises in Europe meant that Lithuania could not arm its 
military as quickly as it would have liked. However, since Kubiliunas 
concentrated only on military matters, he did not understand this. This 
animosity was exacerbated when budget shifts went against the defense 
ministry and in favor of the agriculture ministry, whose head was Prime 
Minister Juozas Tubelis. Kubiliunas blamed Giedraitis, whom he felt 
could not adequately defend the military's interests in the cabinet. In 
addition to disliking Giedraitis and Tubelis, Kubiliunas also disliked 
Interior Minister Colonel Steponas Rusteika, whose Internal Security 
49Herkelis, pp. 422-423; Musteikis, p. 12; Stasys Rastikis, 
Lietuvos likimo keliais: Is mano uzrasu (On the Roads of Lithuania's 
Destiny: From Hy Notes), ed. Jonas Dainauskas (Chicago: Akademines 
skautijos leidykla I Academic Press, 1982), pp. 233, 251. For 
biographical information see A. -Sova, "Buve vadai ir tautiniai herojai" 
("Past Leaders and National Heroes"), Karys, March 1975, pp. 92-94; A. 
Sova, "Generolas Petras Kubiliunas" ("General Petras Kubiliunas"), 
Karys, February 1976, pp. 49-53, March 1976, pp. 87-93; O. Urbonas, 
"Generolas Petras Kubiliunas" ("General Petras Kubiliunas"), Karys, 
June-July 1973, pp. 195-200. Cf. chap. 2 of this study for professional 
military contempt toward politics. 
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Department had begun surveillance of officers.so 
The Voldemaras group played on Kubiliunas' anger, urging him to 
frighten Smetona into replacing Prime Minister Tubelis with Professor 
Voldemaras. According to their logic, this would be beneficial for both 
domestic and foreign politics. If Voldemaras were prime minister, so 
the scenario went, relations with Germany would improve. In turn, it 
would purchase Lithuanian agricultural products, eliminating the 
economic crisis and rejuvenating agriculture. In this improved economic 
situation, the military would be able to arm and improve. Kubiliunas 
did not have to oust Smetona, whom he respected, but merely ask that new 
leadership be brought into government.5 1 
With these aims in mind, on the night of 6-7 June 1934, the 
chief of staff confronted his commander-in-chief. The Internal Security 
Department had discovered the plot and war.ned the government. 152 
military policemen and twenty-five soldiers were guarding the 
presidential residence. Thus the men commanded by Kubiliunas could not 
surround Smetana, and the pre.sident could speak with authority. The two 
companies that Kubiliunas marched through Kaunas, along with several 
tanks, were ordered back to their barracks by Kubiliunas himself - a 
sign of his fidelity to the president. Kubiliunas was not willing to 
have Lithuanian troops fight among each other, for the cadets of the 
Military Academy and the men of the second infantry regiment were 
50Merkelis, pp. 423-424; Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones, p. 96. 
51Merkelis, p. 424. 
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prepared to liquidate the revolt. Two delegations of officers headed by 
Kubiliunas would visit Smetona and demand changes in the cabinet. On 
both occasions, Smetana refused to negotiate and stated that he would 
not make such decisions under duress. Since Kubiliunas was a loyal 
officer, and since the commander-in-chief was calling his bluff, the 
revolt thus ended.52 
Meanwhile, Professor Augustin as Voldemaras had been flown from 
exile in Zarasai to Kaunas and waited at air force headquarters. 
However, it was soon realized that the attempt had failed. Under 
demands from the government, Colonel Juozas Narakas brought Voldemaras 
to military headquarters, where he was arrested by Defense Minister 
Giedraitis. 53 
Though others organized the revolt, Kubiliunas lent his 
authority to it. Thus a court-martial sentenced him to death. Two 
other officers, Colonel Narakas- and Lieutenant Colonel Jonas Backis, 
received the same sentence. In response to requests for clemency, 
Smetana commuted the sentences to life for Kubiliunas, twelve and 
fifteen years respectively for Narakas and Backis. Narakas was 
amnestied 8 April 1936, Kubiliunas and Backis 16 February 1937. 
Kubiliunas was allowed to live on his farm. A number of officers 
received prison sentences. Others were transferred to different 
52
.For details of the revolt see Jakstas,' pp. 141-142; Merkelis, 
pp. 424-428;> 'Musbe·ikis., pp. 15-18; Norem, p.· 137. 
53Jaksta::t,. p. ,142; Musteiki~, pp. 18-19; Skipitis, Nepriklausoma 
Lietuva, p. 147. Jakstas wrftes 'that Voldemaras remarked to air force 
officers, "You brought me right into prison." 
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units. Approximately seventy officers were discharged. The fortunate 
ones were able to remain in the reserve. The unfortunate ones were 
demoted to enlisted grades, had their shoulder insignia cut off in front 
of the men, and were dishonorably discharged.54 General Rastikis writes 
that "many stars fell from shoulders" following the revolt.55 
Although Kubiliunas and the Iron Wolf failed to bring about a 
change in the regime, Smetona decided to replace a number of ministers 
on 12 June. One of them was the new defense minister, General Petras 
Sniuksta, the longtime head of the military tribunal system. He had, 
according to Rastikis, a better working relationship with the military 
leadership.5 6 Tubelis, however, remained as prime minister. The 
Nationalists were not prepared to relinquish relevant political power --
and were certainly not willing to allow Voldemaras to gain a foot in the 
political door. 
There were other high-level changes in military attaches and 
unit commanders. The new chief of staff was Lieutenant General Jonas 
Jackus, a hot-tempered man who dealt with the rebels severely. However, 
a brain hemorrhage would incapacitate him soon after his apointment. 
The new commandant of the Military Academy was Colonel Jonas Cerni us, 
who would become chief of staff the following year. Significantly, 
54Bulota,Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, p. 124; Jakubickas, p. 
65; Merkelis, p. 428; Musteikis, pp. 20-21; Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones, 
p. 96; Skipitis, Nepriklausoma Lietuva, p. 148. 
55Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones, p. 97. 
56Rastikis, I, p. 487. 
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Major Aloyzas Valusis was named the commander of a cavalry regiment. 
Valusis was Smetona's first military aide following the coup ~ and his 
son-in-law. The changes on the military chessboard meant that some 
individuals, such as Cerni us, Stasys Rastikis, and Kazys Musteikis, a 
future defense minister, would become general officers out of 
sequence. This occurred at other grades as well. It was the inevitable 
result of political considerations playing a greater role in military 
appointments. 57 Further aspects of politico-military affairs will be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
G. THE FATE OF VOLDEMARAS 
A military tribunal sentenced Professor Augustinas Voldemaras to 
twelve years imprisonment. He was amnestied, though, in 1938 under the 
condition that he leave the country. After spending some time in Paris 
and Rome, he violated his exile .and returned to Lithuania in 1939. He 
was seized at the border and sent once again to Zarasai in northeastern 
Lithuania. Voldemaras was exiled again in the spring of 1940. 
Following the Soviet occupation of Lithuania on 15 June 1940, 
Voldemaras, for some as yet unknown reason, returned to Lithuania. He 
was seized at the border and deported to the Soviet Union. Death came 
in a Moscow prison on 16 December 1942 -- almost exactly sixteen years 
after the coup. 
Iron Wolf continued to operate under the guise of the Lithuanian 
Nationalist Party. The Voldemaras faction continued to subvert the 
57Augustaitis, Antanas Smetona, pp. 68-69; Merkelis, p. 427. 
83 
government and attempt to overthrow Smetona. However, Voldemaras and 
the wolves were never strong or organized enough to succeed.58 
58Bulota, Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, p. 149 writes that 
some of the Kubiliunas rebels amnestied several years after the revolt 
began agitating in the officer corps to overthrow Smetona. 
CHAPTER V 
POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS 
A. A POLITICIZED MILITARY 
According to Western tradition, the military is subordinate to 
civilian authority. This is one of the hallmarks of modern, liberal 
democracy. However, reality dictates that the two spheres cannot be 
wholly separated. For example, the political chief executive is also 
often the commander-in-chief of the military; the line is blurred. 
Defense belongs to politics and can be manipulated by it for selfish 
political ends. Indeed the military can become a blatantly political 
instrument. 1 General Stasys Dirmantas created an analogy between the 
military and a knife. According to him, a knife can be used to cut 
bread for the hungry - or to stab a person. 2 The politico-military 
connection during the Smetana regime demonstrated the ambivalent 
position of the military in both state and society. 
One school of thought says that the military had little 
influence in the politics of independent_ Lithua_nia. General Dirmantas 
stated that the "military never had decision-making authority in affairs 
1see Antanas Sova, "Del praeities ivykiu" ("About Past Events"), 
Dirva, 30 January 1974, p. 3. 
2A. Reklaitis, "Lietuvos kariuomenei prisiminti: Pasikalbejimas 
su Ramoves pirm. gen. S. Dirmantu" ("Remembering Lithuania's Army: 
Conversation with Ramove President General Sta sys Dirmantas"), Draugas, 
21 November 1964, p. 3. 
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"3 of state and the state was not militaristic. Gerutis writes: 
Since the regime came into existence as a result of a military coup, 
the army was to become an important politic al factor. Though the 
President constantly reiterated the importance of the army in the 
life of the state, there were no tendencies among the army officers 
to take a direct hand in the affairs of state. The officers' group 
which organized the coup turned the gove4nment over to civilians, and 
repeated their faith in Antanas Smetona. 
Granted the state was not militaristic and government was turned over to 
President Smetona. Yet, Gerutis appears to hedge his bets with regard 
to the role of the military in politics, granting it the status of 
"important political factor." 
A more realistic appraisal is made by those analysts who 
acknowledge the military's political role, attributing it to both 
internal and external factors. One example follows: 
The domestic politic al order in Lithuania had a number of innediate 
consequences to foreign and defense policies. Lithuania under the 
Nationalist one-party regime of President Antanas Smetona can be 
described as a partially mobilized conservative authoritarian system, 
without formal sub-system (infrastructure) autonomy, but with 
considerable pluralistic and competitive processes persisting among 
the input structures of the system. The anti-industrial and 
traditionalist bias of the Smetona regime, its conservative agrarian-
oriented economic policies 'in the long run imposed severe limitations 
on national military capabilities. Lithuanian society was only 
partially mobilized for the tasks of modernization, and this 
substantially affected national capabilities for self-defense. The 
army was mainly important for internal order, and the nation's 
security depended largely on the state of relations between Berlin, 
Moscow, and Warsaw. Furthermore, the nationalistic attitudes that 
the Smetona regime found necessary to promote, as means of 
maintaining unity and the regime itself, imposed severe limitations 
on the flexibility of foreign policy, especially on the handling of 
3Reklaitis, p. 3. 
4Albertas Gerutis, "Independent Lithuania," in Lithuania 700 
Years, 2nd rev. ed., ed. Albertas Gerutis (New York: Manyland, 1969), 
p. 222. 
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the key Vilnius question. Finally, one-party rule affected decision-
making capabilities and quality of leadership. On the one hand, the 
limited interest articulation and mobilization of society and, on the 
other hand, the logic of one-party rule resulted in a relative 
isolation of the Smetona regime from society and imposed severe 
constraints on wider consultation and recruitment of leaders.5 
The gist of the citation is that Lithuania had no control over its 
external affairs. Its relatively small army, though undoubtedly the 
guardian of independence until 1940, would have been ineffective against 
a deliberate attempt to destroy the Lithuanian state. Within the 
domestic context, however, the army was needed to guarantee the 
existence of the Smetona regime. The alliance between the Nation's 
Leader and the military was crucial to the survival of the post-coup 
order. 6 
Western politicians lamented this state of the Lithuanian 
military. Many senior officers, according to one American analyst, were 
merely political figures not interested in, or suited to, their 
duties. Instability and political intrigue affected not only the 
officer corps, but the enlisted ranks as well. This would change only 
in the latter years of independence.7 
5Thomas Remeikis, "The Impact of Internal Politics on Response 
Capabilities of the Lithuanian Regime to International Challenges, 1938-
1940," in Seoond Conference on Baltic Studies: Summari of Proceedings, 
ed. Rimvydas Silbajoris, ·et al. (Norman, OK: Association for the 
Advancement of Baltic Studies, 1971), p. 65. 
6cf. Vladas Krivickas, The Coup d 'Etat of 1926 in Lithuania, 
Diss. Columbia University 1970, p. 242. 
Vardys, 
Soviets: 
Praeger, 
7stasys Rastikis, Ivykiai ir' zmones, pp. 17-18; V. Stanley 
"Independent Lithuania: A Profile," in Lithuania Under the 
Portrait of a Nation, 1940-65, ed. V. Stanley Vardys (New York: 
1965). p .• 38. 
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Changes among the "Big Three" of the military, that is the 
defense minister, the commander-in-chief, and the chief of staff, were 
closely tied to politics. With almost every change in the cabinet, the 
military would receive three new men to run its affairs. This 
politicization allowed little, if any, time for consistent planning and 
execution. The Nationalists, of course, attempted to capitalize most on 
these changes; however, as has been shown above, opposition parties were 
not above intrigue. Fragmentation and discontent in the army followed 
-- a reflection of the fragmented nature of society during the Smetona 
era. 8 
In view of the fluid and unpredictable nature of politics, the 
Nationalists wished to "nationalize" the military. According to them, 
if an officer had any dealings with the political opposition, this was 
an unwarranted intrusion of politics into the military. On the other 
hand, if an officer dealt with the Nationalist Association, it was not 
considered unacceptable, for it was a non-political association, not a 
party.9 Thus when assigning commanding officers of regiments and 
higher, loyalty and trustworthiness both politically and personally to 
Smetona were important criteria. As a result, strong personalities were 
unable to develop in the military. This passivity would have 
8Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones, pp. 17-18; V. Stanley Vardys, 
"Independent Lithuania: A Profile," in Lithuania Under the Soviets: 
Portrait of a Nation, 1940-65, ed. V. Stanley Vardys (New York: Praeger, 
1965)' p. 38. 
9stasys Rastikis, Ko¥-Ose del Lietuvos: Kario atsiminimai (In the 
Battles for Lithuania: A Soldier's Reminiscences) (Los Angeles: Lietuviu 
dienos I Lithuanian Days, 1956), It 500-501. 
88 
devastating consequences in 1940 when challenged by the Soviet Union. 10 
A short catalogue reveals the interconnection between the 
political and military spheres in Lithuania. The military's effect was 
felt beyond formal military boundaries. For example, there were many 
reserve officers holding positions in the important Interior Ministry. 
Colonel Kazys Skirpa, the chief of staff who attempted to halt the 1926 
coup, was appointed military attache to Germany in 1928. He would also 
hold ministerial positions at the League of Nations and in Warsaw. In 
1938 he was appointed minister to Germany. 11 Colonel Povilas Zadeikis 
was minister to the US from 1935 until his death in 1957. Lieutenant 
Colonel Juozas Papeckys was dismissed as defense minister following the 
coup, but was allowed to remain in the military• He was named to the 
board of the justice ministry in 1927 and two years later became a 
member of the Council of State. 12 General Petras Sniuksta, appointed 
defense minister in 1934 following the Kubiliunas revolt, was a member 
of the Council of State in 1935-1936 following his retirement from the 
military. 13 Lieutenant General Teodoras Daukantas was named a member of 
10Antanas Rukas, Mykolas Slezevicius (Chicago: Terra, 1954), 
p. 278. See also Bronius Bieliukas, "Tegul meile viens kitam dega musu 
sirdyse" ("Let the Love for One Another Burn in Our Hearts"), Karys, 
December 1975, pp. 374-375. 
11 A. Gaigalai te, "Burzuaziniai nacionalistai hi tlerines 
Vokietijos tarnyboje 1939-1941" ("Bourgeoise Nationalists in the Service 
of Hitler's Germany 1939-1941 11 ), Lietuvos TSR Mokslo darbai (Works of 
the Lithuanian SSR), Series A, 2 (11), (1961), 140. 
12Aleksandras Merkelis, Antanas Smetona: Jo visuomenine, 
kulturine ir politine veikla (Antanas Smetona: His Social, Cultural, and 
Political Activity) (New York: American Lithuanian National Association, 
1964), pp. 384-385. 
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the Council in November 1928 after holding the post of defense 
minister. In January 1931 he was named the first charge d' affaires to 
South America (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay). 14 The cabinet of 
Brigadier General Jonas Cernius in 1939 contained four general officers 
holding the posts of prime minister and ministers of defense, finance, 
and interior. 15 
Granted, officers were required to retire to the reserve prior 
to assuming political posts. However, many continued to wear uniforms 
while carrying out their political duties. This further blurred the 
line between politic al and military affairs. There was not really a 
civil-military dualism as found in the U.S. military establishment, for 
example. With the exception of four years, the defense minister was 
always an army officer whose political role was played out in the 
cabinet. 
B. SMETONA AND THE MILITARY 
During the wars of independence in 1918-1920, the two most 
popular names among Lithuanian military volunteers were that of 
Commander-in-Chief General Silvestras Zukauskas and President Antanas 
13Rapolas Ski pi tis, Nepriklausoma Lietuva: Atsiminimai 
(Independent Lithuania: Reminiscences) (Chicago: Draugas, 1967), p. 188. 
14Merkelis, pp. 365, 441. 
15Rastikis, I, pp. 554, 557. The appointment of pre-coup 
officials to important posts demonstrates, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, the leniency of the regime. The Skirpa and Daukantas 
appointments, however, may have been measures to remove them from 
influence, or "kick them upstairs." 
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Smetona. This popularity helped ensconce the new National Leader 
following the 1926 coup. It was largely Smetona's popularity within the 
military as one of the nation's saviors that guaranteed the survival of 
his regime. 
Smetona felt that Lithuania would remain strong as long as the 
military was obedient and unified. Further, the military had an 
honorable calling in guaranteeing the nation's freedom. He would 
constantly mention the following: chivalry, strength, virtue, bravery, 
obedience, harmony, the difficult wars of independence. The military, 
along with all of society, composed one body and one soul. However, as 
far as the maintenance of independence was concerned, the military 
possessed primacy. By default, if the nation was legally in a state of 
war with dangerous neighbors surrounding and threatening it, especially 
Poland, there were implications for the importance of the mili tary's 
political role. 16 
Smetona viewed the military as performing an important role in 
.national development and education. A soldier, as far as he was 
concerned, needed a· deep and broad knowledge of national ideals. and 
culture. This is to' develop dutiful and productive individuals with a 
strong Lithuanian character, for it was spirit, and not numbers of men 
and types of weapons, which determined superiority. 17 
16Merkelis, pp. 354, 359; Edvardas Sulaitis, "A. Smetona apie 
kariuomene" (A. Smetona on the Army"), Karys, June-July 1959, p. 162. 
17Merkelis, pp. 413-414, 423. Major F.G. Beaumont-Nesbitt of 
the British Army's General Staff inspected the Lithuanian army in July 
1927. He was impressed by its discipline and training. He stated, 
"With such a disciplined and well-trained army, you Lithuanians will 
91 
What were the ties between the president and the officer 
corps? This question is problematic, for even Smetona' s biographer, 
Aleksandras Merkelis, is ambivalent regarding the answer. On the one 
hand, he writes that there were close and trustworthy ties between the 
president and the military, stemming from his status as first 
president. He would often eat lunch and dinner with the officers 
assigned to the presidential residence, even play cards with them. 18 On 
the other hand, Merkelis criticizes the military for desiring the lion's 
share of control over domestic politic al 11 fe; the president's and the 
military's relationship was not always smooth. 19 Another commentator 
repeats this opinion, stating that Smetona did not trust the officers. 
He only had to remember the revolt of his chief of staff, General 
Kubiliunas, to recall his fears. 20 
The · president participated in all major military events and 
ceremonies. 1928 and 1929 were especially busy.years. The former was 
overcome your enemies. While technically weaker, you will surpass them 
morally." See E.J. Harrison, ed., Lithuania 1928 (London: Hazell, 
Watson, & Viney, 1928), pp. 71-72. A. Reklaitis, "Lietuvos kariuomenei 
prisiminti: Pasikalbejimas su Ramoves pirm. gen. s. Dirmantu" 
("Remembering Lithuania's Army: Conversation with Ramove President 
General Stasys Dirmantas"), Draugas, 23 November 1964, p. 5 writes in 
the same vein, stating that Lithuania's military preceded the formation 
of the Lithuanian state in 1253, for the Lithuanians were forced to band 
together to defend themselves against invaders. 
18Merkelis, pp. 411, 458-459. 
19Merkelis, p. 472. See also "Antanas Smetona ir kariuomene" 
("Antanas Smetana and the Army"), Karys, 13 June 1940, pp. 634-635. 
20Petras Jurgela and Paulius JurkUs, Gen. Povilas Plechavicius 
(Brooklyn: Karys, 1978), p. 70. 
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the decennial of independence, the latter the celebration of ten years 
existence for many military units. Smetona also attended drills and 
maneuvers, and visited barracks. He was a frequent visitor at veterans' 
gatherings, especially honoring invalids as living monuments of a free 
Lithuania. 21 
As in the US, all officer commissions were formally issued by 
the president. In a pledge of almost personal loyalty to Smetona, each 
graduate of the Military Academy would kneel before the president and be 
touched on the shoulders with the officer's saber. The president would 
intone to each, "Do not raise this without purpose, do not lower it 
without honor" ("Be reikalo nepakelk, be garbes nenuleisk"). In 1929, 
the name of the Military Academy was changed to "Military Academy of the 
First Lithuanian President" (Pirmojo Lietuvos Prezidento Karo Mokykla), 
with Smetona's likeness on the Academy's flag.22 
Before leaving this section, a short synthesis of Smetona' s 
speeches and writings regarding the military will be put forth. The 
first volume of his works was published in Lithuania, the second 
posthumously in the US. 23 On 18 May 1934, Smetona gave a speech 
21 Merkelis, pp. 411, 413. 
22Merkelis, pp. 364, 412; Vaclovas Sliogeris, Antanas Smetona: 
Zmosus ir valstybininkas. Atsiminimai (Antanas Smetona: Person and 
Statesman. Remini.scences) (Sodus, MI: Juozas J. Bachunas, 1966), p. 
64. For a photograph of the commissioning of a new lieutenant, see H. 
Serafinas, . ed., V:ttauto Didziojo mirties 500 metu sukaktuvems pamineti 
albumas (Album Commemorating the 500th Anniversary of the Death of 
Vftautas the Great). (~aunas: Spindulys, 1933), p. 166. 
' . 
23Antanas Smetona, Pasakyta parasyta: 1927-1934 (Spoken Written: 
1927-1934) (Kaunas: Pazanga, 1935), I; and Smetona, Pasakyta parasyta: 
1935-1940 (Spoken Written: 1935-1940), ed. Leonas Sabaliunas (Boston: 
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containing politic al implications at the graduation of the first class 
of the Senior Officer Courses. He said that the Leader (Vadas) is the 
foundation of political life everywhere in the world. The same 
principle operates in the military. Officers, however, must also 
comprehend other aspects of life. They must understand politics and 
teach youth within that framework.24 
As far as Smetona was concerned, the barracks were the home not 
only of the soldiers, but of the entire nation as well. There, young 
men from all over the country came together and grew in a spirit of 
unity. A soldier must be proud of his army and nation, for they compose 
one family. In addition, defense is the concern of everyone; every 
individual must conscientiously carry out his duties. 25 
War and various external threats were frequent themes of 
Smetona's speeches. During war, he said, all activity revolves around 
the military. Thus in peacetime an officer must be aware of his 
nation's history, geography, and language in order to best carry out his 
wartime duties. Politics, in the broad sense of that term, must not be 
foreign to the officer. 26 In a speech to the University of Vytautas the 
Great Student Reserve Officers Fraternity 11 Ramove" on 21 October 1934, 
Smetona warned that the threat of war lurks everywhere and is 
---------------. 
Lithuanian Encyclopedia Press, 1974), II. 
24Merkelis, pp. 412-413. 
25smetona, I, pp. 20, 40; II, pp. 180-181. 
26Smetona, I, p. 35. 
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increasing. He said that the next war will involve entire nations. 
Thus military preparation must be broad and all-encompassing, using 
.. 
military development to develop national consciousness. 27 On another 
occasion he repeated that the entire nation must prepare for war. It 
must be re-educated on the basis of obedience and unity. Every school, 
organization, and activity must serve this purpose, for the military is 
strong only when the nation is united: 28 
It would be a mistake to surmise that the nation's security depends 
solely on armed force. Good order in society, national consciousness 
and various spiritual goods are also great forces in resisting 
danger. We prepare them together, thus all must be good, cooperative 
workmen. The idea of national unity must predominate, not only in 
the defense of the Motherland, but in all the work we do. 29 
As far as the president's formal powers vis-a-vis military 
affairs are concerned, they will be reviewed in the relevant appendices 
of this study. The following sections of this chapter deal with the 
formal powers of other very powerful individuals in independent 
Lithuania, namely the district military commandants who, in the formal 
state of war which existed, wielded considerable political power. 
C. THE DISTRICT MILITARY COMMANDANTS 
In all fairness to Smetona, he was not the first to give 
military conrnandants civil authority. As early as 1919, military 
conrnandants could issue orders under paragraphs six and seven of the 
27Merkelis, p. 423. 
28smetona, I, pp. 39, 42. 
29smetona, II, p. 295. 
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Special State Defense Statutes (Ypatingi valstybes apsaugos istatai), 
passed on 7 February 1919. 30 The police and civil administration were 
bound to execute these orders. The commandants could also overrule and 
countermand civil orders. Under paragraph ten, commandants could 
exercise control over assembly; paragraph twelve allowed them to 
restrict freedom of the press. 31 Each administrative district 
(apskritis) had a civil head (apskrities virsininkas) and a military 
commandant (karo komendantas). During the period of independence there 
were anywhere from twenty-three to twenty-nine districts in Lithuania.32 
The commandants frequently used their power over assembly. For 
example, on 29 January 1930 the Kaunas commandant issued Order Nine, 
which stated that the civilian district head must receive a request for 
30see Laikinosios vyriausyb'8 zinios (Provisional Government 
News) (Kaunas: Ministru tarybos kanceliarija I Chancellory of the 
cabinet), 7 February 1919, No. 4. 
31 Juozas Bulavas, Rinkimai ir "tautos atstovavimas" burzuazineje 
Lietuvoje (Elections and "National Representation" in Bourgeoise 
Lithuania) (Vilnius: State Political and Scientific Press, 1956), pp. 
49-50. See also M. Maksimaitis, 11 Burzuazinio teisetumo paneigimas 
administraciniu-policiniu organu antiliaudine veikla Lietuvoje 1919-1926 
metais" ("The Countermanding of Bourgeoise Law in the Anti-Populist 
Activity of Administrative and Police Organs in Lithuania 1919- 1926"), 
Lietuvos TSR Mokslo Akademi os Darbai (Works of the Lithuanian SSR 
Academy of Sciences , Series A, 2 (13), (19 2), 2 -28, which discusses 
laws regarding organizations (Laikinosios Vyriausybes Zinios No. 15, 
October 1919), assembly CLpikinosios Vyriausxbes Zinios No. 20, 21 
February 1920), press (Laikinosios Vyriausybes Zinios No. 17, 30 
November 1919 and Vyriausybes Zinios No. 197, 20 June 1925. 
32see Centralinis Statistikos Biuras I Central Statistical 
Bureau, Lietuvos statistikos metrastis (Lithuanian Statistical Yearbook) 
(Kaunas: c.s.B.), 1927-8, p. 1; 1932, p. 6; 1938, p. 13; and the 
Bureau's Visa Lietuva: Informacine knyga (All Lithuania: Infonaation 
Book) (Kaunas: Spaudos fondas I Press Fund), 1922, pp. 236-237; 1931, 
p. 24. 
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permission to assemble at least fourteen days prior to the meeting. The 
request had to include the program and abstracts of the speeches. 
Permission from the head had to be registered in the local police 
station twenty-four hours before the meeting. One week later on 6 
February 1930, the Internal Security Department of the Interior Ministry 
issued Circular 17086, which required district heads to state an 
official positive or negative opinion regarding each requested 
meeting. In the spring of that year, the Kaunas Food Workers 
Association (Kauno maisto produktu darbininku ir tarnautoju sajunga) 
twice asked for permission to assemble. The civil district head labeled 
the organization "bolshevik." Upon receipt of this opinion, the 
military commandant rejected the request on 17 April 1930.33 
The commandants' power also had politic al implications. After 
various communist excesses in response to poor economic conditions, 
Kaunas military commandant Lieutenant Colonel Zigmas Talevicius issued 
an order on 27 August 1933 under the State of Emergency Statutes. 
Agitation would result in three months imprisonment or a five thousand 
litas fine. An attack upon the civil police would result in the 
criminal being brought before a military tribuna1.34 Two years later, 
330. Ruzelyte, "Susirinkimu laisve ir jos suvarzymas darbo 
zmonems burzuazineje Lietuvoje" ("Freedom of Assembly and Restrictions 
for Working People in Bourgeoise Lithuania", ed. H. Miskinis, et al. 
(Vilnius: Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences, 1976), pp. 101-103• See 
H.K., Valstybininkas politikos sukuriuose: Prelatas Mykolas Krupavicius 
1885-1970 (Statesman in the Whirlwind of Politios: Prelate Mykolas 
Krupavicius 1885-1970) (Chicago: Pope Leo XIII Fund, 1980), p. 181 for 
an account of how the local military commandant gave Rev. Mykolas 
Krupavicius permission to speak at a meeting. 
34Merkelis, pp. 444-445. 
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FIGURE 5.1: LITHUANIAN ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS 1 JANUARY 1939 
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(New Haven, CT: Human Relations Area Files, 1955), map 2. 
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in November 1935, Smetona would use the commandants to close down all 
opposition parties. This under a presidential act which allowed the 
commandants to restrict or close organizational activity threatening to 
the state.35 
The entire basis for the power of the regime, in general, and 
the co11111andants, in particular, was the state of war (karo stovis) which 
existed in the country, even during peacetime. The state of war was 
lifted by the Grinius-Slezevicius administration in 1926, but was 
reinstated three days after the coup on 20 December 1926. This was 
based on a "recommendation" by the cabinet and paragraph thirty-two of 
the Constitution. Presidential Act 517-a declared a state of war in all 
Lithuania and ended guaranties of constitutional civil rights.36 
Military and police methods were utilized during the entire state of 
war, especially· during the Seimas elections of 1936. 37 General Petras 
Sniuksta, who served as defense. minister from 12 June 1934 until 2 
November 1935, disliked the state of war, especially since his 
commandants were forced to dispose of political cases and punishments. 
35see Vyriausybes Zinios (Government News) (Kaunas: Ministru 
tarybos kanceliarija I Chancellory of the Cabinet), No. 450, 12 July 
1934; Bulavas, p. 90; Lithuanian Christian Democratic Association, 
Arkivyskupas Mecislovas Reinys (ArchbishoE Mecislovas Reinys) (Chicago: 
L.C.D.A., 1977), p. 45; M. Maksimaitis, "Tautininku fasistine diktatura" 
("Nationalist Fascist Dictatorship"), in Burzuazijos diktaturos 
Lietuvoje valstybiniai-teisiniai aspektai (State and Legal Aspects of 
the Bourgeoise Dictatorship in Lithuania), ed. H. Miskinis, et al. 
(Vilnius: Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences, 1976), p. 84; M.K., 
p. 127. 
36vyriausybes Zinios No. 242/1582; Bulavas, pp. 88-89. 
37su1avas, p. 57. 
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Indeed he resigned over this matter after becoming embroiled in 
differences with the ministers of justice and interior.38 
General Stasys Rastikis, conunander-in-chief 1935-1940, fought 
long and hard to end the permanent peacetime state of war. Supporters 
of the state of war said that it was needed to maintain order in the 
troubled Klaipeda region; it would be politically unfeasible to maintain 
it in that region if it were not enforced in Lithuania Major as well. 
Rastikis surmises that perhaps the political leadership preferred to 
have the military conmandants punish citizens administratively, rather 
than judicially. This was more efficient and allowed politicians to 
keep their hands clean of distasteful political cases. Rastikis wished 
to release the commandants of functions which he felt should properly 
have been handled by the ministries of interior and justice. He wanted 
them to deal strictly with military matters, such as management, draft 
enforcement, mobilization, and preparedness. The state of war made the 
conunandants unpopular figures, for punishments for political offenses 
were made in their name, though the cases were managed by the civil 
police. The military even had to carry out the death penalty for 
civilian offenders, though there were not many such instances. Rastikis 
saw this as inconsistent with the calling of a soldier, the principles 
of military honor, and moral development.39 
Under pressure from Germany, which threatened not to conclude a 
38Sliogeris, p. 129. 
39Rastikis, I, pp. 408-409. 
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new and broader trade pact, the state of war was recalled on 1 November 
1938. As a result, the military no longer had to deal with political 
offenses and more civil liberties ensued. However, Germany would use 
this to agitate in Klaipeda.40 
Administrative punishment was the tool used by military 
co111Dandants under the state of war. It circumvented regular judicial 
channels and allowed them to unilaterally punish civilians. Many cases 
that the co11111andants dealt with were rather mundane, including curfew 
violations, public drunkenness, and disorderly conduct. 41 Even prior to 
the Srnetona regime, paragraph eight of the Special State Defense 
Statutes allowed a military commandant to punish a person deemed 
dangerous to the public order or who had participated in anti-state 
activity. There were four types of punishment: 1) exile out of the 
district, 2) three months imprisonment or fine, 3) sentencing to a 
concentration/hard labor camp for any length of time (though the camps 
were administered by the justice ministry), 4) exile out of Lithuania 
itself. Any citizen could be punished by any of these methods for not 
obeying mandatory directives of the commandants. 42 
40Martynas Anysas, Kova del Klaipedos: Atsiminimai 1927-1939 
(The Battle for Klaipeda: Reminiscences 1927-1939), ed. H.G. Slav~nas 
(Chicago: Lithuanian Cultural Society, 1978), pp. 352-353; Maksimaitis, 
"Tautininku fasistine diktatura," p. 82; Rastikis, I, p. 409. 
41See Karpenka, "Komendaturos isteigimas ir jos veikimas" 
C"Commandery's Founding and Activities"), in Kauno karo komendatura 
1919-1929 (Kaunas Military Co111Dandery 1919-1929), ed. P. Jurgelevicius 
{Kaunas: Kaunas Municipal and District Co111Dandery, 1930), p. 57 for the 
1926-1928 Kaunas district statistics regarding these minor violations. 
42A. Berzelionis, Dimitravo sienos netyli: Dokumentine apybraiza 
(The Walls of Dimitrava are not Silent: A Documentary Sketch) (Vilnius: 
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The following table, Table 5. 1, gives statistics with regard to 
the number of individuals serving administrative punishments on 1 
January: 
TABLE 
1928 
38 
5.1: ADMINISTRATIVE PUNISHMENTS 
BEING SERVED ON 1 JANUARY 1928-1936 
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 
45 67 54 80 109 89 
1935 
67 
1936 
-
129 
Source: Compiled and cross-checked from Bulavas, p. 93, Centralinis 
Statistikos Biuras, Lietuvos statistikos metrastis, 1929-30, p. 147; 
1931, p. 353; 1932, p. 271; 1933, p. 291; 1934, p. 300. 
In the period 1927-1940, a total of 6, 329 individuals received 
administrative punishments (administracine tvarka nubausti). 43 
D. MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
One area where the military intruded into a traditionally 
civilian sector was the judicial sphere. The military tribunal was 
Mintis, 1968), p. 8; Bulavas, p. 53; Karpenka, p. 54; Vyriausybes Zinios 
No. 49. 
43v. Sinkevicius, "Lietuvos valstieciu dalyvavimas 
revoliuciniame ir antifasistiniame judejime 1927-1940 metais" 
(Lithuania's Peasant Participation in the Revolutionary and Anti-Fascist 
Movement, 1927-1940"), Istorija, 15, 2 (1975), 41. Statistics from the 
Kauna~ district display an increase in administrative punishments issued 
by the local military cormnandant in 1927, the year following the coup. 
There were seventy-six sent to camps as opposed to fifty-three the 
previous year. Sixty-seven were exiled from the Kaunas district as 
opposed to eighteen in 1926. The year 1928, however, displayed dramatic 
decreases in both categories: twenty-five and twenty-eight, 
respectively. See Karpenka, p. 58. 
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often used to try civilians for both politic al and criminal offenses. 
By way of introduction into procedural questions, the following is 
ofj'.ered: 
According to the Military Court Statutes .Promulgated on March 27, 
1919, and subsequent amendments thereto, a military court is formed 
in order to speedily deal with serious offenders whose guilt is 
already quite clear and does not call for prolonged investigation. 
'Ole object of a military court is to punish the offender as quickly 
as possible and thereby put a stop to the further spread of similar 
offences. A military court is formed in places where the army is 
actively combating the enemy or where a state of war has been 
declared. 'Ole Commander-in-Chief authorizes a military court to be 
formed, and in his absence the Minister of National Defence. In 
special cases, the aforesaid persons may delegate the formation of a 
military court to lower commanders. A Military court is composed of 
an officer president, two members from among officers, and two from 
among the men able to read and write. Officers appointed to a 
military court must have served not less than two years in the 
regular army, and of the men one must be a non-commissioned officer • 
• • • A court, the confirmation of sentence, and its fulfilment (only 
where the death penalty is awarded) must last not longer than two 
days. 'Ole condemned person within two days may appeal to the central 
Government for pardon. Civilians may be brought before a military 
court for espionage, if they are caught on the spot and their guilt 
is perfectly clear. For robbery and murder, if the offender is 
caught on the spot or not far away, the death penalty may be awarded 
instead of penal servitude. For Bolshevism, anti-State agitation, 
and agitation in favour of the enemy, among the troops, inciting to 
active non-fulfilment of State laws, or opposition to the Government, 
overt action against State order, rising against the Government, 
formation of Bolshevistic organizations or other organizations 
hostile to the Government, if the offender is caught in flagrante 
delicto, whether he is a soldier or civilian, the punishment may 
include imprisonment of two years or more, up to the death penalty. 
Furthermore, the Commander-in-Chief or the Minister of National 
Defence has the right to bring before a military court and punish 
according to the laws in force during war time persons accused of 
other offences, if such should be deemed of sufficient gravity, or to 
protect the interests of the army, or for the sake of public order 
and tranquility of the State.44 
The fact that civilians could be tried by military tribunals is 
44 Harrison, pp. 65-66. 
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neither a new nor surprising phenomenon. One need only reflect upon the 
~American Civil War to see such activity. A state of war permits such 
judicial alteration. Thus the key phrase, "a military court is formed 
in places where a state of war has been declared," is 
accentuated. The peacetime state of war provided the authority to bring 
civilians before military tribunals for the aforementioned violations. 
During the wars of independence, military tribunals were an 
efficient tool utilized by military commandants to clean the country of 
looters and bandits. In all fairness, it must also be recalled that the 
state of war was in effect during the Christian Democratic regime of 
President Aleksandras Stulginskis from 1920 until 1926, whereupon it was 
cancelled by the short-lived Grinius-Slezevicius administration. 
Smetana returned this practice and efficiently used it to bolster his 
regime, take distasteful political cases out of the hands of the 
civilian leadership, and neutralize the opposition without encumbering 
civil procedural requirements. All that was needed was an agreement 
among the ministers of interior, defense, and justice to transfer a 
civil suit to a military tribunal. In the period 1919-1940, seventy-
five percent of all political suits were tried before military tribunals 
-- 22.5% in military field courts (karo lauko teismai) and 52.5% in army 
courts (kariuomenes teismai). 45 
-----------------45Bulavas, p. 91; A. Bulota and G. Feigelsonas, "Burzuazijos 
teismines represijos pries revoliucinio ir antifasistinio judejimo 
dalyvius Lietuvoje 1919-1940 m." ("Bourgeoise Legal Repression .Against 
Participants in the Revolutionary and Antifascist Movement in Lithuania 
1919-1940"), in Lietuvos Komunistu Partijos istorijos klausimai 
(Historical Issues of the Communist Party of Lithuania), vol 6, ed. K. 
Navickas, et al. (Vilnius: Mintis, 1967), p. 200; Skipitis, 
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An example of military justice for political offenses occured in 
1930-1931. At the end of the summer of 1930, all seventy high school 
student circles (moksleiviu kuopos) of the Lithuanian Catholic 
Federation "Ateitis" were closed by the Smetana regime. The Lithuanian 
bishops then issued a pastoral letter condemning the action. The letter 
was confiscated by the Interior Ministry. A group of Catholic students 
belonging to "Ateitis" issued an appeal to the Catholic public urging it 
to heed the bishops' statements. The authors and disseminators of this 
appeal were placed under arrest and tried before a closed military 
tribunal on 12-13 May 1931. Two priests and six students were issued 
various punishments. 46 
Nepriklausoma Lietuva, p. 186. For legal specifics see Bulavas, pp. 
55-56; Mykolas Romer'is, Lietuvos konstitucines teises paskaitos 
(Lectures in Lithuanian Constitutional Law) {Kaunas: Law Faculty at the 
University of Vytautas the Great, 1937), I, pp. 386-389; Centralinis 
Statistikos Biuras I Central Statistical Bureau, Valstybes statistikos 
kalendorius (Government Statistical Almanac) (Kaunas: C.S.B.), 1937, p. 
37. See also Juozas B. Laucka, "Keletas zvilgsniu i Lietuvos 1922 metu 
konsti tucija: Jos kilme ir pagrindiniai principai" {"Several Looks at 
Lithuania's 1922 Constitution: Its Origin and Major Principles", Aidai, 
May-June 1985, pp. 133-147. 
46Lithuanian Christian Democratic Association, pp. 96-97. See 
Jonas Demereckis, Savanorio ir kontrazvalgybininko atsiminimai 
{Reminiscences of a Volunteer and Counterspy) (Chicago: Author, 1976), 
pp. 100-105 for an account of someone sentenced to five years hard labor 
for a non-political crime by a military tribunal; the sentence was later 
commuted. For other accounts see J. Lankutis, et al., eds., Atsiminimai 
apie Vytauta Montvila (Reminiscences ·About Vytautas Montvilas) (Vilnius: 
Vaga, 1966), pp. 292-296; Michalina Meskauskiene, Zvelgiu i tolius 
{Looking in the Distance) (Vilnius: Vaga, 1969), pp. 419-422; Stasys 
Rastikis, Lietuvos likimo keliais: Is mano uzrasu {On the Roads of 
Lithuania's Destiny: From My Notes), ed. Jonas Dainauskas (Chicago: 
Akademines skautijos leidykla I Academic Press, 1982), p. 256. 
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E. INTERNAL SECURITY 
While the military police would ordinarily maintain order among 
the soldiers themselves, it was not unknown for them to assist the civil 
police if necessary. General Povilas Plechavicius, who was chief of 
staff following the coup, successfully urged Interior Minister Colonel 
Ignas Musteikis to order the civil police to work closely and routinely 
with the military commandants. There were other ties between the police 
and the military. Military officers assisted in the training and 
administration of the civil police. Police officers were often former 
soldiers and reservists. 47 
While General Rastikis forbade the use of troops to restore 
order during the Suvalkai farmers .·unrest, there were other cases when 
troops were utilized. Colonel Konstantinas Zukas, Peasant Populist 
deputy to the Constituent Seimas and former defense minister, attended a 
small gathering commemorating the decennial of that Seimas on 15 May 
1930. Upon exiting, Zukas saw many people and police outside. Six days 
later, Colonel Kazys Skucas, the commander of the second infantry 
division and of the Kaunas garrison, criticized Zukas for participating 
in an "outlawed, horrible demonstration." Skucas had been under orders 
to disband it, using truncheons if necessary. However, at the last 
minute, President Smetona decided to call the attack off. 48 The Kaunas 
47Apolinaras Bagdonas, ed., Lietuvos policija istatymu ir 
tvarkos tarnyboje (Lithuania's Police in the Service of Law and Order) 
(Chicago: Lithuanian Police Club "Krivule, 11 1974), pp. 40, 47, 62; Jonas 
Juodvalkis, Mano dienos: Atsiminimai (My Days: Reminiscences), ed. 
Bronius Kviklys (Chicago: Anatolijus Kairys, 1973), pp. 100-101; Jurgela 
and Jurkus, p. 51. 
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workers' strike of 18-20 June 1936 was patrolled by troops assisting the 
civil police. 49 
One other police function carried out by the military under the 
guise of the state of war was the censorship of publication. Under a 
state of war, nothing could be published without the approval of the 
military censor. This, however, was no secret; it was a fact generally 
known among the citizenry. The verso of books would often have 
"Permitted by the Military Censor" ("Karo cenzuros leista") printed on 
it. While it was a rather liberal censorship, there were, of course, 
those individuals who attempted to circumvent it. Professor Kazys 
Pakstas was a geography professor who, during the period 1928-1931, 
lectured on geography every other week in Riga, Latvia. When in Latvia, 
he would correspond with friends in the US and dispatch various reports 
regarding the situation in Lithuania so as to avoid military 
censorship. Granted his information was not inflanrnatory or of an anti-
state nature, but he nevertheless found it necessary and expedient to 
issue his reports by this indirect method.50 
General Stasys Rastikis disliked the use of military personnel 
48Konstantinas Zukas, Zvilgsnis i praeiti: Zmogaus ir kario 
atsiminimai. Medziaga istorikams (A Glance at the Past: A Person's and 
Soldier's Reminiscences. Material for Historians) (Chicago: Terra, 
1959), pp. 444-446. 
49Maciuika, p. 61; J. Ziugzda, et al., eds., Lietuvos TSR 
istorija nuo 1917 iki 1940 (History of the Lithuanian SSR 1917-1940) 
(Vilnius: Mintis, 1965), III, 303. 
50Bulavas, pp. 49-50; Juozas Eretas, Kazys Pakstas: Tautinio 
sauklio odiseja 1893-1960 (Kazys Pakstas: Odyssey of a National Herald 
1893-1960) (Rome: Lithuanian Catholic Academy of Sciences, 1970), p. 90. 
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for such police and internal security assignments. Indeed he had 
receiv~d a promise from Smetona that the military would not be used to 
maintain domestic order except in cases of extreme emergency. Smetona, 
however, appeared not always to hold true to his promise, which made 
Rastikis even more resentful. Rastikis was of the opinion that internal 
order is best guaranteed by a democratic regime, and best managed by 
competent civilian authorities whom the police answer to. In this way, 
the attention of the military is focused on matters of external 
defense. 51 
Nevertheless, the Internal Security Department worked closely 
with the military commandants and tribunals. Indeed internal security 
work was often executed by military men not under the direct authority 
of the defense ministry. One of the most famous of these was Lieutenant 
Colonel Steponas Rusteika. By training he was a lawyer, but had spent 
his life in the politico-military sector. From 1920 to 1930 he was the 
military commandant of the Telsiai district. In 1930-1931 he was the 
director of the Internal Security Department, being promoted to the post 
of minister of the interior which he held until 1935. For the last five 
years of the independence period he was the deputy mayor of Kaunas. 
Another was Colonel Ignas Musteikis who served as interior minister from 
15 May 1928 until 30 November 1929. The US State Department wrote that 
he resembled a Czarist Russian governor-general in appearance and in the 
execution of his duties. 52 Finally, it was Colonel Brunonas Stencel is 
51Rastikis, I, p. 407. 
52Merkelis, p. 421. 
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who, as general secretary of the interior ministry, was charged with the 
dissolution of the Iron Wolf organization, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. 53 
The old school ties that were developed among military men in 
different agencies were partially responsible for the Kubiliunas revolt 
in June 1934. It was rumored that the close ties between Rusteika and 
Defense Minister Colonel Balys Giedrai tis led to officers being 
commandeered to spy and report on fellow officers. Kubiliunas opposed 
this, claiming th~ it would destroy obedience and discipline. When 
Giedraitis did not oppose the scheme, Kubiliunas was further moved to 
act against the regime.54 Kubiliunas once ordered Colonel Kazys 
Musteikis, who at that time was in charge of administrative matters for 
the military, to visit the then-Director of Internal Security Jonas 
Statkus and infor~ him that any officer or NCO discovered to be an agent 
woul,d be dishonorably discharged. Statkus replied that no such activity 
was occuring, though rumors and discontent within the officer corps over 
this matter continued. NQbody was ever discovered or discharged.55 
Spying on fellow soldiers and officers was not a new occurence 
in the Lithuanian military. There was mention of a secret military 
police as early as 1922 spying on soldiers and reporting to 
53For photographs of Stencelis and Rusteika see Serafin as, pp. 
281 and 282, respectively. 
54 Merkelis, p. 425; Kazys Musteikis, Prisiminimu fragmentai 
(Fragments of Memories) (London: Nida, 1970), p. 14. 
55Musteikis, p. 14. 
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superiors. 56 Following the coup, though, intra-military surveillance 
expanded. The government no longer trusted the officer's oath and words 
of honor. Many officers could not trust each other and, consequently, 
there were a number of resignations precipitated by such activity. 
Ironically, some of the first to leave the military were those officers 
actively involved in the coup.57 
In his memoirs, General Rastikis reports that Defense Minister 
General Petras Sniuksta did not enjoy receiving reports from the 
Internal Security Department which recommended punishment of officers 
for alleged political offenses. Sniuksta would read all the reports, 
but often found no justification for disciplinary action. Such reports 
would often flow back and forth among the the ministers of defense, 
justice, and interior consuming valuable time. Sniuksta would 
occasionally send these reports to Smetona, who agreed with Sniuksta' s 
opinion, but advised to settle the matter among his fellow ministers. 
Though Sniuksta was angry at such interference from another agency, 
Rastikis reports that Sniuksta himself was fearful of the Internal 
Security Department -- another example of fear and distrust in the 
officer corps caused by the intrusion of politics into the military.58 
56Kazys Kemezys, Po pasauli besiblaskant: Atsiminimai (Scurrying 
About the World: Reminiscences) (Sydney, Australia: Author, n.d.), 
p. 69. 
57Rukas, p. 276. 
58Rastikis, I, pp. 478-488; Ivykiai ir zmones, p. 77. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY 
A. EDUCATION AND SOCIALIZATION 
In his memoirs, General Stasys Rastikis writes that the matter 
of national defense was downgraded upon conclusion of the wars of 
independence. In addition to instability in the senior grades and 
posts, and the politicization of the military, the political leadership, 
in particular, and society, in general, did not demonstrate proper 
concern with military matters. However, he also faults the military, 
especially the senior officers, for not displaying initiative vis-a-vis 
politicians and the citizenry. They did not attract sufficient 
attention to military concerns and did relatively little to improve 
military capability. The divorce of society from the military resulted 
in an attitude that the military could see to its own needs. This 
perspective even led to reluctance regarding mandatory terms of service 
under conscription. 
Rastikis charges defense ministers as a whole for not supporting 
the general staff with regard to military preparedness and 
improvement. Further, some chiefs of staff contented themselves with 
peacetime administration, without considering wartime necessities. The 
modern warfare which would surface during the Second World War was not 
on the minds of the civil or military leadership. Nostalgia over the 
wars of independence took precedence over modernization and 
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strengthening for the future. 
Rastikis called for a general effort, a national partnership 
among the military, society, and politicians to popularize the idea of 
national defense. Rastikis, as will be discussed more fully in the 
following chapter, approached the president and government officials 
over this matter, but was met with inaction. Thus he chose to take the 
initiative himself in such activities as the army-society festivals 
which will be dealt with below. His relatively successful campaign 
entailed a great deal of speaking and writing directed at soldiers, 
national guardsmen, and youth. Since the military belongs to society 
and must serve as its watchdog, both spheres must be brought closer 
together. 1 
One method for drawing the military closer to society and vice 
versa was conscription. A Lithuanian male was drafted at the age of 
twenty and served twelve months if an infantryman or eighteen months in 
any other branch. Clergymen and individuals in poor health were not 
called. Deferments were granted to those attending gymnasium or higher 
education until that education was completed. They were also granted if 
conscription caused hardship in the family or if the target individual 
was the only able-bodied son, brother, or grandson in the family. 2 
1stasys Rastikis, Kovose del Lietuvos: Kario atsiminimai (In the 
Battles for Lithuania: A Soldier's Reminiscences) (Los Angeles: Lietuviu 
dienos I Lithuanian Days, 1956), I, 387-391. 
2vyriausybes Zinios (Government News) (Kaunas: Ministru tarybos 
kanceliarija I Chancellory of the Cabinet), No. 538, 30 June 1936. See 
also Lietuvos Sauliu Sajunga I Lithuanian National Guard, Musu 
kalendorius 1930 metams (Our Almanac for 1930) (Kaunas: L.N.G., 1929), 
pp. 160-161; Vanda Tumenas, ed., Justinas Tumenas (Chicago: Author, 
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One of the purposes of conscription was basic non-military 
training. Most enlisted men only possessed a grade school education, if 
even that. To compensate for this, they were taught various trades, 
reading, writing, history, and geography. It was also suggested that 
they read widely, including literature, agriculture, physical education, 
and theology. Such programs were instituted after several incidents 
whereby it was discovered that the education of the men was sub-standard 
even in the most basic areas. For example, in January 1929 Chief of 
Staff Colonel Povilas Plechavicius visited a number of units and 
discovered that almost one-half of the enlisted men did not know the 
words of the Lithuanian · National Anthem and did not comprehend its 
meaning.3 
Education was not limited to the enlisted grades. The Senior 
Officer Courses taught law, political economics, and finance among other 
subjects. Officers also received special training at the University of 
Vytautas the Great in Kaunas in fields as diverse as engineering, law, 
1959), p. 50. 
3Petras Jurgela and Paulius Jurkus, Gen. Povilas Plechavicius 
(Brooklyn: Karys, 1978), pp. 57-58; J.M. Laurinaitis, ed., Kareivis: 
Lietuvos gyg~jas. Lietuvos kareivio knyga (Soldier: Lithuania's 
Defender. A Book for the Lithuanian Soldier) (Kaunas: Headquarters 
Staff ,_Military .. Education Board, 1926), pp. 189-191; Owen J.C. Norem, 
Timeless l.1thuan1a, 2nd ed. (Cleveland: Viltis, 1967'), p. 145; Juozas 
Vaiceliunas·; Tevynes sargyboje: Lietuvos kar~ninko-lakuno atsiminimai 
1932-1941 {Guarding the Motherland: Reminiscences of a Lithuanian 
Officer-Pilot 1932-1941 ) (Sudbury, Ont: Author, 1955), pp. 21-22, 29-
31. For personal experiences in the military see Aleksandras Pakal-
niskis, Gyven!mq pakelei (Life's Roadsides) (Chicago: Author, 1979), pp. 
73-96; and his Mes griztame: Jauno zmogaus dienorastis (We Return: A 
Yol!ns Person'.s Diary) (Chicago: Stasys Jankus, 1976), pp. 7-27. 
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chemistry, medicine, and veterinary medicine. The Student Reserve 
Officers "Ramove" Fraternity at that university initiated the idea of 
establishing a chair of military studies (karinio auklejimo katedra). 
"Ramove" received support from the military and Major Vytautas Bulvicius 
was appointed lecturer on national security matters. 4 
Of course, these educational-socialization efforts were 
conscious and deliberate: 
The strongest state educational institution is military service. The 
result of its influence on the masses is huge. It gives ideological 
foundations; civic culture develops an entire list of social 
virtues. The educational value of military service in the first 
place is determined by the army's elite, its corps of instructors. 
Those masses of recruits who each year march into the barracks have 
not only to protect the religious culture of their parents, but to 
also deepen it, so that a new type of citizen is formed: obedient, 
loyal to the oath, having a subtle feeling of honor. To achieve that 
purpose it is necessary to have within the army a stable, well 
prepared and developed educational elite that well comprehends its 
tasks. Lacking that, even the best recruit training will not bring 
the republic good, trustworthy, selfless and strongly staunch and 
resistant soldiers. Also very important is the link which must exist 
between the army and society, which must manifest itself in the first 
place in cooperation with those organizations which operate in the 
sphere of military preparedness and various forms of national 
defense. The army and those organizations which work with it must be 
4
.)'odauga, "Kariuomenes mokymas" ("Military Education"), in 
Li~tuva t918-1938: Leidinys 20 metu Lietuvos nepriklausomybes sukakciai 
pamineti (Lithuania 1918-1938: Publication Commemorating the Twentieth 
Anniversary of Lithuania's Independence), ed. Vincas Kemezys (Kaunas: 
Spaudos fondas I Press Fund, 1938) , p. 85; Jonas Kar ka, ed. , Vytauto 
Didziojo universi teto Kaune Studentu atsargos karininku korporacija. 
"Ramove" 1933-1983: Atsiminimai (Ramove Student Reserve Officers 
Fraternity at the University of Vytautas the Great, Kaunas 1933-1983: 
Reminiscences) (Toronto: Ramove, 1983), p. 104; Rastikis, I, p. 529; 
Antanas Smetona, Pasakyta parasyta: 1935-1940 (Spoken Written: 1935-
1940, ed. Leonas Sabaliunas (Boston: Lithuanian Encyclopedia Press, 
1974), II 187. See also Andrius Bulota, Limuzinas nr. 4: Dokumentine 
apysaka (Limousine No. 4: A Documentary Narrative) (Vilnius: Vaga, 
1977), p. 11; Petras Lelis, Lietuvos keliu 1910-1973 metai (Lithuania's 
Path 1910-1973) (Toronto: n.p., 1973), p. 118. 
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free from any kind of destructive partisan political warfare. The 
door to partisan political activity in the army and those 
organizations must be well shut. The foundation of military service 
is sacrifice, resignation from one's "I," obedience and preparedness, 
so that the strength designated for the protection of the life of the 
state and freedom are not wasted for the purposes of narrow, egoistic 
groups.5 
Other commentators make similar statements regarding the positive 
aspects of military service. In a theoretical pamphlet, Toliusis writes 
that the idea of democracy penetrates the military. A soldier is not a 
blind follower, but an informed, enlightened citizen-soldier. He 
advocates short military training for all in order to create a citizen 
militia - a hallmark of democracy. The best fighters know what they 
are fighting for; education bolsters morale and effectiveness. 
Ultimately, the military should be the nation under arms. 6 Steponaitis 
wrote that discipline develops upon educating village boys and men. 7 
General Stasys Dirmantas, also a professor of geodesy, referred to the 
Lithuanian army as a school of citizen responsibility, love of the 
Motherland and of its history. 8 General Stasys Rastikis writes of a 
5Mykolas Krupavicius 
rinkinys is jo palikimo (Social 
His Legacy) (Chicago: Pope 
Krupavicius' emphasis. 
Visuomeniniai klausimai: Straipsniu 
Questions: A Collection of Articles From 
Leo XII Fund, 1983), pp. 477-478. 
6z. Toliusis, Demokratija ir jos priesai arba demokrato 
katekizmas (Democracy and its Enemies or the Democrat's Catechism) 
(Kaunas: Varpas, 1926), pp. 23-24. 
7Antanas Steponaitis, Tevyneje ir pasauly: Prisiminimai ir 
apybraizos (In the Motherland and the World: Remembrances and Sketches) 
(Brooklyn: Lithuanian Franciscan Fathers, 1962), p. 146. 
8A. Reklaitis, "Lietuvos kariuomenei prisiminti: Pasikalbejimas 
su Ramoves pirm. gen. S. Dirmantu" ("Remembering Lithuania's Army: 
Conversation with Ramove President General StCJSYS Dirmantas"). Draugas, 
21 November 1964, p. 4. 
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national military, where the military and sochty exist hand-in-hand. 
Only in such fashion can there be reciprocal trust, support, will, and 
strength. The type of nation which supports the military determines the 
type of military produced. It discontent exists within the nation, it 
will spill over into the military.9 A National Guard publication wrote 
how the military takes different kinds of people and gives them a single 
mind and goal, while teaching and equalizing them. It also writes that 
all disciplines and fields of study are necessary for the creation of a 
good military machine. The cultural element composed of well-rounded 
people, not just the "fist and stick," is needed. 10 
Lanskoronskis views peacetime military service as a ~uge 
national school, with reciprocal interplay among good citizens, the 
military, and democracy. Physical, intellectual, and spiritual 
qualities are honed and refined through service. Military development 
is a continuation of national development, comprising the family, 
school, church, and society. He sees armed force composed of three 
elements: 1) material forces (land, population, weapons, fortifications, 
factories, transportation); 2) intellectual forces (education, 
development, preparation, organization, leadership, training); and 3) 
spiritual forces (love of the Motherland, honor., duty, sacrifice). All 
of these are needed to fight and survive under conditions of extreme 
9Rastikis, I, p. 448. Lithuania's bistory bears this out. 
10Lietuvos Sauliu Sajunga I Lithuanian National Guard, Musu 
kalendorius 1932 metams (Our Almanac for 1932) (Kaunas: L. N.G., 1931), 
pp. 50-55. 
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stress. With the emergent complexity of fighting, material goods are 
less effective without intellectual and spriritual support. 11 
The socializing value of military service has long been 
recognized in various contexts: 
The army is perhaps the most effective such institution [of 
socialization] and has been consciously used in the new nations, 
especially in Africa, as a _primary agent of adult socialization t.o 
national political culture. 12 
11 Lanskoronskis, "!autos parengimas karui" ("Preparing the 
Nation for War"), in Kareivis: Lietuvos gynejas. Lietuvos kareivio 
knyga (Soldier: Lithuania's Defender. A Book for the Lithuanian 
Soldier), ed. J.M. Laurinaitis (Kaunas: Headquarters Staff Milita~y 
Education Board, 1926), pp. 119-120, 123-124. See also Mykolas 
Birziska, Lietuviu tautos kelias i naujaji g_y:venima: Galvojimai apie 
tauta savyje ir kaimynu tarpe (The Path of the Lithuanian Nation Toward 
a New Life: Thoughts Concerning the Nation Within and in the Midst of 
Neighbors) (Los Angeles: Lietuviu dienos I Lithuanian Days, 1952), I, 
110; A. Dilys, Kareivis: Lietuvos gynejas. Lietuvos kareivio knyg_a 
(Soldier: Lithuania's Defender. A Book for the Lithuanian Soldier), ed. 
J.M. Laurinaitis (Kaunas: Headquarters Staff Military Educati.on Board, 
1926), pp. 138, 140; K. Jankunas, "Kariuomenes ~nasas i tautos gerbuvi" 
("The Army's Contribution to the Nation's Well-Being"), Karys,. January 
1982, pp. 1-6; Jurgela and Jurkus, p. 63; "Kariuomene ir visuomene 
jubiliejiniais metais" ("The Military and Society During the Jubilee 
Year"), Karys, 26 January 1939, pp. 107-108; Patriotizmas ir 
patriotinis tautos auklejimas (Patriotism and National Patriotic 
Education) (Kaunas: Vilnius Liberation League, 1935), p. 7; Rastikis, I, 
pp. 379-380. For a poem romanticizing the link between citizen and 
soldier, see J. Palionis, "Kariai ir tauta" ("Soldiers and the Nation"), 
Karys, 23 September 1939, p. 1333. For arguments for and against a 
regular, standing army see Br. Nemickas, "Kariuomene -- Lietuvos 
valstybingumo ugdytoja" ("The Army - Developer of Statehood"), Karys, 
February 1972, p. 40; Sova, "Kariuomenes organizacija ir komplektavimas" 
("Military Organization and Recruitment"), in Lietuva 1918-1938: 
Leidinys 20 metu. Lietuvos nepriklausomybes sukakciai pamineti 
(Lithuania: 1918-1938t Publication Cormnemorating the Twentieth 
Anniversary of Lithuania's Independence), ed. Vincas Kemezys (Kaunas: 
Spaudos fondas I Press Fund, 1938), p. 72; Vanda Daugirdaite-Sruogiene, 
Lietuvos Steigiamasis Seimas (The Lithuanian Constituent Assembly) (New 
York: Lithuanian National Foundation, 1975), pp. 201-202. 
12James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., Comparative 
Politics: The Quest for Theory (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 
1981),p. 113. 
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The use of Cuban troops on a large scale in combat, training, and 
indoctrination missions in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and 
elsewhere in Africa is viewed not only as a way of exporting 
revolution, but also as a means for indoctrination and ideological 
hardening of young Cubans. 13 
In addition to its role as defender of the nation, the military was 
used to socialize the populace. Conscious efforts were made to draw 
the military and citizenry closer together for two reasons: 1) to 
popularize it, and 2) to show that the armed forces served all 
Lithuanians, not just one group, i.e. the Nationalists. • • • The 
military through regular units and auxiliary organizations sought to 
maintain close ties with society. This form of socialization raised 
morale, bolstered the stability of the regime, gave people a sense of 
closeness with the men defending their freedom in a hostile 
international environment, and raised nationalistic consciousness. 
Furthermore, citizens could directly participate in thine 
institutions -- and in a sense become a part of the regime itself. 
Socialization vis-a-vis the military proceeded both directly and 
indirectly. One indirect method proceeded merely from the fact of 
citizenshi.p and residence. Both officers and men frequently came from 
the same place: the Lithuanian village. It was here that the wars of 
independence were fought and won, with people providing food, clothing, 
and shelter to their fighting brothers. At first there were some 
officers and NCOs who were Russians or Germans - and often could not 
even speak Lithuanian. Gradually, the government trained its own people 
and the military became "more Lithuanian." This was a boost to 
-----------------13aabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., "Political 
Socialization and Political Culture," in Comparative Politics Today: A 
World View), 3rd ed., eds. Almond and Powell (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1984) f p. 33. 
14Robert A. Vitas, "Smetona and Socialization: Lithuania 
1926-1940, 11 unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, Loyola 
University of Chicago, 6 December 1983, pp. 20, 22. 
' ' 
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patriotism and enthusiasm. Further, the officer corps had a broader 
base than during the era of czarist rule. Even a farmer's son could 
become an officer. 15 
A soldier, at least in the beginning, was lured to the military 
by more than just idealism and patriotism. In order to encourage 
volunteers to join the Lithuanian army during the wars of independence, 
the government promised land to those who served until demobilization. 
Volunteers and the families of soldiers who were killed in the line of 
duty received eight to twenty hectares (nineteen to forty-eight acres), 
one hundred logs, and grain. The volunteers were second in priority 
after the landless and small landholders who had land confiscated 
following the abolition of feudalism in czarist Russia in 1861. l6 
"Everyone, except volunteers, had to pay for the land within thirty-six 
years, beginning the ninth year after receiving the land. 111 7 The 
government was true to its word and began land reform under Agriculture 
Minister Rev. Mykolas Krupavicius following the cessation of 
hostilities. As of 1 January 1935, volunteers had been granted 1O,421 
___ .., ________ .. _____ " 
15vaiceliunas, p. 18 was an example of this. Reklaitis, p. 4; 
Antahas Smetana, Pasakyta parasyta: 1927-1934 (Spoken Written: 1927-
1934) (Kaunas:. Pazanga, 1935), I, 27. 
16v1adas Bublys, 11 Zemes reforma" ("Land Reform"), in Zemes uki.o 
aamybine kooP!racija rtepriklausomoje Lietuvoje 1920-1940 (Cooperative 
Aaricultural Production in Independent Lithuania 1920-1940), ed. Jonas 
Glemza C[ondon: Nida, 1972), p. 27; Pranas Pauliukonis, "Mykolas 
Krupavicius ar'ld Lithuanian Land Reform," Lituanus, 16, 4 (Winter 1970), 
pp. 40-43; Adolfas. Sapoka, ed. Lietuvos istorija (History of Lithuania), 
3rd ed. (Fellbach-Wurttemberg, Germany: Patria, 1950), p. 572. 
17Pauliukonis, p. 44. 
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plots of land consisting of 104,210 hectares (257,503 acres). This was 
out of a total of 467,460 hectares (1,155,094 acres) of land at the 
disposal of the government. Thus military men received almost twenty 
percent of all land granted. 18 
Following the coup, Smetana made tours of Lithuania in 1927 and 
1928. Chief or' Staff Colonel Plechavicius, occasionally accompanying 
the president, would urge people to present requests to Smetana. 
Smetana's military aide, Captain Aloyzas Valusis, would take these 
requests and then dispatch them to appropriate agencies for action. 
Smetana's and Plechavicius' travels were enormously successful, with 
them always being warmly greeted and often being carried on shoulders 
back to their automobiles. 19 
Society also had other contacts with the military and vice 
versa. Youth groups often visited military installations and were 
allowed to fire weapons and eat the soldiers' mess. It was not unusual 
for some visitors to an air base to even be taken up for a short flight 
in a fighter plane. Films of maneuvers and drills were shown in movie 
theaters. On the other hand, the military participated in major civil 
activities and served as honor guards at the funerals of prominent 
181 ha = 2.471 acres. R. Mackevicius, Dvidesimt metu 1918-1938 
(Twenty Years 1918-1938) (Vilnius: n.p., 1938), p. 70. For further 
details see Ladislovas Natkevicius, Lietuvos kariuomene (The Lithuanian 
Army;) (New York: Lithuanian Development Corporation, 1919), pp. 163-164; 
Konstantinas Zukas, Zvilgsnis i eraeiti: Zmogus ir kario atsiminimai. 
Medziaga istorikams (A Glance at the Past: A Person's and Soldier's 
Reminiscences. Material for Historians) (Chicago: Terra, 1959), p. 434. 
19Jurgela and Jurkus, pp. 58, 75-78. 
!', 
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Lithuanians, such as poet Rev. Jonas Maciulis-Maironis in June 1932. 
The winters would see troops chopping ice on the Nemunas River.20 
There were also official civil-military ties. One link was the 
Arms Fund (Ginklu Fondas). Several members of the 11 Ramove11 Fraternity 
began writing articles in 1935 urging people to collect money to buy 
weapons for the army; radio programs also promoted the idea. The 
military supported it, for the official budget could not support all the 
purchases the military leadership desired to make. On 15 June 1935 a 
number of organizations met and formed the Arms Fund and the Association 
to Support the Armed Forces (Ginkluotoms Krasto Pajegoms Remti Sajunga), 
which sought moral and material support for the military. By the end of 
1939, it had 141 chapters with about seven thousand members. These 
organizations collected money and were able to purchase rifles, machine 
guns, and other material.21 
The Lithuanian military also possessed ties to Lithuanians 
beyond the country's borders. In 1927 the Knights of Lithuania, based 
---~------~------20Jurgela arid Jurkus, pp. 52-53; Pakalniskis, Mes griztame, p. 
13; Vaiceliunas, pp. 16, 112-117. Jorge I. Dominguez, "The· Civic 
Soldier in Cuba , 11 in Political-Military Systems: Comparative 
Pers~ectives, ed. Catherine McArdle Kelleher (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 
1974 , p. 236 writes that Cuban troops are employed in the sugar 
harvest. Socialization was sometimes cleverly executed. One book 
contains an illustration of a Lithuanian knight with the Knight's Cross 
on his robe slaying a speared dragon, while a Lithuanian maiden looks on 
from behind a shield decorated with the insignia of the Grand Duke 
Gediminas. See A. Marcinkevicius, ed. Neuzmirsk Lietuvos (Do Not Forget 
Lithuania) (Kaunas: Lithuanian National Guard, 1927), p. 99. 
21 Karka, p. 31. For example 
Laupinaitis, As kaltinu: Trilogija 
Brazil: Author, 1954), pp. 17-18. 
of such accusations see Melduti s 
(I Accuse: Trilogy) (Sao Paulo, 
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in the US, established the Lithuanian Military Support Col'llDittee 
(Lietuvos Kariuomenes Remeju Komitetas). On 3 July 1927 two of its 
representatives, K. Vesulas and Rev. Juozas Simonaitis, presented a gold 
saber to Commander-in-Chief General Silvestras Zukauskas as a symbol of 
gratitude for the work of the Lithuanian army. 
placed on display at the War Museum.22 
It was subsequently 
Did close civil-military ties contribute to militaristic 
attitudes? The answer to this question is problematic. Certainly, 
there was no resemblance to the militarism prevalent in Nazi Germany. 
If militarism was a phenomenon, it did not exist for the sake of 
militarism per se. There were very real external dangers facing 
Lithuania, thus national security was very much on the minds of soldiers 
and civilians alike. Organizations were sometimes administered in 
military fashion, for example, the "Ramove" Fraternity, the Lithuanian 
Scouts Association, Young Lithuania (Jaunoji Lietuva), and the National 
Guard. Uniforms were worn, rank was designated, and administration was 
based on a top-down principle. The symbol of Lithuanian judges 
contained the judicial scales supported by a sword. This went to 
unusual extremes on occasion; not only did policemen wear decorations, 
but some postal workers did as we11.23 
22Jurgela and Jurkus, pp. 71-73. See also Jonas Matusas, Sauliu 
Sajungos istorija (History of the National Guard), 2nd ed. (Sydney, 
Australia: Mintis, 1966), pp. 191-192. For a photograph of t.he 
presentation ceremony see Ignas Sakal as, ed., Lietuvos vyciai Amerikoje 
(The Knights of Lithuania in America) (Chicago: Knights of Lithuania, 
1963)' p. 39. 
23For photographs see 
policija istatymu ir tvarkos 
Apolinar as Bagdonas, 
tarnyboje (Lithuania's 
ed • , Lietuvos 
Police in the 
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Youth was not bypassed in the exercise of socialization and 
militarism. In 1928 a letter was dispatched to middle schools urging 
youth to join a junior version of the National Guard (Tautos 
Gvardija). Military training under this program was to occur in 
conjunction with the Senior Officer Courses. However, this plan was 
never implemented. 24 However, a more formalized plan was implemented 
beginning in 1930. In that year, training in shooting, drills, and 
military discipline and courtesy were begun in schools and conducted by 
active and reserve officers. The children involved started from the 
fourth class of progymnasium, the fifth class of gymnasium, or the first 
course of specialized schools. Beginning in 1936, grade school students 
were acquainted with the military, its purpose and history, along with 
civic training emphasizing patriotism. School libraries received issues 
of Karys (Warrior), which was the weekly magazine of enlisted 
personnel. Training was not limited to students. During the sununer 
months, the Military Academy conducted military courses for female 
teachers and for male teachers who had never served in the military. 25 
Service of Law and Order) (Chicago: Lithuanian Police Club 11 Krivule," 
1974); Ant an as Gintneris, "Pastininkai sauliu darbo baruose" ("Postal 
Workers in the Work of of the National Guard"), in Nuo krivules iki 
raketos: Lietuvos pastininku atsiminimai (From the Staff to the Rocket: 
Reminiscences of Lithuania's Postal Workers) {Chicago: Lithuanian Postal 
Workers Association, 1968); B. Masiulis and K. Avizonis 11 Teisejas" 
("Judge"), Lietuviu enciklopedija {Lithuanian .Encyclopedia), vol. 30, 
p. 495. 
24Audrius Bulota • Nuo bal tojo zirgo iki svastikos (From the 
White Steed to the Swastika) (Vilnius: State Political and Scientific 
Press, 1962), p. 67. 
25Lietuvos. Sauliu Sajunga I Lithuanian National Guard, Sauliu 
kalendorius 1939 metams (National Guard Almanac for 1939) (Kaunas: 
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The Lithuanian Scouts Association, mentioned above, was also a 
component of the movement of the military toward youth. As of 1928, the 
Lithuanian government officially protected and sponsored the scouting 
movement under the general oversight of the Ministry of Education. In 
addition to providing policy and administrative guidance, it also 
provided a portion of the organization's funding. 26 The organization's 
founder, Petras Jurgela, was a Lithuanian-American who emigrated to 
Lithuania, founded the scouting movement, and then became an army 
officer, for a time serving as Colonel Plechavicius' aide. General 
Teodor as Daukantas, one-time defense minister and later diplomat, was 
chairman of the Lithuanian Scouts Assistance Society. Colonel Mykolas 
Kal~antas, chief of the National Guard from 1925 until 1935, also served 
a term as chief scouter 1925-1927. 27 Colonel Juozas Sarauskas, long-
time chief of the army's press and education section, served as chief 
scouter from 1935 until 1940. The president, by law, was the chief of 
the scouts -- an analogy to his position as commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces. In 1932 President Smetona awarded Sir Robert Baden-
Powell, founder of the world scouting movement, the Order of Grand Duke 
' L. N.G., 1938), pp. 103-104. For a photograph of military training at 
the Vindeikiai grade school in the Kretinga district see J. Ziugzda, et 
al., eds., Lietuvos TSR istorija nuo 1917 iki 1940 (History of the 
Lithuanian SSR 1917-1940) (V:ilnius: Mintis, 1965), III, 234. One child 
is lying on the ground pretending to be either dead or wounded. 
26Antanas Banionis, ed., White Badge (Boston: Lithuanian Boy 
Scouts-in-Exile, n .d.) , p. 11. 
27For photographs of Kalmantas and Daukantas see Marcinkevioius, 
pp. 117 and 121, respectively. 
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Gediminas (First Class) on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday. 28 
One scouting publication associated scouting with knighthood and 
chivalry, in addition to public service. Scouts were to join the 
vanguard of national renaissance. 29 The military press often praised 
the scouts. Troops even built. a pontoon bridge for the 1938 jamboree, 
and the army's commander-in-chief awarded prizes at scout shooting 
competitions organized by the 11 Ramove11 Fraternity. The Collegiate 
Division of the Lithuanian Scouts Association had especially close ties 
to the military. A number of reserve officers belonged to the 
organization and donated money to the Arms Fund. In one instance, 
female collegiate scouts donated a rifle to the second infantry regiment 
whose commanding officer, Colonel Juozas Tumas, was a sponsor of their 
organization.3° 
B. THE MILITARY AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH 
The status of the Roman Catholic Church in Lithuania was 
ambivalent during President Smetona' s tenure. The Church was given a 
number of privileges in the military and society. However, while 
Lithuania was 85.5j Roman Catholic, it was also persecuted by the 
Nationalists, who feared the Church as its largest potential enemy. 31 
28Lithuanian Boy Scouts Association, Lithuanian Scouting 
(Chicago: L.B.S.A., n.d.), pp. 16-17, 21, 23. 
29stasys Salkauskis, _Sk,,,_a~u_t_a~i,___i_r~~p_a_s_a~u_l_e_z_i~u~r_a~_<_S_c_o_u_t~s~_a_n_d 
Worldview), 3rd ed. (Chicago: Collegiate Division, Lithuanian Scouts 
Association, 1953), pp. 7, 11, 15-16, 26. 
30Karys apie akademikus skautus" ("Karys on the Collegiate 
Scouts"), Musu vytis (Our Knight), no. 2 (1984), pp. 19-22. 
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, the high school circles of the 
Cathol'ib\' Federation "Ateitis" were closed, as well as the Christian 
Democratic Party. Anti-Catholic action even went to the extreme of 
expelling the papal nuncio to Lithuania in 1931. In 1929, Prime 
Minister Augustinas Voldemara~ prohibited members of "Atei tis" from 
enrolling in the Military Academy. This restriction was lifted the 
following year subsequent to protests from the military leadership and 
Voldemaras' dismissa1.32 
Perhaps part of the answer for the stormy relationship between 
the government and the Church may be found in the contrast between their 
philosophies. Professor Stasys Salkauskis, who was the head of 
"Ateitis" from 1927 until 1930, wrote that politics must be firmly based 
on a Christian foundation, dominated neither by aggressive nationalism 
nor cosmopolitan internationalism. He stated that party politics was 
good and necessary, but that it should not degenerate into extreme 
partisanship; all positive political and non-political groups are 
equal. 
for. 33 
Finally, world Christian peace and unity should be striven 
The contrast with Smetona and his nationalistic philosophy is 
obvious, and Salkauskis experienced his share of difficulty with the 
31Tomas Zemaitis (pseud.) Dvidesimt metu (Twenty Years) 
(Vilnius: duplicated samizdat, 1978), p. 55. 
32vaiceliunas, pp. 58-59. 
33stasys Salkauskis, Ateitininku ideologija (The Ideology of 
"Ateitis"), 2nd rev. ed. (Putnam, CT: M. Juras, 1954), pp. 125-129. 
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regime over issues such as academic freedom, and freedom of the press 
and organizational activity. 1be Nationalists were not about to 
sacrifice what they saw as the good of the nation to excessive 
Christianity, though Smetona, at least on the surface, was a devout 
Catholic. Neither were the Nationalists about to allow party politics 
free rein, nor acknowledge the equality of all groups. Finally, at this 
point in Lithuania's history, the Nationalists saw their road as more 
beneficial than trans-national action. Poland, after all, was also a 
Christian country. 
Nevertheless, the Lithuanian army was always very much 
influenced by religious matters. On 11 May 1919, the first military 
oath was administered by the local bishop in the Kaunas Cathedral 
square; mass was also celebrated. The oath itself co11111itted the 
soldiers, in the name of God, to serve faithfully in the army, to be 
faithful to the Constitution, and to obey their superiors.34 The bishop 
was also involved in the first blessing of the Military Academy that 
same year. 35 Lithuanian soldiers would always take the oath of 
allegiance during the course of a mass, which included the kissing of a 
crucifix. 36 
34Natkevicius, pp •. 59-70. For a photograph of the bishop, in 
full garb, speaking to the men from the steps of the cathedral, see 
p. 72. 
35see Natkevicius, p. 132 for a photograph. 
36Pakalniskis, Mes griztame, p. 19; Vaclovas Sliogeris, Antanas 
Smetana: Zmogus ir valstybininkas. Atsiminimai (Antanas Smetona: Person 
and Statesman. Reminiscences) (Sodus, MI: Juozas J. Bachunas, 1966), 
p. 120. 
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According to General Stasys Rastikis, the m1li tary leadership 
was very much concerned with the religious and moral development of the 
men. As he interprets the oath, the officers and men committed them-
selves to be responsible first to God, then to their military obliga-
tions. Religious feast days were observed and included mass. Parades, 
bivouacs, and maneuvers were accompanied by outdoor mass. Unit flags 
were blessed and contained religious illustrations and mottos. 
Crucifixes and religious illustrations hung in barracks and other 
fac1li ties. Army Chaplain Canon Adol fas Sabaliauskas wrote Catholic 
Soldier (Karys Katalikas), a missal and prayerbook. It was published by 
the army's press and education section and went through at least five 
ed i t1ons. 37 In his memoirs, Colonel Vaclovas Sliogeris adds that 
morning and evening inspections were accompanied by prayer, often 
hymns. Religious instruction was routine, and troops marched to church 
in ranks.38 
Article seven of the concordat between Kaunas and the Vatican, 
signed on 27 September 1927, stated that the Lithuanian army is provided 
with all privileges provided to armies of the Holy See as stipulated by 
Canon Law. 39 There were other ties between the two entities. Many 
37stasys Rast1kis, Lietuvos likimo keliais: Is mano uzrasu (On 
the Roads of Lithuania's Destiny: From My Notes), ed. Jonas Dainauskas 
(Chicago: Akademines skautijos leidykla I Academic Press, 1982), pp. 
259-261. 
38s11ogeris, p. 120. 
39Konkordatas tarp Sventojo 
(Concordat Between the Holy See and 
(Chicago: Draugas, 1928), p. 4. 
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priests were members of the National Guard; one of them was the noted 
writer Rev. Juozas Tumas-Vaizgantas, who was the first editor of the 
Guard's periodical Trimitas (Bugle). 40 
Whether or not the various religious-military ties had any 
effect on the men is difficult to answer. One former air force officer, 
while praising General Rastikis for his devotion, writes that many of 
the officers he encountered were not very religious, sending the men to 
church while themselves not entering. 41 What is important in this 
context are the ties between the two entities in a country which was 
overwhelmingly Roman Catholic and where religious activists, both clergy 
and lay, had played such important roles in the nation's renaissance as 
well as during independence. Perhaps the government had problematic 
relations with the Church, but it was certainly not a secularist 
government and did not expect its military to be so either. The Church, 
which played an important role in politics and society, played an 
equally strong role in the military. 
C. ARMY-SOCIETY FESTIVALS·· 
When General Stasys Rastikis was appointed commander-in-chief in 
40Aleksandras Merkelis, Juozas Tumas Vaizgantas (Chicago: J. 
Karvelis, 1955), I, pp. 269-271. Antanas Rukas, ed., Mykolas 
Slezevicius (Chicago: Terra, 1954), p. 176 brings out an interesting 
detail. During the funeral mass for former Prime Minister Mykolas 
Slezevicius in 1939, Reserve General Vincas Grigaliunas-Glovackis 
assisted at the altar wearing a surplice over his uniform. Ironically, 
he was one of the officers who participated in the coup which ousted the 
Slezevicius government. 
41 vaiceliunas, pp. 79-81. 
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1935, he sought to remedy what he discerned as a gap between the 
military and society, one w~ich had developed after the 1926 coup. Some 
of the reasons for this were discussed in the previous chapter. His 
plan to close the gap was three-pronged: 1) a press campaign to 
popularize the military and inform the public of its activities, 2) a 
similar radio campaign, and 3) open events which would bring the 
military and society closer together. 42 11 Rastikis felt that such 
experiences were beneficial for all parties concerned. They raised 
morale within the ranks and brought civilian support; they helped 
engender the idea of a unified national front -- a sphere in which there 
could be no opposition. 1143 
Petras Indreika writes that the idea for the army-society 
festivals (kariuomenes ir visuomenes susiartinimo sventes) arose from 
the 11 Ramove" Fraternity. The military agreed and the president, along 
with the government, supported its planning. The first such festival 
occured on 15 May 1935 with senior civil, military, and diplomatic 
officials participating. The festival commenced with mass in the church 
of the Kaunas garrison, which was followed by ceremonies honoring war 
dead at the War Museum. Speeches and parades closed out the 
festivities. 44 Such festivals in Kaunas and the provinces enabled the 
citizenry to visit military installations and facilities, and witness 
42Rastikis, I, p. 383. 
43vitas, "Socialization and Smetona," p. 21. 
44Karka, pp. 41-42. 
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how their fighting men 11 ved. They could ride cavalry horses, fire 
rifles and automatic weapons, fly in fighter planes, and sample the 
mess. 45 
There were other occasions when the military came into contact 
with society• 16 February, Lithuanian Independence. Day, and 23 
November, the anniversary of the army's founding, were always celebrated 
with large milftar.y parades and ceremonies. Each year, units throughout 
the country celebrated their anniversaries and staged unit holidays, 
which included sporting and shooting 'ell/en ts, and banquets. President 
Smetona took time to visit some of these holidays; such visits resulted 
in even larger ceremonies.46 The first Lithuanian World Congress 
occured in Kaunas in 1935, bringing Lithuanians from many countries into 
the capital. This was the occasion for a massive military and air 
display for the guests and residents of Kaunas.47 
According to one commentator, the officers of the Lithuanian 
army had become praetorians, guarding the security of the regime and 
keeping it isolated from the citizenry, despite official propaganda and 
"banal" patriotic speeches. 48 The army's and state's affairs had been 
45 Rastikis, I, p. 385. 
46s11ogeris, pp. 62-63. 
47Rapolas Ski pi tis, Nepriklausoma Lietuva: Atsiminimai 
(Independent Lithuania: Reminiscences, (Chicago: Draugas, 1967), pp. 
406-407. For accounts and photographs of public military displays see 
V. Augustinas, photographer, "Kariuomenes ir visuomenes diena Kaune 
1938 m. 11 ("Army-Society Festival in Kaunas 1938"), Karxs, August-
September 1958, p. 218; Gintneris, p. 168, Lelis, p. 125. For President 
Smetona' s remarks at the army-s.ociety festival on 26 May 1935 see 
Smetona, II, pp. 171-172. 
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effectively maintained in the hands of one political group, the 
Nationalist Association, since the 1926 coup. This was formalized in 
the outlawing of opposition political parties in 1935. A substantial 
portion of society had thus fallen away from the government - and the 
military which kept it in power. It is interesting that the initiative 
for the army-society festivals came not from official sources, but from 
the "Ramove" Fraternity. General Rastikis credits the festivals, as 
well as other public military displays, with providing moral support to 
the army and giving it a sturdier foundation upon which to carry out its 
tasks •. From the o.ther perspective, society was perhaps better able to 
understand and appreciate the military which, despite being composed of 
its own sons, brothers, and husbands, had become someWhat of an 
alienated mystery and gendarme. 49 
D. THE MI(ITARY MEDIA 
In a theoretical article, Zlabis writes of the close ties 
between the military and press during both war and peace. Information 
is reciprocally exchanged and subject to mutual feedback between the 
military and nation. Military information and civic education proceed 
by way of the press. The pen is a mighty weapon, as the power of 
propaganda has demonstrated time and time again.so 
48Rukas, pp. 278, 280. 
49Rastikis, I, pp. 380, 383-384. 
50Juozas Zlabis, 11 Spauda ir karas" ("The Press and War"), in 
Pirmasis Lietuvos zurnalistu sajungos metrastis . (First Yearbook of the 
Lithuanian Journalists Association), eds. V. Kemezys and J. Paleckis 
(Kaunas: L.J.A., 1934), pp. 62-64. 
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These facts were not lost on the military leadership, especially 
General Rastikis. He saw to it that the press corps was invited to 
drills and maneuvers throughout the country, in addition to various 
ceremonies and commemorations, and the commissioning of new officers at 
the Military Academy. The press never refused such invitations and 
Rastikis reports that both government and opposition press were 
objective in their accounts. Rastikis, who viewed the press as a 
partner, held news conferences and related plans for the future. He 
himself contributed a great deal to the military press on the necessity 
of civil-military cooperation.51 
Two examples of the importance of the pen to the military 
follow. Issue number thirty-nine (1928) of Trimitas (Bugle), the 
National Guard periodical, recounted maneuvers which occurred in 
Kedainiai, appoximately twenty-five miles north of Kaunas, on 12-21 
September 1928. The account emphasized good relations between the 
soldiers and people, especially the farmers, during the course of the 
maneuvers. It also wrote that the people were patriotic and proud of 
their soldiers.52 In 1939-1940, Captain Jurgis Polujanskas wrote 
articles and analyses regarding the course of the European theater of 
World War II for the Lietuvos aidas (Echo of Lithuania) newspaper, a 
Nationalist daily.53 
51Rastikis, I, p. 383. 
52Jurgela and Jurkus, p. 55. 
53sronys Raila, Paguoda (Solace) (London: Nida, 1975), III, 74. 
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Radio was also viewed as a partner of the military. Stations 
never refused to broadcast news of a military nature, and Sundays and 
holidays saw half-hour segments devoted to the military. They included 
lectures, announcements, news, concerts by military orchestras and 
choirs, and. plays whi9h were written and acted by officers and soldiers 
of all grades. The themes of the plays were taken from the wars of 
independence and general military life. The thrust was always patrio-
tism and the self-sacrifice of the soldier. All broadcasting was done 
by military men under the direction of the army's press and education 
section. The broadcasts were listened to by civilians and soldiers, who 
were provided with barracks radios and speakers.54 11 Humor was a 
component of military broadcasting; this in a constant effort to 
humanize the face of the army - and indirectly that of the regime. 1155 
The National Guard had its own separate half-hour program. other 
organizations would later begin their own broadcasts, often imitating 
the military's examples and formats.56 
E. THE ACTIVITY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL VLADAS NAGIUS-NAGEVICIUS 
One example of the link between the military and society was 
perfectly embodied in Brigadier General Vladas Nagius-Nagevicius. His 
cultural and social activity, coupled with faithful military service for 
.. 
a lifetime, made him one of the most popular figures in the Lithuanian 
54 Rastikis, I, pp. 383-384. 
55vitas "Socialization and Smetona," p. 21. 
56 Rastikis, I, p. 384. 
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military. 
He was born in Kretinga, Lithuania on 17 June 1881 and was a 
graduate of the Institute of Archeology and the Military Academy of 
Medicine, both in St. Petersburg, Russia. As a student, he participated 
in the Lithuanian national movement in Russia and was once jailed for 
that activity. He served with the Russian fleet in the Baltic and Black 
seas from 1910 until 1917. After the declaration of Lithuania's 
independence on 16 February 1918, he volunteered for the Lithuanian army 
and was appointed head of the army medical corps'. He would hold this 
position until 1940, making dramatic inroads into the health and 
treatment of military men.57 
Though Nagevicius was a i>ersonal friend of Smetona, with the 
president occasionaily visiting his farm, he did not actively 
participate in the 1926 coup, and never either approved or justified 
it. Indeed, shortly before the coup, General Nagevicius proposed that 
President Ka2ys Grinius, a medical doctor, be elected an honorary member 
of the medical organization Fraternitas Lithuanica. In a speech several 
years after the coup, Nagevicius stated that it was a sad event, and the 
country must return to normal! ty and democracy. Be that as it may, 
Nagevicius also often played the unpleasant role of intermediary and 
peacemaker. One such occasion was inunediately following the coup, when 
------·~---------57 Jonas Puzinas, "Vlad as Nagius-Nagevicius," Enc>;clopedia 
Lituanica, 1975, vol. 4, p. 11. See also Henrikas Brazaitis, "Gen. dr. 
Vlada Nagiu-Nageviciu prisimenant" ("Remembering General Doctor Vlad as 
Nagius-Nagevicius"), Dirva, 4 October 1984, p. 9 for a treatment of 
Nagevicius' early life. 
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Nagevicius delivered a letter from Smetona to President Grinius, 
pleading that Grinius step down to avert a Polish invasion. Grinius 
returned the letter to Nagevicius without a response.58 A similar role 
took place in March 1938, following the Lithuanian government's 
acceptance of a Polish ultimatum demanding the restoration of diplomatic 
relations. During a demonstration in Kaunas inv?lving seven to eight 
thousand people, the participants assembled on the grounds of the War 
Museum, of which Nagevicius was founder and director. He spoke on 
behalf of the government, requesting people to calm down in the face of 
this very unpopular move by the Smetora regime.59 
On one occasion, Nagevicius was an intermediary not merely 
within Lithuania's borders, but beyond them as well. The Lithuanian 
government had a practice of sending emissaries to visit Lithuanian 
colonies abroad. In 1938, Nagevicius was chosen to visit South 
Africa. After a discouraging beginnirig, he was able to bring a number 
of Lithuanians together in that obscure colony. He brought a book and 
film about Lithuania to acquaint the people with their homeland. 
Indeed, that year, Lithuanian Independence Day was celebrated in 
Johannesberg. The fruit of the general's visit was the organization of 
58Balys Matulionis, ed., Generolo gydytojo Vlado Nagiaus 
Nageviciaus gyvenimo ir darbu apzvalga (Review of the Life and Work of 
Physician General Vladas Nagius Nagevicius) (Putnam, CT: Veronika 
Nageviciene, 1962), pp. 44-45, 216-217; Sliogeris, pp. 62, 76, 78-79. 
59Kostas Navickas, The Strue;gle of the Lithuanian People for 
Statehood (Vilnius: Gintaras, 1971), p. 102. See also Robert A. Vitas, 
"The Polish-Lithuanian Crisis of 1938: Events Surrounding the 
Ultimatum," Lituanus 30, 2 (Summer 1984), 69. 
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the South African Lithuanian Society (Pietu Afrikos Lietuviu 
Draugija). 60 
At home, Nagevicius maintained his farm, Zemai tkiemis, near 
Babtai and Vendziogala, north of Kaunas. Over time, this area had 
become gradually polonized, and Nagevicius was determined to return a 
Lithuanian spirit to the area. He began holding festivals there, 
including Lithuanian songs, folkdances, traditions, and games. 
Eventually, it became not uncommon for two thousand to attend. Under 
Nagevicius' leadership and by force of his example, the area around 
Zemaitkiemis was gradually brought back under Lithuanian spiritual 
influence. It was this farm which received an array of distinguished 
visitors, including President Smetona, Kaunas Archbishop Juozapas 
Skvireckas, government and military officials, foreign diplomats, and 
leading members of society.61 
General Nagevicius, in addition to being the director of the War 
Museum and head of the army's medical service, had a wide range of 
social and cultural activities.62 He urged his medical Fraternitas 
Lithuanica to assist the army's medical service morally, materially, and 
in terms of talent. He also sought to assist the other arm of the 
military, the navy. This was an interest stemming from his days in the 
Russian fleet. In 1923 he founded and was the first president of the 
60Matulionis, pp. 41-43. 
61Matulionis, pp. 67, 215-216; Sliogeris, p. 79. 
62The following information is taken from Hatulionis, pp. 35, 
40-41, 65-66, 236-250, 263-265, 275 ff. 
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Sailors Association (Jurininku Sajunga). This organization helped found 
a sailors training school and arranged scholarships to allow sailors to 
train abroad. In 1927, General Nagevicius requested Mrs. Celina 
Mosinskis to establish the Lithuanian Womens' National Naval Assistance 
Society (Lietuvos Moteru Tautlniam Laivynui Remti Draugija). Its 
purpose was to develop interest in sea power and its importance to the 
state, and to assist in the navy's establishment. The society raised 
funds through donations, balls, lotteries, and picnics. It later helped 
establish the Navy Fund (Karo Laivyno Fondas), another example of 
society being brought into the sphere of military funding, provisioning 
and assistance. 
In his continuing effort to preserve and promote Lithuanian 
culture, he founded a women's committee to revive the wearing of the 
Lithuanian folk costume. He also urged women to join in cultural and 
social work, to maintain Lithuanian traditions, and not to surrender to 
foreign influence. A women's organization he helped found would later 
become the famous Birute Society. 
Other activities included the establishment of the Lithuanian 
Beautification Society (Lietuvai Pagrazinti Draugija) to preserve 
historical areas. He also established the Animal Protection Society 
(Gyvuliams Globoti Draugija) and headed it for many years. The society 
drafted rules for the handling of animals which were later adopted by 
the government and enforced by the police. He organized Finnish-
Lithuanian, Estonian-Lithuanian, and Latvian-Lithuanian friendship 
associations to promote more solidarity within the Baltic. His academic 
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work included archeological digs, articles, and presentations at 
international conferences. In the military sphere, he founded the 
Kaunas Officers Club (Karininku Ramove) and served on the Central Board 
of the National Guard. 
The activity in which Nagevicius took most pride, however, was 
his work with military invalids and their association with the War 
Museum. He founded a number of committees to assist invalids and mili-
tary hospitals. 63 Military invalids worked at the Museum, which was 
considered a national shrine. They were guards, honor guards, assis-
tants, and guides. They were distinguished by their special, dark 
uni :~orms. The invalids executed public ceremonies daily and special 
ones on holidays. Many spectators gathered for these events, which 
included the lowering of flags and the honoring of the unknown soldier 
in the evening. Important foreign guests were received at the Museum, 
which was also a focal point for all national festivals, parades, and 
ceremonies. Nagevicius, who founded and directed the museum until the 
loss of independence, is most famous for these activities.64 
63see Matulionis, pp. 35, 40, 65. For a publication. honoring 
invalids see J. Viliusis, Vycio zenklas 1918-1938 (Knight's Cross 1918-
1938) (Kaunas: Association of Invalids of Lithuania's Wars of 
Independence, 1938). An advertisement for products produced by an 
invalid sewing shop appears in Centralinis Statistikos Biuras I Central 
Statistical Bureau, Visa Lietuva: informacine knyga (All Lithuania: 
Information Book) (Kaunas: Spaudos Fondas I Press Fund, 1925), p. 403. 
64E. J. Harrison, ed., Lithuania 1928 (London: Hazell, Watson & 
Viney, 1928), pp. 78-79; Merkelis, Antanas Smetana, pp. 351, 361; Petras 
Pleskevicius, Mes nesem laisve (We Carried Freedom), 2nd rev. ed. (n.p.: 
n.p., n.d.), pp. 165-171. For a detailed description and explanation of 
the Museum see Matulionis, pp. 81-167. Even though the War Museum is 
now the Communist State Museum, it is still a focus for Lithuanian 
nationalism. On 14 May 1972 Romas Kalanta, a Lithuanian student, burned 
139 
The Museum was closed after the Soviet occupation of June 
1940. It was reopened and functioned in a limited capacity during the 
German occupation of 1941-1944. When the Soviets invaded and occupied 
again in 1944, Nagevicius and his wife fled to Austria and later 
emigrated to the US. 
1954. 65 
F. CONCLUSION 
He died in Willoughby, Ohio on 15 September 
Following the 1926 coup, there was a discernible gap between the 
military and society, mainly due to the fact that the army was 
controlled by one . politic al group, for which it was forced to act as 
gendarme. For quite some time there was no action to remedy this 
incongruity between the citizens and their soldiers. General Stasys 
Rastikis, commander-in-chief 1935-1940, was one of the few who undertook 
positive steps, often using standard techniques of political socializa-
tion. He was partially successful in these efforts. As the indepen-
dence period continued, albeit for a short time, soldier and civilian 
did grow closer together a vital ingredient for stability and 
strength in any political system. It is to General Rastikis whom this 
study now turns. 
himself to death there in protest of the continued Soviet occupation. 
65 Puzinas, p. 12. 
CHAPTER VII 
PERSONA PRIMA IN MILITARY AFFAIRS: 
DIVISIONAL GENERAL STASYS RASTIKIS, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 1935-1940 
A. PREFATORY REMARKS 
Persona prima is the title bestowed upon Rastikis by Aleksandras 
Merkelis, President Smetona's biographer. According to Merkelis, 
Rastikis rose like a meteor at a time when the military' s prestige was 
at an all-time low following the Kubiliunas revolt of June 1934. People 
within and without the military looked to him with great hope. In 
return, Rastikis wished to raise the military's prestige by enhancing 
his own personal authority and popularity. 1 During his tenure at the 
helm of Lithuania's armed forces, he would take dramatic steps to 
reorganize and modernize them, while raising the citizenry's trust in 
their fighting men. 2 For example, Rastikis' efforts at socialization, 
discussed in the previous chapter, were notable. His importance to 
Lithuania, both military and nation, was such that his influence is felt 
throughout this study, as his memoirs are mentioned numerous times. 
Those memoirs were published in four volumes between 1956 and 
1Aleksandras Merkelis, Antanas Smetona: Jo visuomenine, 
kulturine ir politine veikla (Antanas Smetona: His Social 2 Cultural, and 
Political Activity) (New York: American Lithuanian National Association, 
1964), pp. 447, 537-538. 
2vaclovas Sliogeris, Antanas Smetona: Zmogus ir 
valstybininkas. Atsiminimai (Antanas Smetona: Person and Statesman. 
Reminiscences) (Sodus, MI: Juozas J. Bachunas, 1966), p. 134. 
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1982. They encompass 2, 800 pages. The Rastikis memoirs are necessary 
reading for any student of independent Lithuania's military. They also 
give insight into life and politics in general. In many cases, the 
information there is found nowhere else. Professor V. Stanley Vardys, 
chairman of political science at the University of Oklahoma at Norman 
characterizes the work as the most important and useful of all the 
memoirs written by leading citizens of independent Lithuania, for they 
chronicle the internal politics of the period 1935-1940. Rastikis, 
according to Vardys, is an expert writer and master of the pen, whose 
work is readable and explains the complex well. Facts are well-recorded 
and attention to detail is scrupulous. His analysis is many-faceted, 
viewing any given question from all sides. Rastikis realized his role 
in history and wrote in such fashion; he was not merely arrogant as 
critics claim.3 
Rastikis was one of the few general officers in the Lithuanian 
military who possessed a broad perspective. He realized the 
implications of the military in politics and society. When others, both 
officers and civilians, were advocating a greater role for the military 
in the politic al power structure, he advocated a strong voice for the 
military, but with strict subordination to civil authority. In this 
sense, he was a Western military man. Though he was serving at military 
headquarters in Kaunas at the time of the 1926 coup, he was not involved 
3v. Stanley Vardys, "Generolo Rastikio memuarai ir jo vaidmuo 
Lietuvos poli tikoje" ("General Rastikis' Memoirs and his Role in 
Lithuania's Poli tics"), Aidai (Echoes), no. 4, (April 1973), pp. 
147-148. 
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and learned of it the following morning along with most residents of the 
capital. Different scholars rate Rastikis differently. Some say he had 
no politic al ambition; others write that he had a secret desire for 
supreme power, .if only indirectly. 
B. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
Stasys Rastikis was born 13 September 1896 in Kursenai. He 
completed gymnasium in 1914. The following year he volunteered for the 
Russian army and was promoted to NCO. He saw combat in several 
locations throughout the Russian Empire and Eastern Europe. Rastikis 
graduated from the Military Academy of Tiflis (Tbilisi) in 1917 and 
remained at the front in the Caucasus until war's end. He returned to 
Vilnius in Spring 1918 and registered to serve in the Lithuanian army, 
which was still in the planning stages. That same year he entered the 
Kaunas Catholic Seminary. The following year Rastikis volunteered for 
service in the Lithuanian army, which was then fighting the wars of 
independence against the Poles, Bolsheviks, and a German-Russian force 
under Colonel Bermondt-Avalov. He was seriously injured in combat with 
the Bolsheviks, and was forced to lie on the battlefield under cover of 
darkness while his own troops and the enemy exchanged fire. Upon being 
taken prisoner, he was kept in various hos pi ta ls, later in the Tula 
concentration camp and Moscow prisons. He was returned to Lithuania 
during a prisoner exchange in April 1921. In 1923 he was transferred to 
headquarters and worked in military intelligence from 1926 until 1930. 
Rastikis graduated the University of Kaunas Faculty of Veterinary 
Medicine in 1929 and the Berlin General Staff Academy in 1932. 
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After serving as an infantry officer, Rastikis was appointed 
chief of staff in 1934, several months after the Kubiliunas revolt. At 
that time, this was the senior uniformed officer in the country; he held 
the position while still a lieutenant colonel. On 1 January 1935, he 
was appointed to the newly reconstituted post of co111Dander-in-chief, the 
new senior uniformed position. Rastikis was promoted to the grade of 
brigadier general on 23 November 1937. In the five years he served as 
commander-in-chief, Rastikis reorganized and strengthened the army in 
terms of combat readiness, administration, education, discipline, and 
decentralized mobilization. He served as acting defense minister for 
eight months in 1938 in the~Mlronas cabinet. 
While Rastikis ostensibly held to the principle of military 
neutrality vis-a-vts politics, Smetona suspected Rastikis of forming a 
rival power center. He was relieved from duties in January 1940, 
promoted to the grade of divisional general two weeks before becoming 
eligible, and discharged to the reserve on 23 April. However, on 7 June 
1940 he was returned to active duty and appointed commander of the 
Senior Officer Courses. During the Soviet ultimatum one week later on 
15 June, Rastikis was appointed prime minister in a desperate move by 
the government, but was not allowed by Moscow to execute these duties. 
He later fled to Germany. His wife was held in a Kaunas prison until 
the German liberation. His three daughters, ages eleven, four, and one, 
along with Rastikis' other relatives, were deported to Siberia. His 
one-year old daughter would die soon thereafter in exile. 
When the Germans launched Operation Barbarossa against the 
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Soviet Union in June 1941, Lithuanians revolted and formed a provisional 
government, with Rastikis as defense minister. The Germans soon 
liquidated this government, but offered Rastikis various senior 
positions during the German occupation. He refused each time, choosing 
instead to work in the War Museum in Kaunas. 
When the Red Army re-occupied Lithuania in 1944, Rastikis fled 
to Germany where he lived in displaced persons camps. Soviet Lithuanian 
emissaries continued to harass him there, urging him to return to 
Lithuania. They used letters from his daughters as bait; Rastikis 
refused. In the beginning of 1948, British occupation forces arrested a 
Lithuanian NKVD agent who had been sent to assasinate General Rastikis 
and another former Lithuanian army officer. 
In 1949 Rastikis and his wife emigrated to the United States. 
He remained active in the Lithuanian community while working in a Los 
Angeles factory. In 1951-1952 he taught Russian at Syracuse Univer-
sity. He worked at the European headquarters of the Supreme Committee 
for the Liberation of Lithuania in 1952-1953. He was transferred to the 
Washington headquarters in 1954. From 1955 until 1968 he was instructor 
of foreign languages at the US Army Language School and the Defense 
Language Institute, Monterey, California. He also gave lectures on 
military-related topics to the officers and men. 
General Rastikis was awarded military decorations by the 
governments of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Sweden, 
France, and Great Britain. 
Divisional General Stasys Rastikis died in Los Angeles on 2 May 
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1985 at the age of eighty-nine. 
C. THE RASTIKIS PLAN FOR MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 
Upon being appointed chief of staff in Autumn 1934, Rastikis 
immediately took steps to rationalize the administration of the senior 
military leadership - and to enhance his own power as senior uniformed 
officer. Throughout the period of independence, the military leadership 
had been the most unstable of all government en ti ties. In the twenty-
two years of independence, there were as many defense ministers and 
chiefs of staff. That period also saw twelve separate terms as 
commander-in-.chief, though one individual, General Silvestras Zukauskas, 
served four of them. Clarification is needed, though. Between 26 
January 1928 and 1 January 1935 there was no commander-in-chief. The 
position of senior uniformed officer was held by the chief of staff who, 
in addition to administering the headquarters staff, was also in the 
chain of command. 4 
Rastikis also had to contend with ambiguity regarding the 
specific spheres of. power of the "Big Three" in the military, that is 
4stasys Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones: Is mano uzrasu (Events and 
Personalities: From My Notes), ed. Bronius Kviklys (Chicago: Akademines 
skautijos leidykla I Academic Press, 1972), pp. 15-16. Sova discounts 
the thesis of instability. He writes that for all practical purposes, 
the leadership of the army can be divided into three phases. From 1919 
until 1929 General Silvestras Zukauskas, a hero of the wars of 
independence, in effect ran the army. Indeed, in addition to three 
previous short terms as commander-in-chief, he served in that post from 
5 June 1923 until 26 January 1928. From 1929 until 1934, Chief of Staff 
General Petras Kubiliunas ran the army, and General Rastikis held the 
reins of military power for the last five years of independence. See 
Antanas Sova, "Del praeities ivykiu" ("About Past Events"), Dirva, 30 
January 1974, p. 3. 
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the defense minister, conunander-in-chief, and chief of staff. 
Occasionally they would overlap; other times a void existed. Clashes 
among these three, especially if one or more of them had a strong 
personality, would reverberate throughout the entire military. The 
defense minister would sometimes make a military-related decision 
without consulting either the conunander-in-chief or the chief of 
staff. Further, the defense minister was often of a lower grade and not 
as competent in military matters as the other two officers. However, he 
was still the superior and had the greater responsibility and 
authority.5 
In his first meeting with the State Defense Board (Valstybes 
Gynimo Taryba) Rastikis presented his reorganization and strengthening 
plan. In the first place, there were several proposals for rectifying 
certain problems of foreign affairs. Smetona responded by stating that 
right was on Lithuania's side and nothing could be done. Rastikis also 
proposed a military alliance with the other Baltic states of Latvia and 
Estonia. Smetona rejected this also, saying that Lithuania's two 
northern neighbors were too sympathetic to Poland. 6 
The second phase of the proposal dealt with military reorganiza-
tion. The president as before, was conmander-in-chief of all armed 
forces. He had the authority to order the army commander-in-chief to 
5Merkelis, p. 423, Sta sys Rastikis, Kovose del Lietuvos: Kario 
atsiminimai (In the Battles for Lithuania: A Soldier's Reminiscences) 
(Los Angeles: Lietuviu dienos I Lithuanian Days, 1956), I, 485-486, 
489-490. 
~erkelis, p. 438. 
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commence military operations when war was declared or Lithuania's 
territory was invaded. The defense minister was head of the entire 
military establishment (vi sos kariuomenes virsininkas) and prepared the 
nation and army for war. His deputy was either the prime minister or 
another minister· designated by the prime minister. The cormnander-in-
chief answered to the defense minister. The army oommander.-in-chief 
possessed responsibility for insuring that the army was combat-ready.7 
Two bodies were to advise on and decide military matters. The 
first was the Military Board (Karo Taryba), chaired by the defense 
minister and consisting of the commander-in-chief, the chief of staff, 
the chief quartermaster and, if required by the minister, one of ·the 
commanding generals of the army's three divisions. The State Defense 
Board, mentioned above, was chaired by the president and consisted of 
the prime minister, the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, finance, 
interior, the commander-in-chief, and the chief quartermaster. 8 The 
organization of the Lithuanian military establishment is found in 
Figure 7. 1. 
The third and final phase of the Rastikis Plan dealt with 
military finance. In his seven year plan to strengthen and modernize 
the army, he requested annually for special expenditures (nepaprastom 
7For a short overview of the organization of the military under 
the statute of 12 May 1919 see Ladislovas Natkevicius, Lietuvos 
kariuomene (The Lithuanian Army) (Ne~ York: Lithuanian Development 
Corporation, 1919), pp. 32, 36. 
Bvyriausybes zinios (Government News) (Kaunas: Ministru tarybos 
kanceliarija I Chancellery of the Cabinet), no. 3259, 31 December 1934. 
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islaidom) 25 million li tai, for a total of 175 million li tai over and 
above the regular budget. The prime minister and finance minister, 
Juozas Tubelis, opPosed such large increases in military spending on the 
grounds that they would be almost imPossible for Lithuania's economy to 
bear, and that large foreign loans were undesirable. President Smetona 
attempted to work out a compromise between the two positions, but the 
clouds of war were approaching and he decided to approve Rastikis' 
request.9 
The Rastikis Plan became operational on 1 January 1935. 
Lieutenant Colonel Rastikis was named commander-in-chief and Colonel 
Jonas Cernius was appointed chief of staff. Most officers were pleased 
with the 1935 reforms and felt that the young, energetic (thirty-eight 
years of age) commander-in-chief would be able to execute his plan to 
its fullest potential. It was adopted perhaps for two reasons: 1) supe-
rior argumentation on the part of its proponent, and 2) fear of another 
military uprising so soon after the Kubiliunas revolt, in which military 
spending had been a factor. One commentator, however, is critical of 
Rastikis' action, stating that he overstepped his authority, for 
budgetary matters are in the hands of the defense minister - according 
to Rastikis' own plan. Nevertheless, during the course of the seven 
year plan -- which would only receive five years to operate - military 
attaches in Kaunas observed that in terms of quality of education, arms, 
and men, Lithuania's army had surpassed those of the other Baltic 
9Merkelis, pp. 438-439. 
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FIGURE 7.1: THE RASTIKIS PLAN: 
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT OF LITHUANIA 
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states. 10 
The increased power which Rastikis received under the 1935 
reforms proved to· have more than just military consequences. Whether he 
wanted to or not -- scholars disagree as to his motives -- Rastikis was 
also placed in the middle of domestic political vicissitudes. This will 
now be discussed. 
D. RASTIKIS AND POLITICS 
Despite the fact that General Rastikis was married to President 
Smetona's niece, Elena Marija Srnetonaite, the relations between the two 
men were mainly official. Very rarely did the Rastikises visit the 
First Family. More often they would visit socially with Marija 
Smetonai te Valusi s, the president's daughter, and her husband, Major 
Aloyzas Valusis. 11 While Rastikis' relationship with the president was 
mainly professional, it should not be construed that he did not have 
strong political opinions. In ~is memoirs, he writes that he felt 
disdain for the excessive and sometimes unethical disputes which took 
pl ace in domestic J?Oli tics. He also disliked the peacetime state of 
war, which necessitated military censorship of the press and political 
intervention. As far as he was concerned, civil administration should 
10stasys Rastikis, "A.a. brigados generolas Jonas Cernius" 
("The Late Brigadier General Jonas Cernius"), Lietuviu dienos 
(Lithuanian Days), September 1977, p. 5. For positive comments 
regarding the plan see Sliogeris, pp. 127, 133. For a critique see 
Jonas Augustaitis, Vardxs ir Sova apie Rastikio atsiminimus (Vardys and 
Sova on Rastikis' Memoirs) (Chicago: Author: 1975), p. 10. 
11Sliogeris, p. 144. 
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not be in the hands of the military and political matters must be dealt 
with by the defense minister. 1be top military leadership should become 
involved only to the extent of coordination, that is, to maintain 
contact with leaders of !!l. political parties and assure that they are 
attending to military-related matters. 12 
Rastikis became unpopular, especially among the Nationalists, 
when he took steps to de-politicize the military. For example, some 
elements referred to Rastikis as a revolutionary when he informed the 
president and defense minister that he would no longer allow the 
military to carry out civilian death sentences. He also wished to 
deemphasize the army's police function. During the Suvalkai farmers 
unrest in 1934, Rastikis was on vacation in Palanga on the Baltic. 1be 
interior minister, through the prime minister's office, requested 
military assistance in restoring order. 1be defense minister agreed to 
send several cavalry units to the Suvalkai region. Rastikis, however, 
discovered this and took swift action to countermand the orders. In the 
end, the army and farmers never clashed. 13 
While Rastikis advocated a strict separation between the 
political and military realms, and obedience to civil superiors, he also 
urged respect from politicians toward the military. He warned that the 
military must not be injected into politics. Further, civil superiors 
must be vigilant that the military not overstep its bounds. Rastikis 
12 Rastikis, I, p. 394. Cf. chapter 2 of this study for a 
discussion of the military profession's disdain for politics. 
13R. t · k. I 407 409 as i is, , pp. - • 
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realized that a number of officers had been transferred to other 
ministries, sometimes for political duties, w:hile remaining on active 
duty. Upon assuming his new duties, he informed them that they must 
either return to regular military service or retire to the reserve prior 
to continuing political activity. 
opted to join the reserve. 14 
Many disliked this ultimatum and 
Rastikis writes that the general public perceived him as a 
member of the government. He responds by saying that he was not, and 
did not attend cabinet meetings unless ordered by the defense minister 
to discuss military-related matters. Rastikis was not even of vice-
ministerial rank; when the post of defense minister was vacant, the 
portfolio was assumed by the prime minister or another minister.. When 
the Constitution of 1938 was being drafted by the Seimas, there was a 
suggestion that the commander-in-chief be designated a formal member· of 
the cabinet with the right to attend meetings. Rastikis writes that he 
urged this provision not to be adopted, for it would detract from his 
military duties, cause him to be responsible for government actions, and 
pull him too far into the politic al sphere; the provision was not 
adopted. Rastikis participated only in sub-cabinet councils. 15 Indeed 
his advice in such settings was often decisive. During the Polish 
ultimatum of 1938, for example, Rastikis' argumentation to accept the 
demand to restore diplomatic relations with Warsaw carried the day. 16 
14Rastikis, I, pp. 393, 
res~rictions on reserve officers. 
410. He did ,not place political 
See Rastikis, I, p •. 396. 
15 Rastikis, I, pp. 489, 490. 
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Rastikis' determination to keep politic al forces out of the 
military evoked the wrath of the ruling Nationalist As~ociation. In the 
first place, he was not pleased that the Sei~as convened in 1936 was 
composed only of Nationalists. Further, he wished to eliminate 
political patronage, and the political basis for promotion and 
advancement in the army. For example, civilian district officials 
wished to control entry into the Military Academy. They wanted only 
those they approved of to gain entry. Rastikis ordered the only 
criterion for entry to be a competitive examination, with personal and 
political considerations omitted. Even innocent encounters with non-
political groups could immerse him in difficulties. For example, if 
Rastikis received delegates from a Catholic organization, it could be 
construed as a manifestation of sympathy toward the Christian 
Democrats. His devout Catholic practice was also not politically 
beneficial. 17 
Aleksandras Merkelis, President Smetona's biographer, writes 
that General Rastikis perceived himself as untouchable, that is, he 
should be above criticism. He, along with another commentator, 
concludes that in twice refusing an offer to become prime minister, it 
is evident that Rastikis sought to maintain his power -- the real power 
based on the military - by managing affairs from behind the scenes, 
without the responsibility and instability of the prime minister's 
16see Robert A. Vitas, "The Polish-Lithuanian Crisis of 1938: 
Events Surrounding the Ultimatum," Lituanus, 30, 2 (Summer 1984), 66-67. 
17Rastikis, I, pp. 409-410, 451-452, 495-496, 500. 
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post. 18 One interesting indication supporting this line of thought is a 
photograph which appears in one book published while Rastikis served 
concurrently as acting defense minister for eight months in 1938. Under 
the photograph, the title of commander-in-chief precedes that of acting 
defense minister. 19 One analyst interprets Rastikis' actions as 
indicative of simple fear; he was afraid to be a civil political leader 
with the position's accompanying'vicissitudes. 20 
One contemporary example of the political sphere being forsaken 
for the military may be found in Egypt. After Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat was assasinated in 1981, Vice President Hosni Mubarak assumed 
interim power while waiting for new presidential elections. During that 
interim, however, Mubarak did not refer to himself as vice president or 
acting president. He did not assume a civil title, but instead declared 
himself commander-in-chief of the armed- forces. Perhaps, Mubarak, as 
Rastikis, knew where the real power of his country was based. 
At first, Smetona approved of Rastikis' increase of authority 
over the military. He felt this would be beneficial for mi'.1.1 tary 
discipline and, perhaps, inject a note of stability into that troubled 
area. Indeed when initial differences arose between General Rastikis 
and the Nationalist Association, Smetona supported Rastikis, despite the 
18Augustaitis p. 11; Merkelis pp. 544, 565. 
19see photograph in J. Viliusis, _v .... y_c_io __ z_e_n_k_l_as~-1--9._1--8._-_1_9=3-.8 
(Knight's Cross 1918-1938) (Kaunas: Association of Invalids of 
Lithuania's Wars of Independence, 1938), p. 7. 
20conversation with Dr. Thomas Remeikis, head of political 
science at Calumet College, Indiana, August 1984. 
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criticism this evoked from his own politic al faction. Nevertheless, 
after some time, Smetana became worried that Rastikis may fall into the 
trap of partisan politics -- on the side of the Christian Democrats -
if he attempted to become persona prima in society, as he was in the 
military. In the minds of many in the regime, Rastikis had b-ecorne a 
tool, albeit unwittingly, of the Christian Democrat.s. Thus during 
official reports, if Rastikis brought up non-military matters with the 
president, Smetana would politely inform him that he did not care to 
discuss them. 21 
Evidently, Smetana soon thought that Rastikis was searching for 
excessive popularity, influence, and authority in the non-military 
sphere. Sliogeris, another biographer of the president and a one-time 
military aide, writes that Rastikis would occasionally define his 
jurisdiction rather broadly. Merkelis asserts that Rastikis admired the 
conunander-in-chief of the Estonian army, General Johan Laidoner, whom he 
met during a visit to commemorate Estonia's independence day on 24 
February 1939. Laidoner was a greater figure than President Konstantin 
Pats. Merkelis is of the opinion that Rastikis desired similar status 
in Lithuania. 22 
As far as Smetana was, concerned, his quiet war with Rastikis for 
primacy began. on 1 October 1936 when Secret Defense Ministry Section II 
21Merkelis, pp. 539-540. 
22Merkelis, pp. 542-543, Kazys Musteikis, Prisiminimu fragmentai 
(Fraeents of Memories) (London: Nida, 1970), pp. 74, 83; Sliogeris 
p. 130. 
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Memorandum Number 3760 was transmitted to the president. In it, 
Rastikis wrote that some communist-influenced reservists, while on 
active duty, would be disruptive and insubordinate. He suggested the 
following remedies: 1) utilize all patriotic organizations to form a 
united front in the fight against co111Dunism, 2) educate the masses, 3) 
utilize more propaganda, 4) control the press and the importation of 
Soviet films (Sovkinas), 5) government officials should take courses in 
ideology and give a loyalty oath, 6) only loyal and trustworthy 
Lithuanians should be hired for government service, 7) transgressors 
should be sent to labor camps, not the standard administrative 
punishments of exile or the guardhouse. While sensible observations and 
suggestions, Smetona did not like the fact that such political material 
was emanating from military headquarters. Indeed he interpreted these 
not as suggestions, but as directives. However, Smetona decided not to 
have a conflict with the military or change leadership at this juncture, 
instead opting to maneuver carefully with Rastikis until the appropriate 
and secure time arrived to remove him. 23 
As the independence period neared its end, Rastikis became 
increasingly involved in political matters. This was especially true in 
events surrounding the government of Brigadier General Jonas Cerni us, 
which will be discussed at more length in the following chapter. 
Cernius was appointed prime minister on 30 March 1939 after the German 
ultimatum, in which Lithuania was forced to cede the Klaipeda Territory, 
23Augustaitis, p. 13; Merkelis pp. 540-541. 
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was accepted. Rastikis actively urged Smetona to place members of the 
opposition in the new cabinet. Smetona, though skeptical, agreed. The 
evening the Cernius government was installed, Rastikis spoke over radio 
to calm the people after such a traumatic international humiliation. He 
informed the citizenry that the president had agreed to form a new 
government based upon a broader political foundation. Ras ti ki s would 
receive many congratulatory letters and telegrams for this action, since 
people were becoming disenchanted with the one-party authoritarian 
regime. 24 
In November of that year, the Cerni us cabinet was weaken.ed by a 
key resignation. Rastikis was politically ac~ive during this cabinet 
crisis also. Smetona, who had not been pleased with the behavior of 
several opposition ministers• was of the opinion that the Christian 
Democrats and Peasant Populists would not want to join a post-Cernius 
government. The president was irritated by Rastikis' declaration that 
the opposition must be included; he perceived this almost as a threat. 
Nevertheless, Smetona gave Rastikis permission to contact the opposition 
regarding their· participation. Consent was secured and the cabinet of 
Ant an as Merkys, the last government of independent Lithuania, . was 
formed.25 
24Augustaitis, p. 4. 
25Merkelis, pp. 540, 561-562; Rastikis, I, pp. 634-636. It must 
be noted that the last two cabinets of independent Lithuania were not 
officially coalition governments, since the opposition had been 
technically outlawed in 1935. However, it had continued to be active, 
albeit without the fruits of political power, until the Cernius cabinet. 
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How does Rastikis himself respond to charges of political 
interference? He writes that he respects President Smetona, though his 
assessment must be realistic and not tinged with any cult of 
personality. As far as Rastikis is concerned, he did not participate in 
any political adventurism. The charges that he desired political power 
and the decrease of presidential authority are false. It was his duty 
to popularize the military per se, not its leadership. However, in 
order to accomplish this, it was necessary for him to emerge as a strong 
and visible individua1. 26 
He did not expect all to agree with him. At the same time, 
though, he did not wish youth to develop into unthinking individuals. 
He wanted them to be critical in their analyses of all topics and come 
to their own conclusions. He also notes that he was forced to do this 
due to a general lack of concern with military matters. 
critic ism of "too much talking" was unwarranted. 27 
Thus the 
Rastikis wrote that senior military officials would be lax in 
their duties if they dealt only with military education and 
maintenance. In a blatant entrance into the civil realm, he states 
that, within the bounds of the national defense effort, the military 
must indirectly manage all agencies dealing even remotely with national 
security. This is the politico-military connection, though he writes 
that he recommended non-military action only when it was for the sake of 
26Rastikis, I, pp. 385-386; Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones, pp. 
26-27. 
27Rastikis, I, p. 391. 
159 
preserving military morale and effectiveness. 28 Be that as it may, the 
perception that Rastikis was too political, especially in the wrong 
camp, eventually led to his demise. This will now be addressed. 
E. THE FALL OF GENERAL RASTIKIS 
Until mid-1938, President Smetona appeared willing to honor 
General Rastikis' opinion. However, by autumn of that year, Smetona 
began expressing dissatisfaction with what he perceived as the pol i tici-
zation of the conunander-in-chief. The Nationalists' dissatisfaction had 
emerged even earlier. By the end of 1937, influential party members 
would go speak with Smetona and Prime Minister Juozas Tubelis regarding 
Rastikis, though the latter were unwilling to take action. Rastikis was 
suspected to be an opposition leader. This was compounded by the fact 
that Rastikis never had any ties to the ruling party, even informally. 
His popularity among the citizenry was viewed as dangerous. Rastikis' 
policy of dealing with all groups was made even more distasteful to the 
ruling elite when the opposition would take the initiative in 
capitalizing on the gener-al's popularity.29 · 
The troubled relationship between Rastikis and the Nationalists 
28Rastikis 1 I, p. 395; Julius P. Slavenas, "General Stasys 
Rastikis as Commander-in-Chief," paper presented at the Sixth Conference 
on Baltic Studies sponsored by the Association for the Advancement of 
Baltic Studies at the University of Toronto, 11-13 May 1978, quoted in 
Rastikis, Lietuvos likimo keliais: Is mano uzrasu (On the Roads of 
Lithuania's Destiny: From My Notes), ed. Jonas Dainauskas (Chicago: 
Akademines skautijos leidykla I Academic Press, 1982), p. 451; Vardys, 
p. 150. 
29Rastikis, I, P• 495; Sliogeris pp. 142-143, 171. 
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began right at the beginning of his tenure. It had become accepted 
practice for the military leadership to deal only with the ruling party, 
not with any other political groups. This, perhaps, was natural, since 
one party had ruled single-handedly for an extended period of time. 
Rastikis stated that the military belonged to all groups; therefore, it 
should have rel at ions with all of them. The Nationalists did not 
approve of such a posture. They understandably saw the position of 
commander-in-chief as an important foundation of the regime. In turn, 
the individual who occupies that post must not deal with those opposed 
to that regime. At fir st , Smetana supported Rasti ki s. For example, 
when Rastikis was appointed chief of staff in 1934, the Nationalists 
invited him to report to them on military matters. Rastikis refused, 
stating that then he would have to do the same for other groups; he 
would report only to his civilian superiors. Despite the pressure from 
his party, the president stood by the connnander-in-chief .30 
The predisposing factor in Rastikis' downfall was his active 
political stance during the events surrounding the Cerni us government. 
The general's demands that the opposition be included in that and the 
Merkys government were to prove fatal in the end. Ant an as Merkys, 
appointed prime minister in November 1939, sought to bring Rastiki s 
down; he had Smetana's approva1.31 
30Rastikis, I, pp. 493-495. 
31 Juozas Jakstas, "Tautos pazangos partijos-Lietuviu tautin.inku 
sajungos istorijos bruozai 1916-1940" ("An Historical Sketch of the 
National Progress Party-Lithuanian Nationalist Association 1916-1940 11 ), 
in Tautines minties keliu: Lietuviu tautininkijos istoriniai bruozai 
(Path of National Thought: Historical Sketch of Lithuanian Nationalism) 
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The precipitating factor was an article Rastikis authored for 
the December 1939 issue of Kardas {Saber), the officers' periodical. In 
it were politic al suggestions, including the necessity of having good 
relations with Moscow. There was also a statement that the commander-
in-chief earned less money than a mayor. This was an indirect slap at 
Prime Minister Merkys, former mayor of Kaunas. Interior Minister 
General Kazys Skucas ordered the issue confiscated prior to 
distribution. This was a blow to Rast! ki s' prestige, who sought to 
restore 1 t by way of several points: 1) the president must publicly 
declare satisfaction with the commander-in-chief's work. The coDHDander-
in-chief would then state that he operates according to the president's 
direct! ves, and that no difference of opinion exists regarding. affairs 
of state; 2) the Seimas, without alteration, was to approve Rastikis' 
proposal to amend the structure of the military leadership;32 3) the 
prime minister was to utilize all available means to assure that General 
Rastikis' name not be used in a derogatory sense in streets and public 
places; 4) Colonel Skucas was to publicly apologize for the 
confiscation; 5) the commander-in-chief's budget proposals were not to 
be cut. 33 
Eds. Jonas Puzinas and Jonas Pranas Palukaitis {Chicago: American 
Lithuanian National Association, 1979), pp. 151-152; Slavenas quoted in 
Rastikis, Lietuvos likimo keliais, p. 455. 
32rhe proposal was as follows: 1) the corrmander-in-chief is the 
head of the entire military establishment and participates in the 
cabinet with a vote, 2) the defense minister merely maintains the 
military. See Musteikis, pp. 70-72. According to Rastikis, he never 
wanted to be in the cabinet. See above. 
33Musteikis, pp. 76-77. 
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President Smetona, who had disapproved of the article as 
military intervention into the political realm, stated that he had 
always carried point one out. As for point two, the matter was in the 
hands of the Seimas Constitutional Commission. With regard to the third 
point, Merkys stated that he could not co·ntrol people's conversations. 
The solution was for Rastikis to tone his ego down. In response to the 
fourth point, Skucas refused to apologize. The fifth point was deemed 
unacceptable. Rastikis was rebuffed in a meeting consisting of him, the 
president, Merkys, and Defense Minister General Kazys Musteikis. 
Rastikis, after being offered a raise in salary, meekly asked to be 
discharged from the regular army.34 
This was a far different manifestation by Rastikis from his 
stance before the fateful meeting. Between the points and his final 
rebuff, he staged yet another attempt to maintain his prestige intact. 
After issuing a request to the defense minister to be relieved as 
commander-in-chief, he stated, through Rev. Aleksandras Grigaitis, that 
he would return only if invited by the president as an indispensable 
official. However, since Defense Minister Musteikis had not relieved 
Rastikis, no invi ta ti on to return was necessary. Smetona, further, 
informed Grigaitis that no person was indispensable. Finally, he had 
asked Rastikis to stay on as commander-in-chief, but the general had 
refused.35 
34Musteikis, pp. 77-80. 
35Musteikis, pp. 75-76. 
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Rastikis was temporarily discharged to the reserve, given a 
three month vacation, and raised to the grade of divisional general two 
weeks prior to becoming eligi~le in January 1940. Divisional General 
Vincas Vitkauskas, the commander of the first infantry division, was 
· appointed temporary commander-in-chief. However, after Rastikis' 
vacation, Smetana decided to keep Vitke1uskas permanently and advised 
Rastikis to choose some other post in the regular army. Instead, on 23 
April 1940, Rastikis requested to be permanently discharged to the 
reserve; the request. was granted. However, because of growing anxiety 
emanating from both the military and society over Rastikis' case, he was 
returned to active duty and appointed co11111ander of the Senior Officer 
Courses on 7 June 1940 - without the authority to issue orders to line 
units.36 
Just one week after being returned to active duty, during the 
Soviet ultimatum, Rastikis would be asked to form a new government as 
prime mini.ster. As the following chapter demonstrates, this was not 
to be. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Divisional General Stasys Rastikis remains a controversial 
figure to this day. Politically and psychologically his position in the 
36Augustai tis p. 6; Merkelis, pp. 565-567; Musteikis, pp. 
80-81. During Rastikis' "vacation , 11 he was secretly approached by an 
individual who claimed that a group was prepared to stage a show of 
force. This to pave the way for Rastikis' return to both military and 
political power. Rastikis refused and asked the individual not to 
execute the plans. See Rastikis, I, pp. 694-695. 
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schema of Lithuanian civil-military relations is problematic. Perhaps 
all that can be said with any certainty, other than historical facts, is 
that he was undoubtedly persona prima in military affairs, and 
approached such stature in society at large. His popularity as a 
patriot and professional was great among soldier and civilian alike. 
Indeed his reputation eclipsed that of most civil officials, including 
the defense ministers he nominally reported to. 
Rastikis' goal was to increase the military's prestige by 
increasing his own stature, that is, to make himself popular so that the 
military, in particular, and national security issues, in general, would 
become popular and emerge to the forefront of domestic affairs. 
Rastikis was closely tied to the political realm, though more as a 
statesman, and not as a partisan politician. He chose to deal with all 
patriotic en ti ties, not reserving a monopoly on virtue only to the 
Nationalist Association. 
Who was more powerful, Rastikis or Smetana? Objectively, 
Rastikis possessed the greater potential power, for the soldiers and 
tanks were his. This strength could have been utilized for political 
adventurism. Granted, he was certainly a proud individual, often 
referring to himself in his memoirs in the third person. This perhaps 
can be justified, though, when taking into account his ascent at an 
early age and the phenomenal progress of the Lithuanian military under 
his tutelage. Of course, he made demands and interfered in politics. 
Yet, he remained patriotic, professional, and democratic. In short, 
when he was under attack from his civilian superiors and the ruling 
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party, he did not utilize his military power for the sake of personal 
gain, but remained loyal and obedient. No power play was staged, though 
others offered to carry one out on his behalf; he meekly requested to be 
released from his duties. This is evidence that he did not seek 
political power, while not ignoring the fact that he wielded much physi-
cal might. 
His contributions to Lithuania and her military are enormous. 
He reorganized, strengthened, and modernized the armed forces while 
increasing their prestige and trust among the citizenry at a time when 
they had been utilized as the regime's gendarme. On a broader scale, 
especially among youth, he increased pride and patriotism. Several 
analysts even cite his role as a force against authoritarianism, giving 
him an important place in the history of democratic evolution in 
Lithuania. 37 A more enduring and invaluable contribution is found in 
his memoirs, which are unrivaled monuments of Lithuanian historiography. 
Rastikis fully admits modest politic al intervention. However, 
it appears that this is an unavoidable role for any military leader. 
For example, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff must become involved in 
politics, budgets, the media, and other agencies, for national security 
is a matter too important to leave only to military men. It is a matter 
for all in any state. The union of politics and senior officers appears 
to exist as long as recorded history. 38 On the other hand, Rastikis' 
37s1avenas quoted in Rastikis, Lietuvos likimo keliais, p. 455; 
Va rd ys p • 1 5 3 • 
38cf. Plato in chapter 2 of this study. 
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Western bent and benevolent methods of political socialization attest to 
the seriousness with which he regarded democracy, the political process, 
and his own responsibilities. He undoubtedly viewed them with more 
gravity than those officers who chose to recklessly tinker with 
politics, that is, the officers who brought Smetona to power in 1926. 
It must be recalled that when Captain Antanas Maciuika marched into the 
Seimas with a pistol on 17 December 1926, he intervened more into 
politics on that one night than Rastikis did in five years. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE TiiILIGHT OF INDEPENDENCE 1939-1940 
A. THE CABINET OF BRIGADIER GENERAL JONAS CERNIUS 
Adolph Hitler decided to add the Klaipeda (Memel) Territory to 
his empire in March 1939. An ultimatum was issued to the Lithuanian 
government demanding its cession to Germany. Kaunas, feeling Powerless 
against the military might of the Third Reich, grudgingly accepted 
Hitler's ultimatum. On 22 March 1939, a treaty was signed by both 
governments which "reunited the Territory with the Reich." The Germans 
moved into the area very quickly, indicating premeditation, and Li thua-
nian private citizens, government officials, and army comPonents suf-
fered many losses in the sudden move to Lithuania-Major • 1 
Following the annexation, morale decreased both in the military 
and society, while negative feelings toward the government increased. 
Even senior army officers, who were supposedly the props upon which the 
regime rested, stated that after two ultimatums -- the Polish ultimatum 
demanding the restoration of diplomatic relations had been accepted one 
year earlier in March 1938 -- the Nationalists were bankrupt, and 
changes were necessary in the civil leadership in order for the nation 
to survive. On 25 March 1939 Prime Minister Rev. Vladas Mironas, also 
1Juozas Audenas, Paskutinis posedis: Atsiminimai (Final Meeting: 
Reminiscences) (New York: Romuva, 1966), p. 127; Julius P. Slavenas, 
"Klaipeda Territory," Encyclopedia Lituanica, 1973, vol. 3, p. 137. 
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the head of the Nationalist Association, invited representatives of the 
Peasant Populists, the Christian Democrats, and the Voldemaras faction 
for a consultation. They warned Mironas of the changing and dangerous 
mood of the country. Mironas, in turn, discussed their points with 
President Smetana. Two days later the Mlronas cabinet resigned. 2 
General Stasys Rastikis influenced events between the Klaipeda 
ultimatum and the appointment of a new cabinet. In the first place, he 
anticipated possible unrest in the military. He issued a declaration to 
the soldiers asking thern to remain confident and to prepare to fight, 
even if it meant losing honorably. 3 Second, he went on radio and stated 
that in view of recent events, Lithuania needed a "practical end ·elastic 
foreign policy." Further, "discipline, order, and unity must be 
maintained by all sections of the people." AlSd, "the economic, rnoral, 
and cultural forces o-f the nation must be strengthened. 114 
Gen:eral Rastikis' third action was most important 'and possessed 
grave political implications. He, along with Defense Minister Brigadier 
General Kazys Musteikis and Chief of Stat.if Brigadier General Jonas 
Cerni us, visited the president, advised him of potential unrest in the 
2Audenas, p. 128; Kazys Musteikis, Prisiminimu fragmentai 
(Fragments of Memories) (London: Nida, 1970), p. 34; U.S. House of 
Representatives, Third Interim Report of the Select Committee on 
Communist Aggression, 83rd Congress, ·second Session (Washington: U. s. 
Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 153-154. 
3Aleksandras Merkel is, Antanas Smetana: Jo visuomenine, 
kulturine ir politine veikla (Antapas smetona: His Social, Cul rural, and 
Political Activity) (New York: Amert.can Lithuanian National Association, 
1964) ' p. 518 •. 
4 U.S. House of Representatives, p. 155. 
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nation, and "in the name of the military leadership" asked him to 
appoint a new government containing the opposition. The president asked 
Rastikis to accept the post of prime minister, partly to remove him from 
the opposition camp, for which the president believed Rastikis was 
working. Rastikis refused, stating that stability in the military was 
more important than stability in the civil government during such 
uncertain times. He added that it was easier to find a prime minister 
than a commander-in-chief. Rastikis concluded by suggesting General 
Cernius for the post. In turn, Smetana offered the post to Cernius who, 
though stunned, accepted the request out of loyalty to the president.5 
Brigadier General Jonas Cernius was neither a politician nor a 
purely military man. He was born. on 6 January 1898 in Kupiskis in the 
county of Panevezys. On 4 March 1919 he volunteered for the army and 
completed the first accelerated class of the Military Academy on 6 July 
of that year. He held various technical positions in the military and 
received his degree in engineering in Brussels in 1929. He graduated 
the Paris General Staff Academy (Ecole Superieure de Guerre) in 1932. 
Cernius was appointed commandant of the Military Academy in 1934 
following the Kubiliunas revolt. The following year he assumed the post 
of chief of staff after adoption of the Rastikis military reorganization 
plan. He was raised to the grade of brigadier general in 1937. On 30 
5 Jonas Augustai tis, Vardys ir Sova a pie Rastikio atsiminimus 
(Vardys and Sova on Rastikis' Memoirs) {Chicago: Author, 1975), p. 3; 
Merkelis, p. 520. Augustai tis, a blatantly anti-Smetona commentator, 
writes that the Cernius cabinet was a satellite of Rastikis. See 
Augustaitis, p. 17. 
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March 1939 Cerni us was appointed prime mini st er of Lithuania. 6 The US 
Minister to Lithuania, Owen J.C. Norem, characterized Cernius as a mild-
mannered, pleasant, and patient man. However, he lacked experience in 
politics and had never openly favored any party. He was thus 1 eft 
without political backing and could not formulate strong policies in the 
face of the volatile international situation.7 Smetona's biographer 
points out that Cernius may have been too willing to believe in the good 
intentions of others.a 
The Klaipeda ultimatum, the demarche by opposition parties, and 
the political request of the military leadership demonstrated that the 
authority of the president and his regime had been stricken. This led 
to the formation of the Cernius cabinet and, moreover, convinced Smetona 
to allow Cerni us to request the opposition to join. The cabinet was 
referred to as the "Government of Unified Work" ("Vieningo Darbo 
Vyriausybe"). The leadership of the Peasant Populists and Christian 
Democrats approved those party members asked to enter the new 
government, but their status as members of the opposition, though 
obvious to the entire nation, was unofficial.9 Further, in his 
declaration to the Seimas, Prime Minister Cernius stated that the 
6v1adas Minge la, "Gen. Jonas Cerni us: 65 m. amziaus sukakties 
proga" ("General Jonas Cernius: On the Occasion of His Sixty-Fifth 
Birthday"), Karys, June-July 1963, p. 188. 
7owen J.C. Norem, Timeless Lithuania, 2nd ed. (Cleveland: 
Viltis, 1967), p. 157. 
8Merkelis, p. 526. 
9Audenas, pp. 127-130, 139. 
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cabinet would operate within the framework drawn by the president. 1 O 
In accordance with the professed desire of Prime Minister Cernius to 
work within the lim"its of the constitution and to establish a close 
relationship with [the Seimas], the Seimas, constituting almost 
entirely members of the Nationalist Party, gave the new Government 
"unconditional support." No disposition was prevalent to permit the 
emergence of any controversies between the opposition and the 
Government party on the future course of the new Government. 
Formation of a united patriotic front was not, therefore, attempted 
as a procedural device for the ~vernment -- at least during the 
first weeks of the administration. 1 
The composition of the Cerni us cabinet was interesting. Of 
course, the inclusion of the opposition was definitely a departure from 
established practice. For example, all were startled at the inclusion 
of Dr. Leonas Bistras, a Christian Democrat. He had only recently been 
exiled from Kaunas to the provinces for his political activity. Now he 
was serving in the sensitive post of education minister. 12 The cabinet 
displayed remarkable balance: two Christian Democrats, two Peasant 
Populists, one Nationalist, one Voldemaras faction Nationalist, and one 
who was considered non-partisan, Foreign Minister Juozas Urbsys. What 
10M. Maksimai tis, 11 Tautininku fasistine diktatura" ("Nationalist 
Fascist Dictatorship"), in Burzuazijos diktaturos Lietuvoje valstybiniai 
teisiniai aspektai (State and Legal Aspects of the Bourgeoise 
Dictatorship in Lithuania), ed. H. Miskinis, et al. (Vilnius: Lithuanian 
SSR Academy of Sciences, 1976), p. 87. See also 11 Army man forming 
Lithuanian cabinet," The New York Times, 28 March 1939, p. 11; 
"Lithuania forms coalition cabinet," The New York Times, 29 March 1939, 
p.15. 
11 u.s. House of Representatives, pp. 154-155. 
12stasys Rastikis, Kovose del Lietuvos: Kar io atsiminimai (In 
the Battles for Lithuania: A Soldier's Reminiscences) (Los Angeles: 
Lietuviu dienos I Lithuanian Days, 1956), I, p. 557. 
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is relevant for this study is the inclusion of four military men, 
including Cerni us. Brigadier General Kazys Skucas was interior 
minister, Brigadier General Kazys Husteikis was defense minister, and 
Divisional General Jonas Sutkus was finance minister. Husteikis was 
allowed to remain in the regular army. Sutkus had retired to the 
reserve not long ago. Cernius and Skucas were required to retire to the 
reserve prior to accepting their political appointments. Yet, Cernius 
continued wearing his uniform while prime minister. 13 
That there was a link between the military and government is 
obvious. What is problematic, though, is the four generals' political 
classification. Juozas Audenas, who served as Peasant Populist 
agriculture minister in the subsequent Herkys cabinet, writes that the 
four generals were de facto Nationalists, since they served as army 
officers in a military which helped maintain the regime. US Minister to 
Lithuania Owen Norem classifies them as non-party ministers. 14 This may 
be a question without a definite answer. This author, though, agrees 
with Norem. Granted the men were officers, but there were many who were 
at least informally members of the opposition. A commission does not 
necessarily mean that an officer is politically of the same stripe as 
the civilian leadership. This does not impugn his loyalty to the 
commander-in-chief. It is perhaps safest to classify the four generals 
as non-political, leaving open at least the possibility of some sort of 
1 ~erkelis, p. 526; Rastikis, I, pp. 554, 557. 
14Audenas, p. 130; Norem, p. 157. 
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latent political affiliation. 
One writer characterizes the appointment of the Cernius cabinet 
as a psychological breakthrough. There was a great deal of enthusiasm 
for the new government. Various ministers began traveling the country 
in an attempt to bring the government and citizenry closer together 
following the decline of trust and confidence in the Nationalist 
regime. People began feeling more free and at ease with regard to 
political matters. Strictures on the media were loosened, permitting it 
to more honestly chronicle the public mood. However, great hopes bring 
with them great demands. While it was a popular cabinet, certain 
benefits were also expected, especially in the area of political 
freedom. 15 
B. PROBLEMS FOR CERNIUS 
Unfortunately for Cernius and the nation as a whole, the cabinet 
would almost constantly be troubled with domestic and international 
crises. The nation was forced to adjust to the economic dislocation 
which emerged following Germany's ultimatum. In addition, approximately 
twelve thousand refugees from the Klaipeda Territory had to be 
absorbed. Cernius also had to maneuver through the troubled continental 
politic al situation. Despite external pressure, he was charged with· 
executing a policy of strict neutrality. 16 
Another problem was constructed by Berlin and Moscow: 
15Audenas, pp. 109, 149-150. 
16u.s. House of Representatives, pp. 154-155. 
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When German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop signed the famous Russo-
German Non-Aggression Pact in Moscow on August 23, 1939, the public 
announcement of the pact made no mention of a secret protocol signed 
between the two parties the same day. By terms of this secret 
protocol the Bal tic area, including Finland, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and the entire territory of the Polish Republic, was 
partitioned between the u.s.s.R. and Nazi Germany. The northern 
boundary of Lithuania provided the dividing line between the two 
spheres of interest. The Vilnius area was recognized as part of 
Lithuania. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and the Polish territories east 
of the line of the rivers Narev, Vistula, and San were declared the 
sphere of influ~nce of the u.s.s.R., whereas Lithuania and the Polish 
territories west of these rivers would constitute the German sphere 
of influence. The ultimate fate of Poland was also sealed in this 
secret protocol, which provided that "whether the interests of both 
parties make the maintenance of an independent Polish state desirable 
can be determined only in the course of further political develop-
ments." •• 1•7 
Later Germany traded [Lithuania] away ••• to ••• 
the u.s.s.R. 
This opened the way for Poland's dissolution. On 1 September 1939 the 
German blitzkrieg began swallowing that country. The Red Army moved 
into the Polish-occupied Vilnius territory on the 17th of that month. 
Ten days later, the two powers carried out the "fourth partition" of 
Poland according to the terms of the secret protocol. Lithuania was 
irmnediately mobilized, albeit temporarily, and began absorbing and 
interning Polish refugees and military personnel. In October, the 
Kremlin placed pressure on Kaunas to sign a mutual assistance pact, 
allowing the establishment of four Soviet bases in Lithuania.. For the 
tiny country, this was a two-edged sword. On the one hand, Lithuania, 
under the provisions of the pact, received most of the Vilnius 
territory -- the territory for which it had been fighting nineteen 
17Bronis J. Kaslas, "The- Lithuanian Strip in Soviet-German 
Diplomacy, 1939-1941," Journal of Baltic Studies, 4, 3 (Fall 1973), 211. 
175 
years. On the other hand, the Soviet bases were Trojan horses in the 
subsequent occupation of the country. 18 
Prime Minister Cerni us also had his share of domestic politic al 
difficulties. President Smetona admired Cernius because he was obedient 
and loyal. However, the president also felt that Cerni us was too weak-
willed for the post of prime minister. There was also the ex;pected 
friction among Smetona, the Nationalists, and opposition ministers. 
Smetona felt that Christian Democratic Deputy Prime Minister Kazys 
Bizauskas was too partisan. Peasant Populist Agriculture Minister Dr. 
Jurgis Kriksciunas desired too much land reform as far as the president 
was concerned. Kriksciunas was able to receive cabinet approval for a 
land reform project -- a project rejected by Smetona as too radical. 
Christian Democratic Education Minister Dr. Leonas Bistras was 
especially disliked by Smetona and the Nationalists. Bistras was one of 
the toughest political opponents the regime possessed. Smetona refused 
even to receive official reports from Bistras. They were given either 
by Cernius or Deputy Education Minister Kazimieras Masiliunas, a 
1 ~or accounts of these events see Auden as, p. 150; Sta sys 
Rastikis, Iv kiai ir zmones: Is mano uzrasu (Events and Personalities: 
From My tes , ed. Bronius Kviklys (Chicago: Akademines skautijos 
leidykla I Ac,a~emic Press, 1972), P.• 44; Ras~ikis, Lietuvos likimo 
keliais: Is mano uzrasu (On 1tti~ 11 Roads of Lithuania's Destiny: From !'!Y 
Notes), ed. Jonas Dainauskas (Chicago: Akademines skautijos leidykla I 
Academic Press, 1982), p. 425. , Many officers and .citizens did not 
understand why• Lithuania did not invade and' take back the Vilnius 
territory in 1939 when Poland was attacked and Berlin was urging Kaunas 
to move. This, though, would have violated ~etona' s policy of strict 
neutrality. . See Vaclovas Sliogeris, Antanas Smetona: Zmogus ir 
val st bininkas. Atsiminimai (Antanas Smetona: Person and Statesman. 
Reminiscences) (Sodus, MI: Juozas J. Bachunas, 1966), pp. 135-13 • 
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Nationalist. Cernius attempted unsuccessfully to mediate. Of the 
opposition, the president did not complain only of Peasant Populist 
Justice Minister Dr. An tan as Tamosai tis. Finally, Smetona stated that 
Finance Minister General Jonas Sutkus was a weak manager of domestic and 
foreign economic matters. 19 
The Nationalist Association actively campaigned against the 
Cernius cabinet from its very inception. Every prime minister until 
then had automatically assumed the leadership of the Nationalist 
Association. Cerni us, however, was not a Nationalist and thus deemed 
unacceptable for the position. The Nationalists also complained that 
the government had insulted and treated them shabbily. It was this 
opposition from the ruling party that ultimately sealed the fate of 
General Cernius' cabinet. 20 
On 10 November 1939 General Sutkus resigned as finance 
minister. The president was able to capitalize on this new weakness and 
asked Antanas Merkys to quietly form a new cabinet. The Cernius 
government resigned on 21 November. Merkys presented his cabinet to the 
president for confirmation the following day. 21 Thus ended the cabinet 
19Audenas, pp. 130-131; Rastikis, I, pp. 557-558, 631. 
20Audenas, pp. 130-131; Juozas Jakstas, "Tautos pazangos 
partijos-Lietuviu tautininku sajungos istorijos bruozai 1916-1940" ("An 
Historical Sketch of the National Progress Party-Lithuanian Nationalist 
Association 1916-1940"), in Tautines min ties keliu: Lietuviu 
tautininkijos istoriniai bruozai (Path of National Thought: Historical 
Sketch of Lithuanian Nationalism). Eds. Jonas Puzinas and Jonas Pranas 
Palukaitis. (Chicago: American Lithuanian National Association, 1979), 
pp. 147-148; Rastikis, I, pp. 557-558. 
21Audenas, p. 132. 
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of the four generals. The only cabinet to be headed up by a 
professional military man was beset by such intense domestic and foreign 
challenges that it would last only eight months. 
C. THE CABINET OF ANTANAS MERKYS 
Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Antanas Merkys was not new to 
government service. He received his law degree from the University of 
Kiev and served as an officer in the czarist army. From 12 March 1919 
until 19 June 1920 he held several posts in the defense ministry, 
including that of minister. After retiring from the military he served 
in the government of the Klaipeda Territory. He returned as defense 
minister following the 1926 coup and served in that post until 8 August 
1927. Afterwards, he served as governor of the Klaipeda Territory, 
consultant to the Council of State, mayor of Kaunas, and Seimas 
deputy. 22 
The Merkys cabinet, the final government of independent 
Lithuania, would have been composed solely of Nationalists had Smetana 
had his way. However, General Rastiki s declared that the opposition 
must be included in this government as well. Smetona, though annoyed, 
viewed this as a serious threat and decided to once again place the 
cabinet upon a broader politic al base. Thus another case of politic al 
intervention on Rastikis' part. Two military men were included: 
Brigadier General Kazys Musteikis continuing on as defense minister and 
22A. Maziulis, "Antanas Merkys," Lietuviu Enciklopedija 
(Lithuanian Encxcloeedia), 1959, vol. 18, p. 255. 
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Brigadier General Kazys Skucas remaining as interior minister. 23 
1bere was one problem with Merkys' Government of Societal 
Consolidation (Visuomenes konsolidacijos vyriausybe). Merkys was not 
well liked by either army officers or the Nationalists. nie government 
was neither supported by society nor consolidated by it. However, 
Smetona also realized that Merkys would succeed in eliminating Rastikis, 
as the previous chapter described. 24 
1be final cabinet meeting of independent Lithuania took place 
during the night of 14-15 June 1940. The president himself was 
presiding, for the government was considering an ultimatum from 
Moscow. The ultimatum included a demand for the arrest of General 
Skucas for allegedly ordering the kidnapping of Red Army soldiers 
stationed in Lithuania, though it was apparent that they had themselves 
deserted. Another point of the ultimatum was permission to allow an 
unlimited number of Soviet troops into Lithuania for the purpose of 
"guaranteeing" the Soviet-Lithuanian mutual assistance pact. Finally, 
the Kremlin called for the formation of a government acceptable to it. 
General Rastikis was invited to the meeting and appointed prime 
minister. He began forming a government, but word soon arrived from 
Moscow that Rastikis was unacceptable. 
23Audenas, pp. 132-133; Merkelis, pp. 561-562. 
24Jonas Augustaitis, Antanas Smetona ir jo veikla (Antanas 
Smetona and His Work) (Chicago: Chicago Lithuanian Literary Society, 
1966), p. 102; Merkelis, pp. 561-562; Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones, pp. 
45, 47. See also Leonas Sabaliunas, "Lithuanian Politics Under Stress: 
Ideological and Poli tic al Developments Before the Soviet Occupation," 
Lituanus, 14, 3 (Fall 1968), 29-42. 
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What is more important for this study is the behavior of 
Rastikis and Commander-in-Chief Divisional General Vincas Vitkauskas. 
They stated that since there were already Soviet bases in Lithuania, and 
that tanks and troops were massing on the border, it would be futile to 
fight. Both advised that the ultimatum be accepted as a means to 
contain damage. 25 This is ironic, considering the martial rhetoric 
emanating from the military leadership all through the independence 
period, including Rastikis' speeches. 26 The president, while urging to 
fight, also did not wish to invite opposition from his own military 
during the crisis. The cabinet decided that the president should leave 
the country and turn presidential power over to Prime Minister Merkys. 
The Red Army began occupying Lithuania on 15 June 1940. Merkys 
was forced two days later to name communist sympathizer and journalist 
Justas Paleckis as new prime minister and de facto president. Paleckis 
was the puppet who assisted in rigging the elections of a People's Diet 
which petitioned Moscow for membership in the Soviet Union. Thus -- at 
bayonet point -- Lithuania became the fourteenth Soviet Republic. The 
Lithuanian army became the People's Army, later the 29th Territorial 
Corps of the Red Army. It became evident that Vitkauskas, whose brother 
was mistak7n1y shot for alleged bolshevik activity in 1919, and who had 
always been identified with the progressive movement, was disloyal. He 
2~usteikis, pp. 105-107. 
2~or examples see Meldutis Laupinaitis, As kaltinu: Trilogija 
(I Accuse: Trilogy) (Sao Paulo, Brazil: Author, 1954), p. 18; Merkelis, 
p. 518. 
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assisted the Red Army in its occupation of Lithuania and participated in 
the new regime's power play.27 
D. CONCLUSION 
To this day, the behavior of the military leadership during 
Lithuania's hour of need provokes the anger of soldier, officer, and 
civilian. Many feel that politics sucked the life-blood out of the 
military establishment, rendering it incapable of executing even 
symbolic opposition to the Soviet occupation. To use Huntington's 
nomenclature, the societal imperative had drawn attention and resources 
away from the functional imperative. There had always been a great deal 
of rhetoric regarding patriotism and preparation for war, but when it 
came to time to fulfill those promises, the military leadership proved 
it possessed a lack of will, though many in the ranks were willing to 
fight. Poli tic al intervention into the military sphere and vice versa, 
while not the only factors in the impotence of the Lithuanian military 
in June 1940, were certainly contributing ones. This was certainly not 
a novel manifestation. General Rastikis, during the Polish ultimatum of 
March 1938 and the German ultimatum of March 1939, also urged acceptance 
27rn a questionnaire which officers were required to complete 
upon occupation, Vitkauskas stated that he had been a candidate for 
membership in the Communist Party. See Stasys Rastikis, Kovose del 
Lietuvos: Kario atsiminimai (In the Battles for Lithuania: A Soldier's 
Reminiscences) (Los Angeles: Lietuviu dienos I Lithuanian Days, 1'957), 
II, 74. For Vi tkauskas' memoirs see his "Paskutiniai burzuazijos 
valdymo metai Lietuvoje" ("The Last Years of Bourgeoise Rule in 
Lithuania"), Svyturys (Beacon), 15 January 1958, pp. 11-12; "Ta 
neuzmirstama vasara" ("That Unforgettable Su111Der 11 ), Svyturys (Beacon), 
30 June 1960, pp. 11-13, 15 July 1960, pp. 10-12. They are mainly 
polemic in tone. 
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in place of armed opposition. 28 One commentator writes that the 
politico-military link "consumed part of the limited martial and 
intellectual resources necessary for dealing with international 
dangers. " 29 Smetona had been surprised at Rastikis' and Vi tkauskas' 
advice during the final cabinet meeting. His biographer concludes that 
the military had been rendered passive by the Nationalist regime 
including the surprised president himself.30 Laupinaitis gives an 
especially angry denunciation. He states that officers relished 
parading and displaying medals, but did not wish to fight. According to 
him, the army was decorative and generals existed merely for parades and 
representation. The "straw" generals were deserters. 31 
Would it have been feasible for Lithuania to fight? One 
parallel example may be found in the Finnish-Soviet War of 1939-1940. 
The Finns opposed a Soviet invasion. Despite the fact that Finland 
emerged in the Soviet sphere of influence, with foreign and domestic 
policy dictated in large measure by the Kremlin, and that it lost a 
portion of its territory, it still remains a separate country. In his 
28see, for example, Robert A. Vitas, "The Polish-Lithuanian 
Crisis of 1938: Events Surrounding the Ultimatum," Lituanus, 30, 2 
(Summer 1984), 62-65. 
29Thomas Remeikis, "The Impact of Internal Poli tics on Response 
Capabilities of the Lithuanian Regime to International Challenges, 1938-
1940," in Second Conference on Baltic Studies: Summary of Proceedings, 
ed. Rimvydas Silbajoris, et al. (Norman, OK: Association for the 
Advancement of Baltic Studies, 1971), p. 66. 
30Merkelis, p. 577. 
31Laupinaitis, pp. 24-25, 30, 41-42. 
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memoirs, Finland's Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim reports that 24, 923 
soldiers and 700 civilians lost their lives. The total killed was 
25, 623 for a rounded-off figure of 26, 000. 32 During the first Soviet 
occupation, 36,000 Lithuanians were either murdered, tortured to death, 
or exiled to the east~rn regions of the Soviet Union. Just from a 
numerical point of view, it may have been worthwhile for Lithuania to at 
least symbolically oppose the Soviets, while taking into consideration 
different political and topographical circumstances. Nevertheless, this 
remains a problematic and controversial question among conunentators to 
this day.33 
The author of this study does not advocate suicide for the 
Lithuanian nation. In the face of a deliberate effort by the USSR to 
destroy Lithuania, it could hav.e done so relatively easily. It would 
have been foolish to oppose the Red Army to the last drop of blood in a 
re-enactment of the Margiris syndrome. Margiris was a grand duke of the 
Lithuanian duchy who, along with his men, chose to commit suicide in his 
burning castle at Pilenai rather than surrender to the Crusaders in 
1336. If contemporary Lithuanians would have seen that continued 
opposition would only hurt the country, the sensible course would have 
been surrender following a decent interval. This for three reasons: 1) 
Pure honor for the nation and its military. 2) The Red Army had not yet 
32P. Zilys, Suomiu-sovietu karas 1939-1940 (The Finnish-Soviet 
War 1939-1940) (Brooklyn: Karys, 1967), pp. 159-160. 
33For a discussion of Bal tic military preparations see Edgar 
Anderson, "Military Policies and Plans of the Baltic States on the Eve 
of World War II, 11 Lituanus, 20, 2 (Summer 1974), 15-34. 
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fully recovered from the Stalinist purges of the 1930's. It was still 
weak. That is why Stalin attempted to forestall Hitler's inevitable 
attack for as long as possible, and when Hitler did attack, his initial 
victories were not that difficult. 3) Lithuania was defending its own 
territory. Soviet enlisted men, literally prisoners in their own army, 
could not have mustered the same level of morale as the Lithuanians. 
Keep in mind that they commenced fighting fiercely only after their own 
Russian soil had been violated. In a word, Lithuania should have 
developed a strategy for "sensible" opposition, opening the possibility 
for success, but without inviting suicide.34 
As was stated in chapter three, the military both saved and 
destroyed the nation in the 1926 coup. The ties with society 
strengthened it. The ties with politics, the gendarme role, and 
participation in political adventurism destroyed its martial will and 
spirit. Consequently, military schizophrenia rendered the nation 
defenseless at a time when it required defense most. 
34on 30 November 1985 the author of this study presented a 
paper, 11 Kariuomenes vaidmens teoretiniai aspektai prezidento Antano 
Smetonos laikais" ("Theoretical Aspects of Military Affairs Under 
President Antanas Smetona"), at the Fifth International Lithuanian 
Symposium on Science and Creativity, Chicago. I am indebted to the 
discussant at the political science panel on independent Lithuania, Dr. 
Leon as Sabaliunas of Eastern Michigan University's political science 
department, for helping me clarify my thoughts regarding the Margiris 
syndrome, in particular, and the issue of Lithuanian opposition, in 
general. 
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HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
The Lithuanian people, like the Latvians, are descendants of one 
of the eastern branches of the Indo-European race, and their language, 
which is the oldest spoken tongue in Europe in terms of its granrnatical 
forms, is closely related to Sanskrit, Greek and Latin. It is assumed 
that it was the ancestors of the present Lithuanians and Letts who are 
mentioned by ancient historians, as early as Herodotus, as inhabiting 
the eastern shores of the Baltic and engaging in trade, particularly in 
amber, with other peoples. 
The name of Lithuania first appears in history in a German 
chronicle of 1009, but it was not until 1236 that the numerous 
principalities of Lithuanian peoples were united under the rule of King 
Mindaugas. The chief force promoting their unification was the external 
threat posed to the Lithuanian tribes by the incursion into their ar~a 
of the German Knights of the Sword early in the 13th century. After 
victories had been won over the Knights at the battle of Siauliai 
(1236), and over Ruthenian princes and Tartar hordes, Mindaugas was 
baptized a Christian in 1251, and, two years later, he was crowned King 
of Lithuania by a papal emissary. His conversion, whose principle 
motive was to take from the Knights their claim to being the bearers of 
Christianity into a pagan region, did not bring the German invasions to 
a halt, and following the apostasy of the King the nation was not to 
become Christian for another century. 
A period of disorder followed the assasination of Mindaugas in 
1263, but Gediminas ( 1316-1342) succeeded in reuniting the state, and 
founded his capital of Vilnius at the confluence of the Neris and 
Vilnele rivers. Gediminas maintained a defensive policy against the 
Teutonic Knights, who continued their pressure from the west, while 
extending the Lithuanian state in the east to Kiev, Pskov, and 
Novgorod. Under the joint rule of Kestutis and Algirdas, the latter 
defeated the Tartars in 1362, and secured Lithuanian control of Kiev and 
Podolia, although he failed to capture Moscow. 
In 1386, Algirdas' son, Jogaila, was elected to the throne of. 
Poland on condition that he marry the Polish Queen Jadwiga. Thus began 
the personal union of the two countries under the Jagellonian dynasty 
which lasted until 1572. At the same time, Lithuania finally adopted 
Roman Catholicism (1387). While Lithuania was under the direct rule of 
Jogaila's cousin, Vytautas the Great (1392-1430), a Lithuanian-Polish 
force crushed the Teutonic Order at the great battle of Tannenberg 
(1410), with the important result that Lithuania, in contrast to the 
territories to the north, was spared domination by the "German Barons" 
who were the descendants and heirs of the Knights. The medieval 
Lithuanian empire now reached its height, including the upper Volga and 
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Oka rivers, and Smolensk, Vyazma, Mozhaisk and Kursk, with a population 
of some five million people. During this reign, Christianity became an 
integral part of the Western European cultural and religious community, 
but, at the same time, the diverse Lithuanian state was notable for its 
religious and linguistic freedom. 
During the 16th century, however, Lithuania lost a number of her 
eastern provinces to the rising power of Muscovy, and this new danger 
impelled her to seek a closer association with Poland, with whom, to 
that time, she had been joined only in a personal union. By the Pact of 
Lublin ( 1569), Lithuania ceded her Ukrainian territories to Poland, and 
recognized Courland and Latgalia as being a oondorniniUm of the two 
states; each, however, retained its separate government, armed forces, 
treasuries and law courts. The Lithuanian state knew a considerable 
degree of prosperity in the 16th century, and the Pact of Lublin 
provided a short•lived security, but increasingly the Lithuanian 
nobility, imitating the example of their peers in Poland, tended to 
acquire more and more rights at the expen.se of the central authority of 
the state. Partly because of the internal weakness of the Lithuanian-
Polish Commonwealth, it was defeated by the Russians in a long war which 
ended with the Peace of Andrusovo (1667), by which Lithuania lost the 
province of Smolensk. 
Despite the attempts of some Lithuanians to break the connection 
with Poland and form new relations with Sweden, the Lithuanian state 
tended increasingly to become the junior partner in the commonwealth, 
and the Lithuanian nobility became ever more polonized and divorced from 
their own nation. The weakness of the joint state·· bacame constantly 
more apparent during the 18th century, and, in the first partition of 
Poland ( 1772), important portions of eastern Lithuania were lost to 
Russia. Despite the last-minute .efforts of the Commonweal th to reform 
itself, the second partition of Poland took place in 1793, costing 
Lithuania more eastern territory, including a small part of "ethno-
graphic" Lithuania. By the final partition of 1795, Russia seized the 
whole of Lithuania, except for the territory south of the Nemunas River, 
the provinc·e of Suvalkai, which was taken by Prussia, but which, in 
1815, was also assigned to Russia. 
Five major revolts occurred in Pol and and Lithuania in the 
succeeding 120 years, the most important being those of 1831 and 1863. 
Beginning with Nicholas I, an ever more drastic policy of russification 
was applied to Lithuania: schools and monasteries were closed; the 
Lithuanian system of law was replaced in 1840' with the Russian Code; in 
1865 the printing of books in Latin characters was banned; the Catholic 
Church, some of whose clergy had been active in the rebellion of 1863, 
was attacked directly and. indirectly. But these very attacks on the 
Lithuanian language and national character only impelled the population 
to cling to them more ardently, and, towards the middle of the century, 
there began a 11 ter ar y and cultural renaissance - based on books 
smuggled into Lithuania from across the German frontier. Then, as was 
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so often the case in eastern and central Europe, cultural nationalism 
soon led to nationalist political manifestations. 
From the beginning, the resistance of the peasantry -- which 
formed the overwhelming mass of the population - was focused and led by 
a number of I,.ithuanian Roman Catholic priests, who resisted both the 
russification of the country and the attempts of many priests and 
members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy -- including both Poles and pro ... 
Polish persons of Lithuanian origin - to polonize the Lithuanian church 
and people. In addition, as a result of the emancipation of the 
peasants in the Suvalkai area in 1807, and in the rest of the country in 
1861 and 1863, a new type of national intellectual leader began to 
emerge from among them. Prior to 1865, the leaders of the rebellion. had 
been largely polonized noblemen who joined with their associates in 
Poland proper in efforts to restore in some form the Polish-Lithuanian 
union-and their own privileges within it. The new leaders, however, 
were social reformers as well as nationalists, who aimed at agral"ian 
reform, the democratization of .Lithuanian society, and ,the defense .of 
the Lithuanian national culture against both russification and 
polonization. Among this .group were Dr. Jonas Basanavicius ( 1851 ... 1927) • 
whose magazine Ausra (Dawn) ap,peared in 1883 in Tilsit, Dr. Vincas 
Kudirka (1858-1899), and the Rev. Juozas Tumas (1869-1933). 
It is therefore very important to note that as increasing 
amounts of the land in Lithuania passed into the hands of the peasantry 
during the nineteenth century, and as the Lithuanian nobility, .fearful 
of reform, increasingly identified its cause and interests with the 
socially conservative nobles of Poland, the importance of the. noble 
class in Lithuania dw,indled, and . the national movement developed apart 
from them. As will be seen below, when independence was at last 
established, the nobility in effect retired from Lithuania into Poland, 
allowing the establishment of the new Lithuanian state on the democratic 
and reformist bases envisioned by the nationalist leaders of the late 
nineteenth century. 
To an even greater extent than elsewhere, it is significant that 
the national movement in Lithuania received important assistance and 
inspiration from Lithuanians living abroad, and particularly from the 
large number in America. 
Political parties emerged in Lithuania at the end of the 
nineteenth century, and first manifested their desire for an autonomous, 
democratic, ethnographic Lithuania, within the Russian Empire, during 
the Revolution of 1905. It was not until 1917, however, that this 
program was capable of realization, and then in the midst of a most 
complex situation including war, revolution and counter-revolution, the 
Lithuanian leaders were able not only to win autonomy but actually to 
establish an independent republic. Their success, however, was due in 
large measure to the successive collapses of the Russian and German 
empires, and to the intervention of the Western allies, and it was 
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limited from the first by the Polish seizure of Vilnius, which destroyed 
all hopes for cooperation between the two states, and by the occupation 
of Klaipeda (Memel) at the expense of Germany in 1923. 
A democratic republic, however, was established after the war, 
on the political basis of a liberal constitution and a multi-party 
system, on which parliamentary government maintained itself for several 
years, and on the economic basis of an agrarian reform {1922) which, by 
partitioning the large estates -- owned in many cases by polonized, 
often absent nobles - for the benefit of 1 andless peasants, and those 
with small holdings, in effect provided that the country would be a 
nation of small farmers. In addition, the State assumed the 
responsibility of providing for the economic welfare of its citizens. 
In 1926, however, a military and conservative coup d'etat set aside the 
constitution in favor of an authoritarian regime, first under Professor 
Voldemaras, and later under President Antanas Smetana. These 
governments suppressed all other parties and established regimes which, 
at least in vocabulary, borrowed considerably from the contemporary 
German and Italian models. The increasingly dangerous international 
situation, which after 1936 involved the withdrawal of Great Britain and 
France from effective participation in the affairs of eastern and 
central Europe, left Lithuania and the other Baltic states -- and 
eventually Poland herself - in the hands of Germany and the Soviet 
Union. When these two states divided eastern Europe between them in 
August and September, 1939, the fate of Lithuania, which was finally 
assigned to the Soviet zone, was sealed, though the U. s. s. R. did not 
actually seize and annex the country until the Allied defeat in the West 
in June, 1940, permitted her to do so without fear of retaliation or 
resistance from any quarter ••• ~ 
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THE FOUNDATION OF THE LITHUANIAN STATE 
The political history of modern Lithuania began, with the 
establishment of political parties, even before there was an independent 
Lithuanian state and, in fact, it can perhaps be dated from the Grand 
Assembly which met at Vilnius on December 4-6, 1905, during the Russian 
revolution of that year. The 2000 delegates at the Assembly represented 
all parts of the country as well as the already exis;;,ing politic al 
parties, including the Christian Democrats, National Democrats, Liberals 
or Progressives, and Social Democrats. This body proclaimed as the goal 
of the national movement the establishment of ethnographic Lithuania as 
an autonomous state within the Russian Empire, which was to be 
reorganized on a federative basis. Vilnius, they stated, was to be the 
capital, and the Parliament was to be elected by general, secret, direct 
ballot, in which women would be entitled to vote. 
This program fell far short of achievement in 1 905, and even 
more so in the years of reaction which followed in the Russian Empire, 
but the Imperial Duma provided a training ground for Lithuanian, as for 
other minority leadership, and provided also a focus for the evolution 
of parties and other agencies which contributed to the growth of 
national sentiment. The actual reestablishment of the independence of 
the Lithuanian state was to come, in effect, largely as a by-product of 
the First World War. But, if the principal causes to that end were the 
successive defeats of the Russian and German Empires, and the 
establishment of a Bolshevik regime in the former - events occurring 
independently of the wishes or actions of the Lithuanian people - a 
significant factor in the winning of independence was the determination 
of the leaders to achieve as much of their prewar program as the 
circumstances permitted. 
The nucleus from which the Lithuanian independence movement was 
to grow was the Central Committee of Relief for War Sufferers, which was 
organized in 1914 with the consent of the Imperial Russian Government, 
and which included such men as Martinas Yeas, a member of the Duma, and 
Antanas Smetona. By September, 1915, however, the German armies had 
occupied most of Lithuania, and the three years of their occupation 
witnessed both the economic and military devastation of the country, and 
some attempts at cultural germanization in order to bring it permanently 
within the orbit of the Reich. One of the first results of the German 
occupation was the division of the Relief Cormnittee into two branches, 
one of which established itself at Petrograd, the other, including 
Smetona, remaining at Vilnius. 
The latter worked at first to soften the rigors of the German 
occupation, and al so to oppose the efforts of those Poles who, in their 
representations both to the Allies and to the Central Powers on the 
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subject of Polish independence or autonomy, sought to perpetuate the 
Polish-Lithuanian union to the disadvantage of Lithuania. As early as 
1916, the Vilnius Cormnittee memorialized the German authorities, not 
only for the redress of specific grievances, but also setting ·forth 
their claims for an independent, ethnographic Lithuania. These efforts 
met with no success at first, but, during 1917, the Germans, noting the 
failure of the Provisional Russian Government to come to an agreement 
with the Lithuanian nationalists ••• , apparently decided to make use 
of the latter for their own purposes, and permitted a national movement 
to develop within the country. On September 18, 1917, a broad 
conference of more than 200 Lithuanians, selected by the leaders of the 
nationalist movement for their loyalty to that cause, met by invitation 
- in default of elections - at Vilnius, under the presidency of Dr. 
Basanavicius. A Taryba (National Council) of 20 members was named, with 
Smetona as its President, and, despite the German occupations a 
resolution was adopted to the effect that Lithuania should become an 
independent democratic state within her ethnic frontiers, and that a 
Constituent Assembly should be summoned. If, however, Germany would 
recognize the Lithuanian state, the latter would then consider entering 
into some special relationship to the German Empire since, it was 
stated, "the interests of Lithuania, in normal times, are rather in the 
direction of the West than the East or South." On December 11 , under 
the pressure of the military situation, the Taryba, which by then had 
become the focus of national sentiment within Lithuania, dropped its 
demand for a Constituent Assembly, and• asked for German assistance and a 
"perpetual and solid alliance" with the Empire, including a customs and 
monetary union. 
During the early part of its existence, meanwhile, the Petrograd 
branch of the Relief Cor1111ittee had occupied itself with extending 
material aid to its compatriots in Russia, and with the setting up and 
coordination of cormni ttees in Sweden, the United States and elsewhere 
which, if they.originally were engaged in charitable activities, soon 
began to develop in a political direction. After the March Revolution 
of 1917, a Lithuanian National Council at Petrograd decided, despite the 
demands by extremists for complete independence and the calling of a 
Constituent Assembly, to seek a rapprochement with the Provisional 
Russian Government. The latter, however, was less conciliatory to the 
Lithuanian national movement than to those of Finland, Estonia and 
Poland, and when the Bolsheviks finally suppressed the Lithuanian 
Council, a conference, attended by representatives of all except extreme 
Left-wing parties, met at Voronezh to replace it. This body recognized 
the Taryba at Vilnius as the supreme organ expressi 'l/e of the general 
will of the Lithuanian people. But, in the more free atmosphere of 
revolutionary Russia it went far beyond the Taryba in proclaiming the 
goals of the national movement: the Lithuanian demand for independence, 
based both on historic state right and on the general trend towards 
self-determination, should be brought before the Powers for recognition; 
the frontiers of the state were outlined, including an outlet to the 
Bal tic; and, while the rights of the future Constituent Assembly were 
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reserved, they clearly called for a system of guarantees of civil 
liberty, protection of national minorities, and universal, equal, secret 
and direct suffrage based on proportional representation. This program 
was important for several reasons: first, it synthesized the claims for 
Lithuanian independence in terms both of state right and of self-
determination; second, for the first .time it linked the Lithuanian 
national cause to republicanism; third, its demands for civil liberties 
went far beyond the claims which could be asserted by a Taryba existing 
under German occupation; and fourth, it laid down the concrete bases of 
peace. As compared to the projects for Letto-Lithuanian federation put 
forth by groups in the United States, or monarchical plans emanating 
from emigrants in Berne, it is striking that the Voronezh program laid 
down the lines along which the Lithuanian national and constitutional 
movement would, in fact, develop. 
The Taryba itself soon discovered, however, that its policy of 
conciliating the Germans, as expressed in the declaration of December 
11, was not achieving the desired results for, according to the Treaty 
of Brest-Li tovsk (signed on March 3, 1918, but known some time in 
advance), the Bolshevik government had been obliged to cede Lithuania 
and Courland to Germany, for future disposition by the Central Powers. 
After much controversy, therefore, the Taryba, on February 16, 1918, 
issued a new declaration which unequivocally proclaimed - rather than 
demanded -- the independence of the country. But on March 23 the Ger.man 
Government granted de jure recognition to the Lithuani.an state - on the 
basis of the declaration of December 11. Recognition was not followed, 
however, by any transfer of authority to the Taryba,. and, indeed, the 
hollow nature of the gesture was soon shown in the German proposal to 
establish a Hohenzollern prince on the Lithuanian throne. 
After great controversy in the Taryba, and the withdrawal of 
some of its members who objected even to a tactical departure from the 
republicanism of the Voronezh program, that body, in connivance with the 
clerical party in Germany -- which opposed too great an aggrandiz.ement 
of the Protestant .house of Hohenzollern - offered the crown . qf 
Lithuania, on June 14, 1918, to Duke William of Urach, a prince of the 
Catholic dynasty of Wurtemberg who was alleged to be a descendant of the 
medieval Grand Duke Mindaugas. T~ German General Staff, however, 
prevented the Duke's acceptance of this invitation from being 
implemented, but as military defeat came nearer in the West the 
authority of the military waned, and on October 20 the new German 
Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, informed the Taryba . that full 
legislative and admin~~trati·ve power would be granted, ~ a Lithuanian 
government as soon ~s it, could be formed, and that the. German forc.~s 
would depart a& soon. as possible,. On November 2, therefore, the Taryba 
withdrew the invitation to Duke William, leaving the form of Government 
to be deqided by the future .. Constituent Assembly. It is significant to 
notE?ctha-ti t,here .was no monarchist party in Lithuania thereafter, 
indicating that the episode of King Mindaugas II was merely the 
expedient answer of the Lithuanian nationalists to the greater threat of 
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a Hohenzollern monarch, and that it had no lasting popular or political 
basis. 
At the same time, the Taryba adopted a provisional constitution 
whereby that body retained legislative power, but vested executive 
authority in a directory of three persons: A. Smetona, J. Staugaitis, 
and s. Silingas, who were to act through a Cabinet responsible to the 
Taryba. This constitution also provided a bill of rights which 
established the absolute equality of all citizens without discrimination 
because of sex, national origin, religion, or class. Six White Russians 
and three Jews were added to the Taryba at this time, increasing its 
membership to 29~ On November 5, the directors asked Professor 
·Augustinas Voldemaras to form a non-party government, but when the 
latter departed for the Paris peace conference later in November, 
Mykolas Slezevicius succeeded him as Prime Minister. 
By the armistice of November 11, 1918, the Allies had required 
the Germans to maintain their forces in the Baltic states and elsewhere 
to hold back the Bolshevik tide which, they feared, might otherwise fill 
the vacuum left by the retreating Germans. The latter, however, began a 
rapid ·and unauthorized evacuation, looting the countries they passed 
through and attempting to oblige the new Bal tic governments to turn to 
them for support against the Russians. By January 5, 1919, however, the 
latter had reoccupied Vilnius, and during the next two months much of 
the rest of the country, and the Lithuanian Government was obliged to 
retire to Kaunas. As early as December 8, the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Lithuania and Belorussia, acting within Russia, had 
established a "Provisional Revolutionary Workers Government of 
Lithuania," under one Mickevicius-Kapsukas, and on December 22 the 
Bolshevik government recognized the independence of Soviet Lithuania 
under this group. 
In the political propaganda and also in the literary creations 
of the new Soviet regime in Lithuania, the assertion is constantly made 
that the Soviet Lithuanian government of 1919 was a popular regime in 
that country, that it was destroyed by foreign intervention, and that 
the events of 1940 only restored a system which was deeply rooted in the 
memories and wishes of the people. It is therefore important to observe 
that the Vilnius Soviet Government of 1919 was maintained only by the 
presence of the Red Army which, however, by acting in the name of that 
government, attempted to transfer a war of foreign aggression into a 
civil conflict. The measures taken by this government -- establishment 
of local soviets, nationalization of land and industry - were not 
popular in the territory under its control, and Bolshevik personnel was 
so scarce at Vilnius that it was necessary to include Mensheviks in the 
government. On February 20, the Lithuanian Soviet Government -
apparently conceding the unreal nature of its existence voted to 
merge with Belorussia, and the Polish reconquest of Vilnius in April put 
an end to the Provisional Revolutionary Workers Government. 
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Though some attempt was made even in 1919 to blame this failure 
on the strength of the Poles and other extraneous factors, a 
considerable polemic ensued in Izvestia and elsewhere on the causes for 
the collapse of the Soviet regime in Lithuania. Among other factors, it 
was said that there had been no real control even of the city, too 
little internal government, too little Cheka activity in a region filled 
with counter-revolutionaries, too small a proletariat - and what there 
was was too moved by nationalist currents. The Red Army was accused of 
arousing distrust because of "its disorderly requisitions." In short, 
the reality of 1919 was far indeed from the political and literary myth 
which has been assiduously cultivated since 1940 in an attempt to vest 
the latter regime with a historical and legal continuity which it did 
not possess. 
One of the first acts . of the Voldemaras government had been to 
issue a call for a popular militia, and even befor.e the Germans had 
entirely left the country many peasants brought out the weapons which 
they had collected during the battles of 1915. The resulting units were 
commanded by Lithuanian officers who had served in the Russian Army, and 
by a few Prussian Lithuanian officers. General mobilization was 
proclaimed in ~arch, 1919, but the new Lithuanian army was able only 
slowly to resist the oncoming Red Army. By the end of 1919, under 
pressure from these Lithuanian units, which won an important battle over 
the Red Army at Griva, near Daugavpils, and from Polish forces to the 
south, the Red Army had been driven from most of Lithuania, and on 
July 12, 1920, peace was signed between the two states in the Treaty of 
Moscow. The R.S.F.S.R. proclaimed again that, since · 
• • all peoples have the right to free self-determination, 
including the right of full secession from the State of which 
they were a part, Russia recognizes without any reserve the 
sovereignty and independence of the State of Lithuania with all 
juridical consequences resulting from such recognition, and 
voluntarily and forever renounces all sovereign rights possessed 
by Russia over the Lithuanian people and territory. 
The fact that Lithuania was ever under Russian sovereignty 
does not place the Lithuanian people and their territory under 
any obligation to Russia. 
The precise meaning to the Soviet leaders of such a declaration had 
already received some demonstration in the events of early 1919. But 
having found the military or political seizure of Lithuania impossible 
in the circumstances of 1919 and 1920, the Bolshevik regime granted a 
fairly generous treaty to the new Republic, including the payment of 
three million gold rubles, and the cession of the Vilnius area to 
Lithuania. In addition, the two parties undertook to prevent activities 
on their respective territories which aimed at the overthrow of the 
government of the other. 
The defeat of the Bolsheviks during 1919 had not entirely 
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cleared Lithuania of foreign forces, for Polish, German adventurer and 
White or anti-Bolshevik Russian troops continued to occupy and ravage 
parts of the country. The Lithuanian forces inflicted a number of 
defeats on these German and White forces in November, 1919, but they 
were ultimately withdrawn to East Pr-ussia only after the intervention of 
an Allied military mission in December. 
A more serious threat was the Polish army which, having fought 
with the Lithuanians against . the Bolsheviks, had seized Vilnius in 
April, 1919. The Poles, however, were driven from the city by the 
Russians in the summer of 1920, and the SO·•Het Government then 
transferred the area to Lithuania by the Treaty of Moscow. Under the 
auspices of the League of Nations, Poland and Lithuania agreed, on 
October 7, to· accept a settlement which assigned Suvalkai to the former 
and Vilnius to the latter. But two days later, an ostensibly 
unauthorized Polish force under General Zeligowski seized Vilnius and 
established an "independent Republic of Central Lithuania," which, after 
a Polish-conducted plebiscite in 1922, joined the Polish state. After 
fruitless negotiations and proposals for compromise, the Conference of 
Ambassadors, on March 15, 1923, finally accepted the status quo in the 
Vilnius area. The Lithuanian government, however, ref'used not only to 
accept this decision, but even to establish diplomatic relations with 
Poland, which would have implied acceptance. The Polish-Lithuanian 
frontier therefore remained practically closed until 1938, and no 
Lithuanian government dared to consider proceeding to a normalization of 
relations. As a result, Lithuanian foreign policy was burdened with a 
"permanent" antagonist from the beginning, and was therefore the more 
obliged to turn to Germany or the Soviet Union as a makeweight against 
Poland. At the same time, attempts at closer relations between the 
three Bal tic states foundered on Latvian and Estonian fears of becoming 
embroiled in the Lithuanian quarrel with Poland, and hopes for a 
regional entente or bloc to include not only the three states, but 
Finland or Poland or both, broke, at least in part, on the same 
obstacle. 
The settlement of the Latvian-Lithuanian frontier, which had 
been left to the parties by the Treaty of Moscow, occasioned no serious 
difficulty, and was decided by a court of arbitration, under the 
presidency of Sir James Simpson, in March, 1921. 
By the Treaty of Versailles, the Germans had ceded the territory 
of Klaipeda (Memel) to the Allied [sic] for ultimate disposition. But, 
while the latter were still discussing its statute and future relations 
with Lithuania, whose sole important outlet to the sea it was, a 
pro-Lithuanian group within the city, with "volunteer" support from 
across the frontier, rose and seized control of the territory from the 
small French garrison which held it in the name of the Allies - on the 
same day, it should be noted (January 10, 1923), on which French forces 
entered the Ruhr. After further negotiations, the Allies, as in the 
case of Vilnius, accepted this fait accompli, although the Memel 
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Convention of 1924 granted a certain degree of autonomy to the 
territory, under international guarantee. 
Though the Lithuanian state had been recognized by Germany as 
early as 1918, and by the R.S.F.S.R. in the treaty of 1920, the Allies 
had hesitated officially to sanction the disruption of the Russian state 
while they still entertained hopes for its restoration under a non-
Bolshevik regime. By 1921, however, such hopes were dwindling rapidly 
and, with the establishment of the Lithuanian frontiers at least de 
facto by that time, there was little reason to continue to deny 
recognition. On September 22, 1921, therefore, the three Baltic states 
were admitted to the League of Nations. On July 28, 1922, the United 
States became the first of the major Powers to recognize Lithuania de 
jure, and, on December 20, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan did 
the same. 
From the above account, it can be seen that, if the Lithuanian 
nationalist leaders pursued their goal of independence with skill and 
dexterity in an almost incredibly complicated situation, their final 
success was due, above all, to the fact that the intervention of the 
western Allies, who were relatively disinterested in the par.ticular 
disputes of the area, provided a balancing force against the local 
contending forces: Russian, German, Polish. The very existence of the 
Lithuanian state was menaced by all of these latter states, and, 
considering the disparity of strength between it and any of them, its 
continued existence would depend on the maintenance of the Allied 
"presence" as a counterweight to the uneasy three-sided balance of the 
interested parties. The preservation of the Lithuanian state, 
therefore, in the same way as its creation, would be a by-product of the 
general international situation in Europe and, in particular, of the 
maintenance of the status quo system erected in 1919 and 1920. 
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FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS, 1922-1926 
A. FOREIGN POLICY 
Even before the three Baltic states had fully established their 
independence from Russia, it was evident that, because of their size, 
or1g1n and geographical location, they would confront many common 
problems of foreign policy. It therefore seemed equally clear that they 
could best meet problems by some degree of cooperative action. As early 
as 1918 Estonian leaders had proposed the formation of a series of 
groupings to maintain the freedom of the Bal tic Sea and to provide for 
common defense, and later the three Baltic republics and Finland 
attempted, without success to pursue joint peace negotiations with the 
R.S.F.S.R. The first Baltic conference was held at Helsinki in January, 
1920, attended by representatives of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Poland, and it considered the co-ordination of foreign policy, 
common defence, and the neutralization of the Baltic Sea. In August, 
the same agreed to adopt a draft arbitration convention and to set up a 
permanent Council of Plenipotentiaries to co-ordinate their policies. 
At this point, however, there emerged the Vilnius dispute 
between Poland and Lithuania, as outlined in the preceding chapter, and 
for Lithuania this quarrel became the principal concern of their foreign 
policy. Despite the failure of attempted compromise solutions at 
Geneva, the annexation of the area to Poland in 1922, and the 
acquieseence of the Conference of Ambassadors in 1923, the government at 
Kaunas stubbornly refused to accept or recognize the loss of the 
territory. A technical state of war therefore continued to exist 
between Poland and Lithuania; diplomatic relations were not established 
between them; and their common frontier remained practically closed. 
Meetings continued to be held among representatives of Finland, Poland, 
Estonia and Latvia, and the later [sic] two states signed a Treaty of 
Defensive Alliance in 1923, but, since Lithuania refused to enter into 
any type of understanding which implied her renunciation of the Vilnius 
area, while the other Bal tic states were unwilling to be drawn into an 
agreement which might involve them in difficulties with Poland, the 
Vilnius dispute effectively destroyed the prospects, not only for the 
greater "Baltic Union" of Powers, but even for an effective entente of 
the three republics themselves. 
At the same time the Vatican's recognition of the Vilnius 
~rchdiocese as a Polish ecclesiastical province in 1925 was a severe 
blow to the clerical Lithuanian government and had important domestic 
political repercussions, as will be seen below. In addition the 
continuation of strained relations with Poland tended to draw Lithuania 
closer to the u.s.s.R. -- with whom Lithuania had no common frontier --
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despite the fact that fear of that state was the principal factor 
tending to unify the policies of the two other Baltic republics, Finland 
and Poland. The major achievement of the Slezevici us .cabinet of 1926 
was a conclusion of a Treaty of Non-Aggression with the Soviet Union, by 
which the latter reaffirmed its recognition of Vilnius as a Lithuanian 
territory. 
A second problem which tended to isolate Lithuania from her 
irrnnediate neighbors was the question of Klaipeda or Memel, the port and 
territory ceded by Germany to the Allied Powers in the Treaty of 
Versailles, and garrisoned by them, pending final disposition, until 
1923. It was originally understood that the territory would be ceded to 
Lithuania, despite the preponderance of Germans in the city, but, as the 
Allies continued to hesitate, Lithuanian opinion, already exasperated by 
the loss of Vilnius, became insistent on a favorable settlement of the 
Klaipeda question. When, therefore, it was rumored that a free city on 
the model of Danzig, might be established, a rising of Lithuanians took 
place on January 10, 1923 - the day on which the French entered the 
Ruhr. Within five days, the French garrison was overwhelmed and a Diet 
was summoned which established a local government and voted the union of 
the territory with Lithuania. The Allies, in effect, accepted this fait 
accompli, and the Lithuanian government, while rejecting a conventIOri 
which granted to Poland special rights .in the port, eventually signed 
the Memel Convention of Hay 17, 1924. By this the Allied Powers ceded 
the Memel Territory to Lithuania, and the latter agreed with them that 
the region should be governed by a Directory responsible to a papularly 
elected Diet, and by a Governor appointed by Kaunas who could veto those 
laws adopted by the Diet which he considered to transgress its 
autonomous authority or to be contrary to the Lithuanian Constitution. 
Since the Diet was al ways controlled by a German majority, it is not 
difficult to understand that this arrangement let [sic] to constant 
frictio_n between it and the Governor, and that the latter, responsible 
to Kaunas, more than· once acted in .a manner which seemed to overstep the 
autonomy granted to the territory. The gravity of such incidents then 
depended on the extent to which the German government was able or 
inclined to assert a protective interest in its co-nationals in Memel. 
It is clear from this brief account that the freedom of action 
of Lithuania in foreign affairs was severely limited, even beyond the 
measure imposed by her size aqd general geographical pasi tion, by the 
special quarrels which more or less definitively cut her off from both 
Poland and Germany. In addition, the Vilnius dispute stood in the way 
of the cooperation of the three Baltic republics, with each other, which 
seemed dictated by their common pasition between Germany, Poland and the 
Soviet Union, and also of the cooperation of the three republics with 
Poland, as seemed implied by their common dangerous position between 
Germany and u.s.s.R. Thus. the problems of Lithuania stood at the heart 
of the w~akness and disunity of a region whose only hope of survival and 
independence, in the long run, depended on cooperation and stability; 
and, if this was not immediately seen during the 1920's, when the pawer 
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of Great Britain and France could, in effect, maintain the central 
European states despite their proximity to the temporarily weakened 
Germany and Russia, the re-emergence of the latter two states in the 
1930's, at the expense of the West, would demonstrate the ultimate 
consequences of these local disputes. Finally, as will be seen, the 
situation of Lithuania nearly surrounded by enemies meant that foreign 
policy was inextricably intertwined with domestic, and that the already 
strong national feeling of a new liberated people was magnified greatly 
in the face of three powerful and hostile neighbors. 
B. POLITICAL PARTIES 
It had been intended in November 1918, that an elected 
Constituent Assembly should adopt the definitive constitution of the 
country, but the war against the R.S.F.S.R. in 1919 forced the temparary 
abandonment of this plan, so that on January 17, 1919, a Provisional 
National Conference, made up of some 200 delegates from throughout the 
country, met at Kaunas, to which the Lithuanian government had been 
driven, and validated the decisions of the incumbent government. In 
addition, they laid plans for a Constituent assembly, and elected eight 
more members -- mainly from the working class - to the Taryba, which 
then numbered 37 and included representatives of practically all 
national and class groups in the state, including the Belorussians and 
Jews, though the Poles refused to participate. On April 4, the Taryba 
modified the provisional constitution to abolish the directory of three, 
and then elected Antanas Smetona as the first President of Lithuania. 
It will be remembered that as early as the Grand Assembly of 
1905, there were already in existence several Lithuanian political 
parties, of which the most impartant was the Christian Democrats, the 
National Democrats or Populists, and the Social Democrats. These 
parties remained in existence through the war and, though the 
provisional government of 1919 and 1920 usually included representatives 
of all parties except the Communists, certain differences began to 
appear as the situation became more stable, and the elections to the 
Constituent Assembly approached. Since it is the interplay of the 
parties which comprises the political history of the country during the 
first years of its existence, it will be useful to consider briefly 
their basis and composition. 
The oldest and most important Lithuanian party was the national 
and clerical Christian Democratic Party, founded in 1890. Its main 
element was the peasantry, but it included also voters of all classes, 
and particularly a large number of Roman Catholic clergy, who formed in 
many cases its local leaders among the peasants. The party had long 
defended Lithuanian ecclesiastical fights against the Polish and 
polonized clergy, and continued to defend them against lay and socialist 
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forces during the period of independence. The Christian Democrats were 
strongly anti-Conununists, but moderately democratic in policy and 
favored agrarian reform in the early 1920's, though they insisted on the 
sanctity of private property and the right of the expropriated 
landowners to compensation. But they also supported the right of 
workers to organize and strike. The party's prewar anti-Polish bias, of 
clerical origin, later exacerbated by the Vilnius situation, strongly 
colored its views on foreign policy in the period of independence. The 
leaders of the party included Bistras, Dr. Karvelis, and Father 
Krupavicius. 
Closely allied to the Christian Democrats, and forming a 
parliamentary bloc with them until 1926, were the Peasant Union, led by 
MM. Stulginskis, Miksys and Petrulis, and the Federation of ,Labor 
founded in 1919, and led by Drs. Ambrozaitis and Milciu:;i,. and MM. 
Radzevicius and Kasa,kai~is. Both, parties were largely off-shoots of the 
Christian Democrats, designed . to dr.aw into the orbit of the latter 
voters from other classes ·and elements of the population than the 
peasantry. The Federation included isome non-socialist workers and a 
number of small landowners and settlers. 
The Populist or People's Socialist Party, formed in 1902, as the 
Lithuanian Democratic Party, was based largely o~ the same social 
cl9sses as the Christian Democrats, and shared the national and social 
policies of the latter. They differed, however, in that they took a lay 
view of problems affecting the relations of Church and State. Their 
lea~e17s included MM. Grinius, Slezevicius and Staugaitis. 
Associated for a time with this party in a "Liberal" bloc were 
the Peasant Party and tbe Nationalists, the latter of which, including 
former President Smetona and Juozas Tubelis, emerged into separate 
existence only in the elections ~f 1926. 
The Social-Democratic Party, led by M. Kairys and Professor 
Cepinskis, was also of pre-war origin, and was associated with the 
Second Internationale. It represented urban workers primarily --
thereby limiting its influence in a predominantly agrarian country -
and its policy included plans for the nationalization of banking and 
industry. 
The Communist Party 
Lithuania after the war. It 
the name of the Labor Rally, 
so until June, 1940. 
had only a brief legal existence in 
won a few seats in the 1922 Seimas under 
but was soon declared illegal and remained 
It should not be forgotten, however, after an enumeration 
between the parties in 1920, that, with the exception of the Conununists, 
all of them were in effective agreement on a number of essential points: 
a republican form of government; some measure of state paternalism in 
economic affairs; agrarian reform; and a nationalist outlook of foreign 
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affairs. 
The first Lithuanian elections were held on April 14-16, 1920, 
when deputies were chosen to the Constituent Assembly on the basis of a 
system of proportional representation •••• 
The success of the conservative agrarian party, the Christian 
Democrats, is not surprising in the Lithuania of 1920, though it seems 
clear that the influence of the Social Democrats extended considerably 
farther than the very small urban proletariat. The 112 members of the 
Seimas included ten lawyers, ten writers, eight physicians, seven civil 
employees, six army officers, three engineers, three representatives of 
the Cooperatives, three artisans, twenty-two farmers, thirty professors 
and priests, and ten other.s. But a striking feature of this Seimas and 
its successors was the absence of members of the noble class, either in 
a party of their own, or as leaders of other parties, due to the fact 
that the largely polonized nobility of Lithuania had, by 1920, largely 
chosen to become absorbed in the Polish state. Their absence meant that 
the proponents of agrarian reform controlled nearly every seat in the 
body. 
The new Seimas put forth a provisional constitution which 
President Smetona proclaimed on June 1 O, and the existing government 
thereupon transfered its powers to .the Seimas. The latter then named 
Kazys Grinius as Prime Minister, and. Aleksandras Stulginskis, its own 
presiding officer, as Acting President of the Republic. 'Ibis government 
remained in office until the adoption of the permanent constitution on 
August 1, 1922, and its.promulgation•a week later. 
The principal strictly legislative work of the Constituent 
Assembly was the agrarian reform law; largely the work of the Christian 
Democrats and Populists, which. was adopted on February 15, 1922 •••• 
The primary task of the Assembly, however, was to draw up the definitive 
constitution of the State, and this it completed in two years. 
C. THE CONSTITUTION OF 1922 AND THE ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT 
The Constitution beginning with words, "In the name of the 
Almighty God," proclaimed that Lithuania was an "independent democratic 
Republic" with the "sovereign Government" of the state "vested in the 
people." All citizens are equal before the law, none were to receive 
special privileges, and all were guaranteed that no right should be 
"restricted because of race, creed or nationality." Freedom of worship 
and conscience were accorded, and no one's religion or convictions shall 
"form the basis for justification of an offense or for refusing to 
perform public duties." 'lbe clergy, however, were exempted from 
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military obligations. Freedom of speech and press, of assembly "without 
arms and without disturbances of the public peace," and freedom to form 
"societies and associations" if there [sic] were not "contrary to the 
penal laws" were all guaranteed. Any citizen could petition the Seimas 
(Parliament) and legislation could be initiated by the people. Property 
rights were guaranteed and property "may be condemned, in the manner 
prescribed by the law, only in the event of public need." 
The Seimas, whose membership would be fixed by the law, was to 
be elected according to proportional representation for three years, by 
general, direct, equal, secret ballot. In an emergency, the President 
of the Republic could extend the life of the Parliament with the consent 
of the latter. The Seimas enjoyed the usual legislative authority, and 
could declare and end war, but the executive could act independently in 
the event of undeclared war against Lithuania. Subject to confirmation 
by the Seimas, the President, acting with the Cabinet, could declare or 
rescind a state of emergency. In this case, the constitution provides 
for the "temporary" suspension of the main civil rights, though against 
[sic] subject to parliamentary confirmation. 
The President of the Republic was elected by secret ballot of an 
absolute majority of the Seimas, for three years, and was ineligible to 
more than two successive terms. The President 11 invited" the Prime 
Minister to form a Cabinet, and could ask the Seimas to re-consider any 
law, unless the latter had declared it to be urgent by vote of two-third 
of all the members. The President could also dissolve the Seimas, but 
was then obliged to face re-election by its successor, which had to be 
chosen within sixty days. He was also commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces of the Republic. 
The Cabinet Ministers were jointly and severally responsible to 
the Seimas, and could be overthrown on a vote of "no confidence." The 
Cabinet was to draft proposed laws, and any member, if he disagreed with 
his colleagues, could submit a separate opinion in writing to the 
Seimas. 
The complete independence of the judiciary was fixed and 
irrevocable. No decision of the Supreme Court was subject to modifi-
cation except by judicial authority, but the courts were required to 
"pass upon the legality of acts proceeding from the administration," and 
"no law which is contrary to the Constitution shall have force." In 
addition, "All citizens are equal before the Courts." 
In addition to these general governmental features, it was 
provided that minorities could autonomously administer the affairs of 
their national culture, including education, charity, and mutual aid, 
and that they had the right to elect bodies to do so, and to impose dues 
upon their members to meet these ends. They could also call upon the 
national treasury for their share of funds allotted for education and 
charity. Education of children was declared the "supreme right and 
236 
natural duty" of the parents, and all schools were to be placed under 
state supervision. Religious education was made compulsory in the 
schools, with instruction in the religion of the student, but schools 
established for children of parents not belonging to any religious 
organization were exempt from this requirement. Further, the State 
Treasury would support private religious schools. 
The Lithuanian economy "shall be so regulated" as to afford 
employment to all citizens. In addition, "There shall be established by 
law bureaus of agriculture, commerce and industry, labor and other 
bureaus, whose cooperation with the State government for the 
standardization of the economic life shall be prescribed by law". 
"The principle of private ownership shall be made the basis for 
the management of land." 
The State was obliged to protect workmen during illness, old 
age, in cases of misfortune, and when unemployed. 
The structure of government laid down in this constitution 
resembles closely those of the other two Bal tic states, each of which 
has a unicameral legislature - largely from reasons of economy -
which, in effect, was intended to form the preponderant weight in the 
administration. The regime, therefore, was to be democratic in that all 
organs were poll tic ally responsible to the Seimas, yet conservative in 
that judicial control and other checks were provided against abuse of 
power. In the areas of religious and educational policy, no state 
church is provided for, but the interests of the preponderant Roman 
Catholic Church are fully protected through compulsory religious 
education, state subsidy to all schools, and the absence of provision 
for a civil register of births,· marriages and deaths. The elaborate 
bill of rights is drawn in part from the Weimar Constitution, and, like 
the similar portion of the latter, it represented the work mainly of a 
clerical party which sought to safeguard religious liberty while 
providing for a broad program of social and humanitarian reform. The 
Lithuanian constitution, therefore, has been called a "de-socialized 
version of the Weimar constitution," in that it foreshadows a benevolent 
regime of Christian state socialism based on individual initiative in 
industry and individual land tenure in agriculture. The state is 
therefore commited at the same time to the defense of the rights of 
property, and intervention in the economic system to the extent of 
according protection to the working class against the perils of that 
system. 
Many of the actual organs of administration of the Lithuanian 
government, however, had already come into existence before the adoption 
of the Constitution of 1922. Among these was the Cabinet, whose 
membership, according to the Constitution, was to be fixed by statute, 
but which usually included these departments: National Defense (always 
held by a mill tary officer), Interior (with control of the police and 
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the administrative machine), Finance, Agriculture, Education, Justice, 
Communications and Foreign Affairs. Early cabinets also included 
special Ministers, in charge of Jewish and White Russian affairs. 
The judiciary had been assigned important powers by the 
Constitution in regard checking abuses of authority on the part of the 
administration, but the organization of the courts and the system of law 
were carried out only very slowly in Lithuania. In 1919, the newly-
created district courts, or tribunals of first instance, were empowered 
to apply the imperial Russian Code, and the translation of the latter 
was begun. 
But it was only in 1925 that the Supreme Court was created and 
the principle, if not the actual use of the jury system was introduced 
into the country. At the same time, the Petrulis ministry appointed a 
commission of jurists to revise the criminal statutes on the basis of 
the Swiss code. The translation of the Russian statutes and their 
modification continued throughout the period of independence but, in 
fact, no complete and autonomous Lithuanian code was ever evolved. 
The Constitution made considerable provision for organs of local 
self-government, based on democratic elections, which were endowed with 
authority to impose taxes for local expenditures. These provisions were 
implemented by a statute of 1925 which divided the country into 20 
districts (later 23, when the Klaipeda Territory was integrated into the 
administrative system) w1 th an average population of 100, 000. Each 
district was subdivided into about 15 communes, and these, in turn were 
composed of "seniunijas." At each level, a council composed of 
representatives elected by the constituent units was in charge of the 
affairs of the division in question. But the Constitution provided that 
the functions and competences of these bodies was to be fixed by law, 
their activities were to be supervised and coordinated by the central 
administration, and ·any disputes between them and the latter were to be 
settled by t.he courts. Therefore, despi. te. the pyramid of elected 
councils, the central administration, through its appointed "prefects," 
effectively controlled the · district administration. As wo_uld be 
demonstrated by the cotip d·'etat of 1926, when the new government easily 
established its authority throughout the country by gaining control of a 
few central offices in the capital, the administrative system was highly 
and thoroughly centralized in the organs at Kaunas. 
D. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
• • • In the Constituent Assembly, where the Christian Democrats and 
their allies controlled an absolute majority of the seats, they 
nevertheless had shared power in most of the cabinets of the period with 
the liberal group, and had cooperated with the latter both in the 
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adoption of the agrarian reform act and the drafting of the 
Constitution. With the completion of these two basic acts, however, the 
Christian Democrats tended to become more conservative, and new issues 
came to the fore - such as popular insistence on a speedy solution of 
the Klaipeda question -- which made difficult the attempt of the 
Christian Democrats to govern alone in the first constitutional 
Seimas. As a result, new elections were held in the spring of 1923. 
The small gains of the Christian Democratic bloc permitted it to 
maintain its conservative regime through most of the normal three-year 
life of the second Seimas. But in the elections of May, 1926, 
restiveness at long one-party control, an econonic depression, and, 
above all, nationalist discontent at the failure of the incumbent party 
to prevent the Vatican from concluding a concordat with Poland which 
recognized Vilnius as a part of the Polish ecclesiastical province, 
combined to bring about the defeat of the Christian Democrats. 
A new coalition of the Populist bloc and the Social Democrats 
now assumed power, and the outstanding event of this regime was the 
Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression concluded on September 27, 1926, 
with the Soviet Union. The domestic policy of the government, however, 
was less successful and raised a series of important enemies against 
it. Thus, the dismissal of a number of Christian Democrats from the 
civil service aroused both that party and the opponents of a "spoils 
system;" reductions in the military budget alienated the army officers; 
changes in the mode of state payment to the clergy were not well 
received by the latter; increasing toleration of Communist activity 
alarmed all conservatives; and concessions made to the minorities, on 
whom the cabinet relied for its bare parliamentary majority, and 
particularly to the Poles on educational affairs, raised the hostility 
of nationalists - many of whom had turned against the Christian 
Democrats in the election precisely because of their inability to deal 
with the Polish question. As a result, a number of army officers, with 
at least the tacit consent of many Christian Democrats, on the pretext 
of an imminent Communist rising brought about a coup d'etat on the night 
of December 16-17 1926, which, while it preserved the constitutional 
forms, brought to power the Nationalist Party, a small group of 
conservative landowner[s] and industrialists, led by the "elder 
statesmen" Smetona and Voldemaras. The former, who had left his 
academic chair at the University of Lithuania to enter the Third Seimas 
as one of the three representatives of the new party, then became 
President of the Republic; the latter became Prime Minister. 
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INDEX TO CIVIL-MILITARY LEGISLATION IN INDEPENDENT LITHUANIA 
Vyriausybes z1n1os (Government News) was published in Kaunas by 
the Chancellory of the Cabinet (Ministru tarybos kanceliarija). It was 
the official organ which published all legislation, presidential acts, 
and directives from the various ministries and agencies. It is the 
reference for all acts cited herein. 
I. STATES OF AWARENESS, READINESS, ANO EMERGENCY 
A. Special State Defense Statutes 
Ypatingi valstybes apsaugos istatai 
Number 4 Statute 42 
5 55 
10 126 
20 255 
23 287 
40 418 
41 430 
49 487 
73 653 
156 1100 
B. Statute Eliminating the State of War 
Karo stovio panaikinimo istatymas 
Number 20 Statute 243 
105 823 
229 1489 
c. State of Readiness Statute 
Sustiprintos apsaugos istatymas 
Number 194 Statute 1318 
o. State of War Statute 
Karo stovio ivedimo aktai 
Number 242 Statute 1582 
E. Statute to Defend the State and Nation 
Tautai ir valstybei saugoti istatymas 
Number 437 Statute 3044 
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F. 
G. 
Amendment to 
Sustiprintos 
Number 
Acts of the 
Respublikos 
Number 
241 
the State of Readiness Statute 
apsaugos istatymo pakeitimas 
456 Statute 3142 
557 3873 
450 3142 
194 1318 
President of the Republic--State of Readiness 
Prezidento aktai~Sustiprinta apsauga 
627 Statute 4504 
671 4950 
649 4734 
637 4643 
H. A..mendment to the Special State Defense Statutes 
Y"'patinguju valstybes apsaugos istatu pakeitimas 
Number 4 Statute 42 
5 55 
10 126 
20 255 
23 287 
40 418 
41 480 
49 487 
73 653 
156 1100 
287 1885 
450 3138 
450 3140 
532 3698 
557 3872 
I. Aunendment to the Statute to Defend State and Nation 
T.autai ir valstybei saugoti istatymo papildymas 
J. 
Number 437 Statute 3044 
684 5092 
Alroendment to the State of Emergency Statute 
N.epaprastojo meto istatymo pakeitimas 
Number 194 Statute 1318 
450 3143 
557 3873 
644 4701 
662 4849 
K. Neeutrality Statute 
Neeutralumo istatymas 
Number 632 Statute 4535 
L. Acts of the 
Respublikos 
Number 
242 
.President of the Republic-Defense 
Prezidento aktai--Gynimo metas 
671 Statute 4950 
677 5011 
M. Acts of the President of the Republic-Neutrality 
Respublikos Prezidento aktai-Neutralumas 
Number 660 Statute 4839 
N. Acts of the President of the Republic--State of Readiness 
Respublikos Prezidento aktai--Sustiprinta apsauga 
Number 637 Statute 4643 
649 4734 
671 4950 
o. Statute Governing the Economy During a State of Emergency 
Nepaprastuoju metu tautos ukiui tvarkyti istatymas 
Number 661 Statute 4840 
II. MILITARY CONSCRIPTION 
A. Calling of Volunteers for National Defense 
Pasaukimas savanoriu i krasto apsauga 
Number 1 Statute 3 
1 4 
B. Conditions for Entry into the National Defense 
Salygos istojimo i Lietuvos krasto apsauga 
Number 1 Statute 5 
5 58 
C. Instruction for Calling Volunteers 
Instrukcija savanoriams saukti 
D. 
Number Statute 6 
Instructions 
Kariuomenes 
Number 
for Calling the Military 
saukimo instrukcijos 
4 Statute 
112 
43 
1019 
E. Calling of Novices to the Military 
Naujoku saukimas kariuomenen 
Number 4 Statute 50 
243 
F. Provisional Statutes for the Calling of Novices 
Laikini naujoku saukimo istatai 
Number 13 Statute 159 
46 458 
56 531 
G. Regulations for Calling and Accepting Novices 
Naujoku saukimo ir emimo taisykles 
H. 
I. 
J. 
Number 15 Statute 190 
39 415 
331 2269 
394 2697 
Statute of Military Conscription 
Karines prievoles istatymas 
Number 57 Statute 
91 
109 
146 
168 
196 
250 
284 
298 
323 
406 
431 
538 
Statute for the Calling of Novices 
Naujoku saukimo istatymas 
Number 45 Statute 
List of Physical Disabilities 
Ligu ir kuno trukumu sarasas 
Number 57 Statute 
533 
760 
843 
1056 
1181 
1330 
1651 
1834 
1988 
2204 
2803 
2987 
3734 
456 
538 
K. Statute Governing the Calling of Males Born 1902 
Vyru gimusiu 1902 m. saukimo kariuomenen istatymas 
Number 109 Statute 845 
L. Statute for the 1926 Novice Contingent 
1926 metu naujoku kontingento istatymas 
Number 221 Statute 1448 
M. List of Recruiting Stations 
Naujoku saukiamuju nuovadu sarasas 
Number 353 Statute 2411 
N. List of Clergymen 
Dvasininku, kurie 
Number 333 
370 
244 
Exempt from Conscription 
atleidziami nuo karines prievoles, 
Statute 2203 
2528 
sarasas 
o. Amendment to the Statute of Military Conscription 
Karines prievoles istatymo pakeitimas 
Nun,iber 14 6 Statute 105 6 
284 1834 
406 2803 
431 2987 
538 3734 
661 4842 
P. Amendment to List of Clergymen Exempt from Conscription 
Dvasininku, kurie atleidziami nuo karines prievoles, saraso 
pakeitimas 
Number 503 Statute 3493 
Q. Statute Concerning the Military Requisitioning of Animals 
Naturaliniu karo prievoliu istatymas 
Number 431 Statute 2983 
469 3287 
513 3556 
R. Amendment to the Regulations Governing the Care for Indigent 
Families of Conscripted Males 
s. 
Karine prievole atliekanciu vyru beturtems seimoms aprupinti 
taisykliu pakeitimas 
Number 551 Statute 3836 
567 3935 
Amendment to the 
Karines tarnybos 
Number 561 
582 
673 
Military Service Statute 
istatymo pakeitimas 
Statute 3893 
4047 
4967 
T. Amendment to the Statute Concerning the Military Requisi-
tioning of Animals 
Naturaliniu karo prievoliu istatymo pakeitimas 
Number 431 Statute 2983 
469 3287 
513 3556 
661 4841 
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III. STUDENT CONSCRIPTION 
A. The Calling of Schoolboys to the Military 
Moksleiviu pasaukimas kariuomenen 
Number 2 Statute 12 
3 12 
B. Provisional Regulations Governing the Training and Service of 
Student Recruits 
Laikinos aspirantu rekrutu, tarnybos ir mokymo taisykles 
Number 259 Statute 1674 
c. Regulations Governing the Service of Student-Recruits 
Kariunu-aspirantu tarnybos taisykles 
Number 358 Statute 2443 
D. Student Service Statute 
Aspirantu tarnybos istatymas 
Number 358 Statute 2443 
420 2909 
420 2914 
461 3226 
E. Reserve Junior Lieutenant Course Statute 
Atsargos jaunesniuju leitenantu kursu istatymas 
Number 487 Statute 3403 
F. Amendment to the Student Service Statute 
Aspirantu tarnybos istatymo pakeitimas 
Number 259 Statute 1674 
358 2443 
420 2009 
420 2914 
461 3226 
568 3948 
IV. RESERVE PERSONNEL 
A. Reserve Officers and Military Managers Statute 
Istatymas apie atsargos karininkus ir karo valdininkus 
Number 22 Statute 272 
B. Regulations Governing Reserve Officers Exercises 
Atsargos karininku pratimu taisykles 
Number 261 Statute 1687 
v. 
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COURTS-MARTIAL 
A. Military Court Statutes 
Karo teismo istatai 
Number 5 Statute 62 
8 103 
23 985 
273 1767 
B. Provisional Army Court Statutes 
Laikini armijos teismo istatai 
Number 10 Statute 130 
273 1768 
c. Amendment to the Provisional Court Statutes 
Laikinuju kariuomenes teismo istatu pakeitimas 
Number 10 Statute 130 
273 1768 
459 3199 
463 3249 
634 4593 
VI. MILITARY ORGANIZATION 
A. Military Leadership Statute 
Kariuomenes vadovybes istatymas 
Number 465 Statute 3259 
VII. SOLDIERS IN POLITICS 
A. Statute Prohibiting Soldiers from Political Activity 
Draudziamasai istatymas dalyvavimui kariams politikoje 
Number 5 Statute 63 
VIII. ESPIONAGE 
A. Provisional Statute Governing the Dissemination of Military 
Information 
Laikinosios vyriausybes isakymas del ziniu platinimo apie 
kariuomene 
Number 4 Statute 52 
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IX. LAND REFORM AND THE MILITARY 
A. Statute Providing Land to Soldiers 
Istatymas kariskiams zeme aprupinti 
Number 8 Statute 95 
15 189 
23 284 
40 425 
47 465 
B. Amendment to the Land Reform Statute: Military Invalids 
Association 
Zemes reformos istatymo pakeitimas: Karo invalidu sajunga 
Number 602 Statute 4210 
c. Amendment to the Land Reform Statute: Lithuanian rlational 
Guard 
Zemes reformos istatymo pakeitimas: Lietuvos Sauliu Sajunga 
Number 559 Statute 3888 
602 4210 
D. Amendment to the Land Reform Statute: Military Volunteers 
Zemes reformos istatymo pakeitimas: Kariai savanoriai 
Number 640 Statute 4656 
X. NATIONAL GUARD OF LITHUANIA 
A. 
B. 
Lithuanian National Guard Statute 
Lietuvos Sauliu sajungos istatymas 
Number 70 Statute 
71 
National Guard Statute 
Sauliu sajungos istatymas 
Number 166 Statute 
490 
624 
637 
1154 
3423 
XI. CIVIL DEFENSE 
A. Statute for Protection Against Air Attack 
Istatymas apsaugos nuo pavojaus is lektuvu 
Number 479 Statute 3358 
493 3445 
517 3598 
B. 
c. 
D. 
E. 
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Regulations Governing the Establishment of Decontamination 
Teams 
Taisykles degazuotoju komandoms steigti 
Number 517 Statute 3597 
Compensation for Expenditures Associated with the Statute for 
Protection Against Air Attack 
Islaidu, susijusiu su Istatymu apsaugos nuo pavojaus is 
lektuvu vykdymu, apmokejimas 
Number 623 Statute 4442 
Amendment to the Statute for Protection Against Air Attack 
Istatymo apsaugos nuo pavojaus is lektuvu pakeitimas 
Number 479 Statute 3358 
'-' 
493 3445 
517 3598 
606 4247 
Regulations Governing the Organization of Air Surveillance 
Teams 
Orinio puolimo sekeju bureliams organizuoti taisykles 
Number 542 Statute 3767 
Regulations 
Equipment 
Degazuotoju 
Numper 
Governing the Acquisition 
turtui isigyti taisykles 
616 Statute 4360 
of Decontamination 
G. Regulations Implementing the Statute for Protection Against 
Air Attack 
Istatymui apsaugos nuo pavojaus is lektuvu vykdyti taisykles 
Number 517 Statute 35 98 
647 4719 
H. Regulations Governing Shelter Construction 
Sleptuvems rengti taisykles 
Number 647 Statute 4720 
543 3777 
I. Amendment to Regulations Governing Farm Shelters: Anti-
Aircraft Protection 
Trobesiu pastogems laikyti taisykliu pakeitimas: 
Prieslektuvine apsauga 
Number 551 Statute 3837 
647 4721 
673 4971 
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XII. ARMS FUND 
A. Arms Fund Statute 
Ginklu fondo statutas 
Number 494 Statute 3447 
502 3488 
B. Postal Tariff Amendment: Arms Fund 
Pasto tarifo pakeitimas: Ginklu fond as 
Number 535 Statute 3723 
c. Amendment to the Arms Fund Statute 
Gin kl u fondo statuto pakeitimas 
Number 494 Statute 3447 
633 4539 
D. Regulations Implementing the Arms Fund Statute 
Ginklu fondo statutui vykdyti taisykles 
Number 502 Statute 3488 
651 4752 
XIII. CIVIL CONTROLS AND CENSORSHIP 
A. Motion Picture Censorship Statute 
Kinofilmu cenzuros istatymas 
Number 390 Statute 2673 
B. Amendment to the Motion Picture Censorship 
Kinofilmu cenzuros istatymo pakeitimas 
Number 466 Statute 3265 
617 4374 
644 4695 
Statute 
c. Levies on Motion Picture Censorship and Advertising 
Kinofilmu cenzuros ir reklamos rinkliava 
Number 413 Statute 2861 
415 2882 
438 3056 
D. Instruction Implementing Motion Picture Censorship 
Kinofilmu cenzurai veikti instrukcija 
Number 464 Statute 3258 
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E. Statute for the Punishment of Participants and Accomplices in 
Foreign Organizations or Organizations of Occupied Lithuania 
Organizaciju, sudarytu okupuotoje Lietuvoje ar svetimose 
valstybese, dalyviams ir ju padejejams bausti istatymas 
Number 304 Statute 2033 
313 2115 
F. Association Statute 
Istatymas apie draugijas 
Number 15 Statute 185 
G. Press Statute 
Spaudos istatymas 
Number 17 
197 
232 
510 
Statute 210 
1339 
1510 
3538 
H. Amendment to the Association Statute 
Draugiju istatymo pakeitimas 
Number 15 Statute 185 
522 3626 
527 3662 
541 3760 
557 3870 
583 4054 
I. Regulations Implementing the Association Statute 
Taisykles draugiju istatymui vykdyti 
. Number 553 Statute 3843 
J. Regulations Amalgamating Similar Associations 
Artimus tikslus turincioms draugijoms jungti taisykles 
Number 573 Statute 3992 
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MILITARY PROVISIONS FROM THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 1928 AND 1938 
In total, Independen_t Lithuania lived under five Constitutions 
promulgated in 1918, 1920, 1928, and 1938. The latter two were 
promulgated by the Smetona regime following the 1926 coup. The Constitu-
tion of 1928 contained more paragraphs for the president than for the 
then-defunct Seimas, illustrating the presidential, not parliamentary, 
democracy which Lithuania lived under. It should also be noted that the 
military answered only to the president, not to any legislative over-
sight organ in addition to the chief executive. 
CONSTITUTION PROMULGATED 15 MAY 1928 
III. The Seimas 
33. The consent of the Seimas is required to begin or end war. 
Military operations can be begun without the consent of the Seimas 
if an enemy country declares war on Lithuania or an enemy, without 
declaring war, violates Lithuania's borders. 
34. In case of war, armed rebellion, or other dangerous disturbances 
in the State, the President of the Republic, on the reconunendation 
of the Cabinet, can implement a state of war or another special 
state in the entire State or parts thereof, temporarily halt 
constitutional guaranties of civil rights (12 [inviolability of 
the person], 13 [inviolability of residence], 15 [free, private 
post and communication], 16 [speech and press], 17 [assembly], 18 
[association] paragraphs), and take measures to resist or 
eliminate danger, using armed force, if necessary. 
IV. The Government 
50. The President of the Republic appoints and removes all senior 
officers and civil officials, whose appointment and removal is 
mandated to him by law. 
55. The President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of all the 
armed forces of the Republic. 
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V. The Judiciary 
70. Appropriate courts try soldiers for violations in 
conjunction with official service. Extraordinary courts may be 
established only in case of war or a state of war. 
VIII. Life of the Republic 
76. All citizens of the Republic participate in the defense of its 
territory according to the law. 
77. Armed forces are organized to defend the Republic. The organiza-
tion, recruitment, type, and term of service of the armed forces 
are defined by law. Protection and maintenance by the State are 
guaranteed to families of soldiers or to soldiers themselves, who 
lost their health or lives in connection with military service. 
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CONSTITUTION PROMULGATED 12 MAY 1938 
XVIII. The Defense of the State 
133. All citizens defend the State. 
The bulwark of defense is the military. 
134. Citizens are appropriately prepared to defend the State. 
The national economy is managed in conjunction with the needs of 
State defense. 
135. The President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of all 
armed forces. 
The structure of the armed forces, the organization and authority 
of its leadership are determined by law. 
136. The President of the Republic appoints and removes the Commander-
in-Chief of the Army. 
Sui ts brought against the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in 
connection with an official violation can be done so with the 
consent of the President of the Republic. 
137. There is established alongside the President of the Republic a 
State Defense Board to decide State defense matters. 
The composition and authority of the State Defense Board is 
determined by law. 
138. During a period of State Defense (Valstybes gynimo metu), State 
defense matters are managed by orders of the President of the 
Republic, which have the force of law. 
While not yet changed by order of the President of the Republic 
during such a time, laws regarding State defense matters are still 
in force. 
An order of the President of the Republic requires the signature 
of the Prime Minister. 
139. When there is a threat to public order or State defense, an 
extraordinary state - State of Readiness (Sustiprintas valstybes 
apsaugos metas) or a State of Defense (Valstybes gynimo metas) 
may be declared in the entire State or a portion thereof. 
An extraordinary state is declared and revoked by the President of 
the Republic on recommendation of the Cabinet. 
140. A declaration of an extraordinary state brings with it the 
authority to restrict or halt civil rights enumerated in the 
section dealing with citizen rights and obligations, except the 
right enumerated in § 20 [freedom of conscience]; the authority to 
use extraordinary means to defend the State and to place 
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extraordinary duties upon the residents. 
Extraordinary courts can be established by law during an 
extraordinary state. 
141. Mobilization, war, and peace are decided by the President of the 
Republic upon recommendation of the Cabinet. 
When the Seimas is functioning, the matter of peace requires its 
consent. 
142. Courts-martial try regular army soldiers and civilian accomplices 
for violations. 
143. The state protects and maintains soldier~ who lose their health in 
connection with military service, and also the families of 
soldiers who lose their lives or health in connection with 
military service. 
In cases determined by law, the State maintains citizens who lose 
their health in connection with participation in the defense of 
the State, and also the families of those citizens who lose their 
lives while participating in the defense of the State. 
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SENIOR CIVIL AND MILITARY OFFICIALS 
1. Antanas Smetona 
2. Aleksandras Stulginskis 
3. Kazys Grinius 
4. Antanas Smetona 
1. Augustinas Voldemaras 
2. Mykolas Slezevicius 
3. Pranas Dovydaitis 
4. Mykolas Slezevicius 
5. Ernestas Galvanauskas 
6. Kazys Grinius 
1. Ernestas Galvanauskas 
8. Antanas Tumenas 
9. Vytautas Petrulis 
1 o. Leonas Bistras 
11 • Mykolas Slezevicius 
12. Augustinas Voldemaras 
13. Juozas Tubelis 
14. Vladas Mironas 
15. Jonas Cernius 
16. Antanas Merkys 
1. Augustinas Voldemaras 
2. Silvestras Zukauskas 
3. Mykolas Velykis 
4. Antanas Merkys 
5. Povilas Zadeikis 
6. Pranas Liatukas 
1. Antanas Merkys 
8. Kostas Zukas 
9. Jonas Simkus 
PRESIDENTS 
4 April 1919 
19 June 1920 
7 June 1926 
19 December 1926 
PRIME MINISTERS 
11 November 1918 
26 December 1928 
12 March 1919 
12 April 1919 
7 October 1919 
22 June 1920 
22 February 1922 
18 June 1924 
3 February 1925 
25 September 1925 
14 June 1926 
17 December 1926 
24 September 1929 
24 March 1938 
30 March 1939 
21 November 1 939 
DEFENSE MINISTERS 
11 November 1 918 
19 December 1918 
24 December 1918 
16 March 1919 
21 August 1919 
1 0 October 1 91 9 
23 February 1920 
19 June 1920 
7 April 1921 
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19 June 1920 
7 June 1926 
17 December 1926 
15 June 1940 
26 December 1918 
12 March 1919 
12 April 1919 
7 October 1919 
22 June 1920 
22 February 1922 
18 June 1924 
3 February 1925 
25 September 1925 
14 June 1926 
17 December 1926 
24 September 1929 
24 March 1938 
27 March 1939 
21 November 1939 
17 June 1940 
19 December 1918 
24 December 1918 
16 March 1919 
21 August 1919 
1 o October 1919 
23 February 1920 
19 June 1920 
7· April 1921 
4 February 1922 
1 o. Balys Slizys 
11. Teodoras Daukantas 
12. Leonas Bistras 
13. Juozas Papeckys 
14. Antanas Merkys 
15. Teodoras Daukantas 
16. Augustinas Voldemaras 
17. Jonas Variakojis 
18. Balys Giedraitis 
19. Petras Sniuksta 
20. Stasys Dirmantas 
21. Stasys Rastikis 
22. Kazys Musteikis 
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4 February 1922 
20 June 1924 
25 September 1925 
15 June 1926 
19 December 1926 
11 August 1927 
6 October 1928 
24 September 1929 
28 June 1930 
13 June 1934 
2 November 1 935 
24 March 1938 
5 December 1938 
20 June 1924 
25 September 1925 
15 June 1926 
19 December 1926 
11 August 1927 
6 October 1928 
24 September 1929 
28 June 1930 
13 June 1934 
2 November 1935 
24 March 1938 
5 December 1938 
17 June 1940 
COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF 
1. Silvestras Zukauskas 27 May 1919 7 October 1919 
2. Pranas Liatukas 7 October 1919 23 February 1920 
3. Silvestras Zukauskas 23 February 1920 14 June 1920 
4. Jonas Galvydis-Bikauskas 14 June 1920 7 July 1920 
5. Kostas Zukas 7 July 1920 7 April 1921 
6. Kazys Ladiga 1 August 1920 5 October 1920 
1. Silvestras Zukauskas 6 October 1920 29 May 1921 
8. Juozas Kraucevicius 29 May 1921 11 February 1922 
9. Juozas Stanai tis 11 February 1922 5 June 1923 
1 o. Silvestras Zukauskas 5 June 1923 26 January 1928 
Vacant 26 January 1928 31 December 1934 
(Chief of Staff the senior uniformed officer) 
11. Stasys Rastikis 1 January 1935 1 January 1940 
12. Vincas Vi tkauskas 1 January 1940 17 June 1940 
CHIEFS OF STAFF 
1 ~ Jurgis Kubilius 23 November 1918 4 December 1918 
2. Pranas Liatukas 24 December 1918 4 March 1919 
3. Edvardas Adamkavicius 4 March 1919 26 April 1919 
4. Silvestras Zukauskas 26 April 1919 27 May 1919 
5. Mykolas Velykis 29 May 1919 7 October 1919 
6. Stasys Nastopka 7 October 1919 13 July 1920 
1. Maksimas Katche 13 July 1920 21 August 1920 
8. Birontas 21 August 1920 23 August 1920 
9. Konstantinas Klescinskas 23 August 1920 13 April 1921 
1 o. Maksimas Katche 13 April 1921 7 October 1922 
11 • Jonas Gricius 7 October 1922 6 November 1923 
12. Juozas Radus-Zenkavicius 6 November 1923 29 February 1924 
13. Jonas Gricius 29 February 1924 7 May 1925 
14. Kazys Ladiga 
15. Jonas Gricius 
16. Kazys Ladiga 
17. Kazys Skirpa 
18. Teodoras Daukantas 
19. Povilas Plechavicius 
20. Petras Kubiliunas 
21. Jonas Jackus 
22. Stasys Rastikis 
23. Jonas Cernius 
24. Stasys Pundzevicius 
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7 May 1925 
16 September 1925 
19 October 1925 
22 July 1926 
24 December 1926 
11 August 1927 
10 February 1929 
7 June 1934 
21 September 1934 
1 January 1935 
30 March 1939 
16 September 1925 
19 October 1925 
22 July 1926 
24 December 1926 
11 August 1927 
10 February 1929 
7 June 1934 
21 September 1934 
1 January 1935 
30 March 1939 
17 June 1940 
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